

Politics of Nationalism in China*

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This paper serves three purposes. First, it will give an overview of the rise and development of nationalism in modern China. Second, it will examine two main characteristics of Chinese nationalism, namely, antiforeignism and culturalism. These two characteristics arise out of the peculiar historical circumstances of China and represent the uniqueness of Chinese nationalism. Third, it will analyze the politics of reunification of mainland China with Taiwan in the context of nationalism. The paper will conclude by assessing the role of antiforeignism and culturalism in contemporary Chinese politics.

Overview of Chinese Nationalism

Nationalism in modern China, in theory and in practice, began with China's contact with the West in the nineteenth century, and has since played an important part in its external as well as internal politics.

Nationalism in the form of ethnocentrism, based on cultural and historical developments, can be traced back to earlier times, long before the coming of the Westerners. In the early Qing period Chinese scholars like Huang Zongxi (1610~1695) and Gu Yanwu (1613~1682) rejected the alien rule of the Manchus. They opposed vehemently to the political oppression of the early Qing period and helped to stimulate the growth of Chinese national feeling against foreign conquest.¹⁾ It has been pointed out that nationalistic thinking in China even appeared as early as in the Spring and Autumn Period (770~476 B.C.) when

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1) Liao Kuang-sheng, *Antiforeignism and Modernization in China, 1860~1980*, 2nd ed., Hong Kong: Chinese University Press, 1986, p. 56.

China was invaded by barbarians.²⁾

The major events that had helped to shape the development of nationalism and to impinge on China's external and internal politics since the nineteenth century include, among others, the Opium War (1839~1842), the War with Britain and France (1856) and with other imperialist powers (1860~1900), the Taiping Rebellion (1850~1863), the Sino-Japanese War (1895), the Boxer Insurrection (1900), the Russo-Japanese War (1905), the establishment of the Republic of China (1911) and the subsequent mass movements against the West, the two World Wars, and the establishment of the People's Republic of China (1949).³⁾ All these events, in one way or another, helped to generate China's sense of antforeignism and to strengthen its determination to build a modern state, rid of undue foreign influence.

From a historical perspective, the development of nationalism in modern China can roughly be divided into five periods:⁴⁾ 1839 to 1900, 1900 to 1911, 1911 to 1919, 1919 to 1949, and 1949 to the present. The first period (1839~1900) may be called a period of national semi-consciousness or partial awakening: semi-conscious because China did not fully understand its position in the world. Its approach to Western learning was hesitant. The suppression of the Reform movement and the sanction of the Boxer insurrection were good indications of its lack of understanding of the West and its position in the world. Its awakening was partial because this awakening was limited to a small group of leaders, intelligentsia, officials, and the portion of the population affected or irritated by foreign aggression. In general, however, the mental state of the Chinese was undergoing a change in regard to things Western, from a state of indifference and superiority to a state consisting of mi-

2) Lee Guoqi *et. al.*, *Minzu zhuyi*(Nationalism), Taipei: Time Newspaper Publications, 1980, p. 20.

3) Tsang Chiu-sam, *Nationalism in School Education in China*, 2nd ed Hong Kong: Progressive Education Publishers, 1967, pp. 18~27.

4) Information of this periodization was taken and adopted from *ibid.*, pp. 27~28.

xed feelings ranging from hatred and fear to mystery and bewilderment.

The second period (1900~1911) began soon after China's defeat by Japan in 1895. It was not until the consequences of the Boxer insurrection in 1900 that China made a determined effort to embark on the road to modernization. Russo-Japanese War in 1905 confirmed the wisdom of adopting the plan for modernization and the doubled effort in this direction. China became more awakened: nationalism was not limited to a small group of leaders, but was shared by the upper class as well as the intellectual class. The element of anxiety was prevalent. But instead of holding aloof from the outside world with a feeling of fear and hatred, this period was one of imitation, receptiveness, assimilation and admiration of Western culture, particularly Western technology and education.

