This paper tries to explore main contents, problems, and political implication of the China’s SOE Reforms in “the New Normal”. Especially regarding reform, it focuses on corporate governance and asset management in the SOEs. The third plenum of the 18th CCP Congress held in November 2013 promulgated a grand reform blueprint, the “Decision on Major Issues Concerning Comprehensively Deepening Reforms(hereafter the Decision) in order to reform SOEs. Roughly two years later, on 13 September 2015, the “Guideline to Deepen SOE Reform”(hereafter Guideline) announced by CCP put a series of specific contents and guideline of reform. The two polices, Decision and Guideline highlighted crucial role played by market as well as corporate governance and state asset management. But at the same times, these polices not only sent conflicting signals on the role of the market and state, but also further heightened the conceptual contradictions on the direction and principle of China’s SOE reforms. These phenomena have managed and reinforced so called corporate governance system of non-separation between government and market with Chinese Characteristics. This paper also examines reform of China’s SOEs under the Xi’s regime and local government’s countermeasures against it in the New Normal. Among local governments, especially this article introduces the case of the City of Shenzhen as a pioneering model in relation to marketization of corporate governance in China.