Financial liberalization in 1980s' Korea was very slow, slouching and fragmented. In addition to the legacy of the developmental state in the 1970s which dominated finance sector, the conflict between the reform groups and opposition groups halted the financial liberalization process. This paper argues that as for the final goal of financial liberalization and reform, there was consensus among the major concerned group. However, as for the details and speed of the liberalization, each group had different policy options. The state was unable to coordinate policy differences and to implement comprehensive financial liberalization package which covered privatization of banks, interest rate liberalization, policy loans, foreign exchange control, etc. It was not the pressure from abroad but the conflict within Korea that determined the content and speed of financial liberalization in the 1980s. The legacy of the fragmented financial liberalization in the 1980s was handed over to Kim Young Sam government in the early 1990s which executed 'delayed reform' and subsequently to Kim Daejung government which executed 'forced reform' by the recommendation of IMF after the 1997 crisis.