The third period (1911~1919) began with the birth of the Republic of China which released much suppressed energy, and it was a period of considerable optimism. People were hopeful of better things to come. The attitude toward the powers was a more friendly one as there was the feeling that China had at long last joined the "family of nations" after having been baptized in the name of democracy and parliamentarianism. During this period the middle class showed greater attachment to the ideals of nationalism.

The fourth period (1919~1949) was a period of great political turmoil. Experiences of the two World Wars and increased knowledge of Western culture and international politics awoke the Chinese government to the fact that the struggle for power governed relations among states. China grew to be skeptical of capitalistic powers and sought assistance from the Soviet Union. The May Fourth Movement in 1919 led by students and educators in Beijing called for the study and practice of science and democracy, and anti-Japanese feelings were running high. Nationalism began to spread over to the common people, at least in the urban areas and treaty ports. These people were but scarcely concerned in the previous periods. Three types of nationalism were

identified by Professor Stuart Schram during this period:⁵⁾ (a) tradition-oriented or conservative nationalism, which attempted to revitalize tradition in order to strengthen the nation; (b) radical Westernization, which tended to blame China's ill largely on itself and to propose learning from the West as a panacea, and (c) revolutionary nationalism, which attributed China's misfortunes to the imperialists and proposed turning the tables on the West by a radical transformation of Chinese society so as to create a dynamism equivalent to that of the West. The third type of nationalism was embraced by Mao Zedong and his fellow revolutionaries; they were able to mobilize the peasantry to revolt successfully against the Nationalists.⁶⁾ Traces of these three types of nationalism are still prevalent today as China makes its progress toward modernization.

The fifth period (1949~present) marks the division of China into two parts: the People's Republic of China (PRC), established in 1949, is in control of the mainland and the Republic of China (ROC) was forced to take refuge in Taiwan. Under communist rule, the PRC first sided with the Soviet Union in the 1950s against the United States, then relations with the Soviet Union turned sour as well in the 1960s. The United States was branded as imperialists and the Soviet Union as revisionists. Rapprochement with the United States began in the early 1970s and relations with the Soviet Union improved toward the end of the 1980s. Domestically, revolutionary nationalism plunged China into mass movements and turmoils of one kind or another, such as the Great Leap Forward in late 1950s and the Cultural Revolution in the late 1960s, until the adoption of the Open Door policy in the late 1970s. The moderate success achieved in modernization in the mid-1980s led professor Michel Oksenberg to describe China's nationalism as confident

5) Stuart R. Schram, *The Political Thought of Mao Tse-tung*, rev. ed., New York and London: Frederick A. Praeger, 1969, p. 19.

6) See Chalmers A. Johnson, *Peasant Nationalism and Communist Power: The Emergence of Revolutionary China, 1937~1945*, Stanford: Stanford University Press, especially pp. 19~30.

nationalism.⁷⁾ On the other hand, the ROC carried out land and other economic reforms and gradually built up a sizeable economy. Diplomatically, it has been forced by the PRC into isolation, but it finds alternative ways to maintain substantial relations with over 120 countries. Both the PRC and ROC claim to be the legitimate government of all China, including island Taiwan, and the reunification of the whole China becomes a hotly contested political issue between the two parties in the process of nation-building.

Antiforeignism and Nationalism

The development of nationalistic thinking is in direct proportion to the amount of suppression exerted by foreign countries: the more suppressed a nation is, the more developed will be its nationalistic sentiments.⁸⁾ Anti-foreign activities are the natural response to outside oppression. Very often, antiforeignism is equated with Chinese nationalism but the difference between the two is more subtle.

Antiforeignism can be regarded as a mass sentiment caused by economic, political, and military suppression by foreign countries. It is a defense of national interests, including culture and tradition.⁹⁾ It originates from a common attachment to a country, and is not a direct result of acculturation, which is a process that brings about modifications in a traditional culture as a result of contact with an advanced society. There is no dispute that cultural or racial conflicts took place after increasing contacts with the West in the mid-nineteenth century. antiforeignism in China, however, is not a nativistic movement aimed at preserving Chinese tradition and culture alone. It is more political in nature. Cultural or religious conflicts can develop into vigorous

7) Michel Oksenberg, "China's Confident Nationalism," *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 65, No. 3, 1987, pp. 501~523.

8) Lee, *Minzu zhuyi*, p. 20.

9) Liao, *Antiforeignism and Modernization in China*, p. 10.

nation-wide antiforeignism only when they are motivated by nationalism.

Antiforeignism in China in the twentieth century is political and economic in nature since it closely relates to injustice and the attempt to change the status quo. Antiforeignism may decline or rise for political or economic reasons, and it usually cannot last too long if it is not constantly refueled by nationalism or ideology or manipulated by the government for various reasons. Unlike cultural conflict or religious conflicts, antiforeignism declines when political or economic conflicts are settled. Antiforeignism in China lasted more than a century, due to incessant aggression and threat from the West and the manipulation of the issue by the Chinese leadership.

During the latter part of the nineteenth century, the Chinese people initiated movements to demand their rights from the imperialists. Previously, antiforeignism sought mainly to deny foreigners power and control in China. Up to the Boxer insurrection, anti-missionary incidents aimed only at destroying or eliminating things foreign; no constructive ideas were put forward. After the insurrection, an increased understanding of the West and an awakening to the immediate danger faced by China induced the Chinese people to begin to seek protection for national interests and the restoration of national rights. They demanded the control over railroads and mines and the abolition of the supervision of customs by Western powers. Most important of all, they demanded an end to unequal treaties and extraterritoriality. The significance of this period is clearly that antiforeignism was now backed by an upsurge in nationalism. And nationalism in China was represented unambiguously by strong and explicit articulation of ideas for national reconstruction.¹⁰⁾

Evidently, modern nationalism did not develop in China until the people recognized the reality of the formidableness of foreign powers. The presence of foreign military forces and incessant conflicts with the

10) *Ibid.*, p. 55.

Western imperialists and Japan in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century helped the Chinese develop nationalism. Thus, a sense of challenge was essential to China's nationalism, as aptly demonstrated by the Movement Resisting Russia of 1901-1905, the Anti-America Boycott of 1905, the Movement for the Recovery of National Rights of the 1910s and 1920s, and the antforeign boycotts of 1908-1926.¹¹⁾

Antiforeignism in the twentieth century differed from that of the late nineteenth century in some ways: twentieth-century antiforeignism interacted with nationalism whereas late nineteenth-century antiforeignism was fueled by ethnic and cultural conflicts. Second, antiforeignism in the early twentieth century involved a greater number and variety of people and became a nation-wide movement whereas nineteenth century antiforeignism was scattered and related to local or regional incidents. Third, antiforeignism in the early twentieth century was constructive in the pursuit of national interests and was no longer oriented toward the expulsion of foreigners from China; instead it was part of the struggle for national equality and independence.¹²⁾

The study of the development of antiforeignism in China during the last century makes clear that both internal and external factors account for antiforeignism's continuous development over the last hundred years. In the early twentieth century, antiforeignism was strengthened by increasing pressure and interference from the West as well as by the emergence of nationalism among the Chinese people. There is little doubt that antiforeignism became an important political sentiment in Chinese society. The Kuomintang (KMT) government utilized anti-foreign sentiment to defend Chinese tradition and culture, while the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) made it the foundation for revolution. In different ways, both the KMT and the CCP pledged to oppose imperialism.¹³⁾

11) *Ibid.*, pp. 57~79.

12) *Ibid.*, p. 79.

13) *Ibid.*, p. 235.

From 1949 up to the early 1970s, antiforeignism was maintained at a relatively high level, especially when an authority crisis occurred, as in 1959-62 and 1966-70. During these periods, endless struggles pushed the country's ideology to leftist extremes and led to strong feelings of antiforeignism, which in turn isolated China from the West. Thus progress toward modernization was impeded.

In the early 1970s the people's response to continuous political struggles and movements in class struggle generated an apathetic attitude toward political movements which led to a decline in antiforeignism. American de-escalation in the Vietnam War and its policy of rapprochement toward China strongly encouraged this trend. Later the Four Modernization programs further contributed to the decline of antiforeignism. In spite of these, leftism and antiforeignism were not actually halted until the death of Mao Zedong in 1976, followed by the arrest of the "gang of four". Since then, tremendous efforts have been made to reduce the reappearance of authority crisis by stressing the development of political stability and unity. Meanwhile, antiforeignism has also been diminished by reducing media attacks on the West and the Soviet Union, and by eliminating antiforeign demonstrations. These efforts have been made in order to forge a closer relationship with the outside world, especially the West, and to stabilize the internal situation.

At the current stage, China's modernization may achieve its expected objectives only if the authority crisis and antiforeignism are held at bay. Undoubtedly, an effective political system is badly needed to ensure that any authority crisis or any antiforeign movement can be brought under control. However, like modernization at other times and in other times and in other places, modernization in China may cause social changes, frustrations, and demands for political participation. Subsequently, these may result in the development of renewed antiforeignism and a new authority crisis.¹⁴⁾ The events surrounding the crackdown

14) *Ibid.*, pp. 240~242.

of prodemocracy movement in Tiananmen Square on June 4, 1989 illustrate this possibility.

Culturalism and Nationalism

Apart from anteforeignism, culturalism is another important feature of Chinese nationalism. The element of culture distinguishes the Chinese understanding of nationalism from that of the West. This difference in perception has influenced and is continuing to influence the thinking and practice of Chinese nationalism and nation-building, including the effort to reunite China.

Culturalism can be understood in terms of the inherited pride of one's own culture. At times, culture as the way of life has been more fundamental than nationalism in China. The early Chinese emperors, the Sons of Heaven, asserted their rule over all mankind with little distinction over race or language. Barbarian invaders who from time to time succeeded them found it expedient to continue and reinforce the established tradition. To any Confucian ruler, Chinese or alien, the important thing was the loyalty of his administrators and their proper conduct according to the Confucian code, so that the Chinese political system as a whole could be maintained in a stable order.¹⁵⁾

In China the concept of state has remained ideally coterminous with the whole culture—polity and culture have almost fused. This may be seen in the way that China since the unification of 211 B.C. has clung to two great political myths: the unity of the Chinese empire and its superiority to all outsiders.¹⁶⁾ Even today, both the PRC and the ROC aspire to the ideal of one China, despising any suggestions of “two Chinas,” or “one China, one Taiwan.”

15) John King Fairbank, *The United States and China*, 3rd ed., Cambridge, Massachusetts and London, England: Harvard University Press, 1972, pp. 88~89.

16) *Ibid.*, p. 89.

A sense of rivalry is the essence of nationalism, but a genuine, old-fashioned Chinese culturalist had no conception of rivalry. Chinese civilization was all the civilization there was. Barbarian conquerors were generally so effectively denationalized by the compelling attractiveness of Chinese culture that the Chinese failed to think in national terms. Even the concept of barbarians was devoid of any racial or nationalistic imperative, as it merely conveyed to the native-born that the people so designated stood outside the pale of Chinese cultural and linguistic refinement.¹⁷⁾ Nationalism was lacking because the imperial court, not the nation-state, was the traditional focal point of allegiance and because the Chinese had been unaware that significant peoples other than themselves existed in the world.¹⁸⁾ Under the influence of the literati in pre-modern China, the Chinese thought of their country as a world (*tianxian*) rather than as a nation (*quojia*); nationalism and, by extension, patriotism were found to be missing.¹⁹⁾

Culturalism played a very important part in shaping the traditional Chinese world view. This view was Sinocentric in scope and orientation, heavily laden with the thinking of concentric and cultural zonation as a measure of closeness to the Chinese empire.²⁰⁾ No linkage existed between domestic and foreign policy, and the concept of the balance of power or alliance was alien to traditional Chinese officials, since there had never been an ally or enemy of equal status or strength in the Sinic system of international relations. The same view left no room for egalitarianism in international intercourse. The legitimacy of this Sinocentric world view rested more on moral virtue than on military might,

17) Samuel S. Kim, *China, the United Nations, and World Order*, Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1979, p. 24.

18) Joseph R. Levenson, *Liang Ch'i-Ch'ao and the Mind of Modern China*, Berkeley, Los Angeles, and London: University of California Press, 1970, pp. 101~111.

19) *Ibid.*, p. 112.

20) This paragraph summarizes the analysis of Kim, *China, the United Nations, and World Order*, pp. 41~47.

China's unresponsiveness to the West was deeply rooted in the Confucian tradition. Owing to the excessive reliance on ritual, harmony, and hierarchy in the social process, the Chinese were poorly equipped to cope with conflicts generated from within or outside. China the Western powers to make whatever adjustments were necessary to fit their relations into the hierarchical image of the Chinese world order. In the ensuring confrontation between the two world views, Chinese culture was no match for Western arms. Amid the wreckage of this traditional Chinese world view was born Chinese nationalism. The stimulus for this birth came from the encroachment of European imperialism on the Chinese tributary system, and it was imperial Japan who acted as a catalytic agent for this birth. The Chinese people in the nineteenth century thus entered the modern world singularly backward in one of its major qualities, the spirit of nationalism in the Western sense, yet in their twentieth-century revolution the inherited pride of culture or culturalism has inspired a new cultural nationalism.²¹⁾ However, if Chinese nationalism did exist in any significant form, it was introspective, looking inward for an explanation of its weakness and unfitness and for a way toward strength.²²⁾ Patriotic and loyal devotion to the conception of an abstract sovereign state did not figure prominently until after the establishment of the Republic of China.²³⁾

Reunification and Nationalism

A unified, independent state is arguably the most important aspiration of nationalism, but China today is a divided country and Taiwan is ruled by the Kuomintang. This symbolizes that the civil war, which

21) Fairbank, *The United States and China*, p. 89.

22) Jerome Ch'en, *China and the West*, London: Hutchinson, 1979, pp. 277~278.

23) Cyprus Henderson Peake, *Nationalism and Education in Modern China*, New York: Howard Fertig, 1970, pp. 120~121.

was started originally between the KMT and CCP, is not yet over.²⁴⁾ Both the PRC and ROC have expressed their desire to achieve reunification of the country under its own terms.

The PRC offers the "one country, two systems" concept for renification, a concept originally designed to accommodate the recovery of its sovereignty over Hong Kong by 1997. The official signing of the Sino-British Agreement on Hong Kong in December 1984 was hailed time and again by Beijing leaders as a successful outcome of the application of this concept. The true test of the concept, however, will not come until after 1997 as there is no precedent in the history of mankind to show that a thriving capitalistic society can be successfully absorbed by or accommodated within an authoritative socialist society. The PRC claimed that the concept is also applicable to Taiwan, with more generous terms than those for Hong Kong. In addition to its present economic and social systems, Taiwan will be allowed to maintain its armed forces. How generous the terms are for Taiwan's control of its external relations have not been clearly spelt out, except for the vague promise that China will grant Taiwan "considerable diplomatic powers to handle some external affairs."²⁵⁾

China's proposal may in fact offer Taiwan a weaker position than Hong Kong at least in one important aspect. To the extent that the Hong Kong Agreement is one between two sovereign governments, the Hong Kong question at least has the appearance of being internationalized. An agreement between the CCP and KMT, short of adding some special international supervision, would be purely a domestic accord completely dependent on the goodwill of the PRC government.²⁶⁾

24) Liao Kuang-sheng, "The 'One Country Two Systems' and the Unification of Taiwan," unpublished paper, 1989, p. 1.

25) Yan Jiapi, "Concept Points Way to Reunification," *Beijing Review*, Vol. 28, No. 14, April 8, 1985, p. 23.

26) Michael C. Davis, "A State is a State! Or is it? Taiwan?" unpublished paper, 1989, p. 8.

At the heart of the "one country, two systems" concept is the issue of national sovereignty: the PRC is to be the sole central government and Taiwan a regional one; only the former is responsible for conducting diplomacy with foreign countries. For Taiwan to accept such terms would be unthinkable because acceptance would mean the surrendering of its present international legal status. The most flexible position that Taiwan seems to be prepared to consider is a "multisystem nation" concept, originally proposed by a Taiwan scholar cum official named Wei Yung, or its latest variant "one country, two equal governments". This concept, in a nutshell, calls for the recognition of the sovereignty of both China and Taiwan by the international community until reunification is eventually achieved.

Each of the two separate sets of concepts has been rejected by the opposite side, for reasons that have been analyzed by many scholars interested in this area. Simply put, China rejects a "mult-system nation" and its many variants, including the formation of a "great China confederation", on the ground that they are tantamount to the creation of "two Chinas" or "one China, one Taiwan." Taiwan, on the other hand, condemns the "one country, two systems" as a "united front tactic" to confuse the free world by creating an illusion of peaceful coexistence.

Bitter polemics apart, it is clear that both China and Taiwan are working toward some sort of "one country, two systems,"²⁷⁾ but they differ in their interpretations of the words "country" and "systems". In the case of China, one country means one sovereign entity under the central government in Beijing, and two systems mean two social entities: one in mainland China and the other in Taiwan. In the case of Taiwan, however, one country means one cultural entity and two systems mean two sovereign entities, separate and independent.²⁸⁾

27) See *Jinshi niandai (The Nineties)*, Hong Kong, May 1985, p. 49; and *The Economist*, London, October 19, 1985, p. 25.

28) Gerald Chan, *China and International Organizations: Participation in*

Both agree on one cultural entity and two social entities but disagree on the number of sovereign entities. The present situation is that there are two sovereign entities—a reality that China dismisses. China wants to extend its sovereignty over Taiwan, whereas the latter refuses to surrender its to the former. Short of an all-out military solution (which is unlikely to happen according to the analyses of leading strategists in this field),²⁹⁾ and barring unforeseen fundamental changes in Sino-America-Taiwan relations or in domestic circumstances in China and Taiwan, the present situation is likely to persist. Any non-military alternative can hardly avoid addressing the problem of how sovereignty is to be *shared* on a positive-sum basis with *increased* benefits to both, in the interim period leading up to some possible agreement toward full reunification.

What is needed at present if a sustainable dialogue is to be established between China and Taiwan is something rudimentary, mutually beneficial and based on a proven track record; something that can be built upon step-by-step so that trust and confidence can be fostered; something that both sides can retreat from to their initial positions without suffering too much damage should the attempt fail; and something that carries a certain amount of international check and balance so that both sides would act fairly according to some agreed rules.

At the moment the only measure that comes close to fitting this bill is the Olympic formula (made in 1979 in the International Olympic Committee) or the ICSU formula (devised in 1982 in the international Council of Scientific Unions) which is gaining popularity among inter-

Non-Governmental Organizations Since 1971, Hong Kong: Oxford University Press, 1989, pp.163~165.

- 29) See Ralph N. Clough, "The Republic of China and the World 1949~1981," in Chiu Hungdah and Leng Shao-chuan (eds.), *China, Seventy Years After the 1911 Hsin-Hai Revolution* (Charlottesville: University Press of Virginia, 1984), pp.524~557; Shaw Yuming, "Taiwan: A View from Taipei" and Huan Guocang, "Taiwan: A View from Beijing," *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 63, No. 5, 1985, pp.1050~1063 and 1064~1080.

national non-governmental organizations. The number of these organizations having members from China and Taiwan has been increasing; available statistics show that it rises from 105 in 1983 to over 200 at present. A similar arrangement was made in 1986 in the Asian Development Bank, a regional intergovernmental organization, whereby both China and Taiwan can become members of the bank, the former registered under the official name of the People's Republic of China and the latter under the name of Taipei, China. The PRC, however, stresses that this arrangement is a unique case which should not be applied to other organizations.

China welcomes Taiwan's compliance of the Olympic formula in seeking membership of international organizations. Taiwan, however, was very cautious at first. Its previously stated policy was to limit the applicability of the formula to sporting organizations so that its young people could have the chance to compete in international sports. In practice, however, Taiwan also went along with the ICSU formula to expand its participation in scientific organizations and with similar methods to maintain or acquire membership of others. At Present, Taiwan is very outward in developing its external relations. Under the so-called "flexible diplomacy"³⁰⁾ it is trying to establish diplomatic relations with countries that have official ties with the PRC. Two recent successful cases involve Grenada and Liberia: the former established diplomatic relations with the ROC on July 20, 1989 causing the PRC to sever its relations with the country nineteen days later; the latter established similar relations with the ROC on October 9, 1989. This time the PRC cut off its relations with Liberia on the following day.³¹⁾

30) See Gerald Chan, "Flexible Diplomacy': Taiwan's New Diplomatic Strategy," Working Paper No. 21, Centre for Contemporary Asian Studies, The Chinese University of Hong Kong, July 1989.

31) *Xianggang shibao* (*Hong Kong Times*), October 3, 1989, p.1; *Ming bao*, Hong Kong, October 10, 1989, p.9.

All these activities, together with increasing people-to-people contacts and bilateral trade, necessitate Taiwan to adjust its policy of "no contact, no negotiation, no compromise" with China to "no avoidance, no retreat," and to handle flexibly individual cases according to prevailing circumstances.³²⁾

Thus, progress made in the area of international organizations and in non-governmental activities has so far brought China and Taiwan closer, representing an elementary yet positive step in the long process toward a possible reunification.

Conclusion

The two characteristics of Chinese nationalism examined above, anti-foreignism and culturalism, are still very much alive today in Chinese political life, although in varying degrees of intensity and under different circumstances. One has to witness the response of the Chinese government to the reactions of Western countries over the June 4 incident in Tiananmen Square. The PRC has accused Western support to the pro-democracy movement and the subsequent sanctions of trade and arms sales to China as interference in its internal affairs. Anti-Western rhetoric is once again coming to the fore, although in some instances in a rather subdued manner. While maintaining that the country will continue its reform programs and to open up to the outside world, it has already diverted some of its earlier neglected attention to the Third World by starting a series of foreign visits to African and the Middle East countries by highranking Chinese officials.

Culturalism is unlikely to fade away as China strives toward modernization. The dilemmas posed by the age-old dialectics between *yin* and *yang* and between "Chinese Knowledge as essence" and "Western know-

32) *Zhongyang ribao* (Central Daily News), int. ed., Taipei, March 2, 1985, p. 1.

ledge as tools" is very much evident in China's development, leading to a zig-zag path of progress or a "two-step forward, one-step back" situation.

Even in China's effort to reunify Taiwan with the mainland, these two characteristics are still apparent. The PRC knows full well that the resolution of the so-called "Taiwan problem" requires the understanding of the United States because through the Taiwan Relations Act, the United States is maintaining *de facto* official relations with the ROC. Yet the PRC has time and again warns the United States to stop its interference in the matter. This antiforeign element exists even though the PRC realizes that the resolution of the issue can hardly avoid some sort of U.S. involvement.

Although the PRC policy appears to be fueled by some form of nation-state based nationalism,³³⁾ it is quite clear that the element of Chinese culture is ever present. Both the PRC and the ROC share a rich cultural tradition, and this deep sense of cultural attachment is evident in the fact that both concur on one cultural entity that is supposedly covering both the mainland and Taiwan. It is nationalism in the Social Darwinian sense that contributes to the unyielding positions adopted by both as regard to the number of political entities. In this big gap between the Chinese and Taiwanese understanding of a future China lies the crut of the reunification problem.

33) Davies, "A State is a State," p. 29.