

From an Authoritarian Party-State to a Democratic and Competitive Party System

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I. Introduction

What happens to a political system of developmental authoritarianism once development becomes well advanced? This paper will address this problem through a case study of political change in Taiwan since 1968. Taiwan has clearly been a rapidly developing or modernizing area during the past three decades. It has gone from a relatively traditional, poor, rural, agraria nsociety to a modern, affluent, urban, industrialized society. The most salient aspect of Taiwan's development is, of course, its fast and steady economic growth. No less apparent than economic growth are indicators of increased social mobilization, e.g., mass media exposure, voting participation, higher education urbanization and job mobility. This process of modernization or development has occurred in a climate of long-term political stability. Western scholars have paid little attention to Taiwan in the past, and if there is any attention it is mainly focused on socio-economic aspects. So far, no serious study has been done on the evolution of the political system and especially on the changing role of the ruling party in Taiwan.

Since 1968, the political system in Taiwan has undergone many important changes. Political recruitment has been expanded to include many new groups into the ruling party and the government. Innovative technocrats have become dominant in the political elite. Political

participation has increased while electoral competition has become more intense, and government policy-making has become more pluralistic and responsive. These changes culminated in the dramatic reforms of 1986~88 in which plans were announced to end martial law, allow the formation of opposition political parties, and lift the ban on strikes, demonstration, and the publication of new newspapers. These are probably the most far-reaching political reforms ever undertaken by an authoritarian party-state which usually denies the validity of dissent and impedes opposition.

This paper attempts to analyze Taiwan's pattern of political development and the above-mentioned reforms in light of relevant Western theories. The paper focuses on the transformation of the Nationalist Party (Kuomintang or KMT), the ruling party and central political organization in Taiwan, as it changes, in conjunction with the rest of the political system and in response to socio-economic development. The central thesis is that the KMT has gradually transformed itself from a revolutionary and exclusionary party into a pragmatic and inclusionary party during the past three and half decades and that it has done so in response to the changing demands of the electorate. The one-party system has come to the threshold of a competitive party system. The most important and dramatic changes have occurred since 1968. Due to limited space and time, I will focus on this period and treat, only briefly, the pre-1968 legacy as background.

II. The Relevant Literature and Theoretical Framework

There is a substantial body of literature that deals with the evolution of authoritarian, developmental one-party regimes. Although various theorists address different kinds of problems and analyze different kinds of regimes, at least four major theories provide insights which converge upon a central theory of the political development of authoritarian reg-

imes after modernization is well advanced. Together they shed light on Taiwan's case and provide the theoretical framework for this study.

1. Samuel P. Huntington divides the evolution of one-party systems into three periods: (1) transformation, characterized by ideology and autocratic leader; (2) consolidation, characterized by pragmatism and institutionalization; (3) adaptation, characterized by innovative technocrats, interest groups, critical intelligentsia, and popular participation. Huntington predicts the following characteristics for the adaptation period: (1) the emergence of a new, innovative, technicalmanagerial class; (2) the development of a complex group structure, typical of a more industrial society, whose interests have to be related to the political sphere; (3) the re-emergence of a critical intelligentsia apart from and, indeed, increasingly alienated from the institutionalized structures of power; (4) the demand by local and popular groups for participation in and influence over the political system; and (5) the revolutionary or exclusionary party will be transformed into an established or inclusionary party.¹⁾

2. Giovanni Sartori divides one-party systems into (1) one-party totalitarian, (2) one-party authoritarian, and (3) one-party pragmatic. The totalitarian single party is strongly ideologized, highly coercive, extractive, mobilizational, and bent on imposed development. It is totalitarianistic and ruthlessly destructive of both subsystem and sub-group autonomy. The totalitarian dictator (or oligarchy) is arbitrary and unpredictable. The authoritarian single party is a control system of a lesser ideological intensity, with lower extractive and mobilizational capabilities, bent upon exclusionary policies. It impedes subsystem autonomy but tolerates, at least de facto, some kind of sub-group autonomy. It is unrestrained by countervailing international and domestic forces, but

1) Samuel P. Huntington, "Social and Institutional Dynamics of One-Party Systems," in Huntington and Clement H. Moore, eds., *Authoritarian Politics in Modern Society; The Dynamic of One-Party Systems*, (New York: Basic Books, 1970), pp. 32~40.

confined, nevertheless, within predictable limits of arbitrariness. Pragmatic unipartism relaxes all the foregoing traits and can be recognized by inclusionary or aggregative policies. It may be quite open to subgroup autonomy and may also allow room for some peripheral subsystem autonomy. With regard to arbitrariness, it is bounded by the constellation of forces with which it must bargain.²⁾

3. In their book, *No Easy Choice*, Huntington and Joan M. Nelson present several models that attempt in total to describe all possible variations in the pattern of political development. They divide development into two phases and offer two models for each phase. In phase I, a choice must be made between the "bourgeois" model and the "autocratic" model. If the bourgeois model is followed, political participation is expanded to the urban middle class and economic growth proceeds rapidly at the cost of income inequality. Alternatively, if the autocratic model is followed, power is concentrated and political participation by the middle class is suppressed. Economic growth is thus enhanced, and socio-economic equality may be promoted as a way of securing the support of the lower classes against the middle class. In phase II, a choice must be made between the "technocratic" model and the "populist" model. The technocratic model is characterized by low levels of political participation, high levels of investment (particularly foreign investment) and economic growth, and increasing income inequality. On the other hand, the populist model is characterized by high and increasing levels of political participation, expanding governmental benefits and welfare policies, increasing economic equality, and, if necessary, relatively low rates of economic growth. Whichever model a developing country follows in phase II, it will go through a "vicious circle" of either participation explosion or participation implosion (which means that the military seizes power and suppresses participation).

All four models are, of course, ideal types. However, Huntington and

2) Giovanni Sartori, *Parties and Party Systems* (Cambridge University, 1976). pp. 221~230.

Nelson assert that some countries have closely approximated one model or the other, and other countries have veered strongly in one direction or the other. They explicitly assert that in the 1950s and 1960s Taiwan tended towards the autocratic model.³⁾ The questions to be examined here are: which model did Taiwan follow in the 1970s and the 1980s? Did Taiwan approximate either one of the last two models in Phase II as outlined by Huntington and Nelson? Must Taiwan eventually go through either one of the vicious circles as asserted by Huntington and Nelson? Huntington and Nelson's models assume some incompatibility among possible goals of development. A choice must be made between equity and growth and between participation and stability. No easy choice indeed!

4. Taiwan, in the 1950s and 1960s, was fundamentally a development-oriented authoritarian system ruled by a single party. Although, it was not a military regime, it imposed martial law on the society and adopted an exclusionary and "bureaucratic" approach to policy making (as opposed to a more "political" approach through which policies are shaped by economic and political demands from different sectors of society) quite similar to the "bureaucratic-authoritarian" model formulated by Guillermo O'Donnell.⁴⁾ However, some of the military authoritarian regimes in South America (e.g., Brazil, Argentina and Chile) are undergoing a process of liberalization.

Douglas A. Chalmers and Craig H. Robinson identify four "principles" which distinguish liberal from authoritarian regimes: (1) Liberal regimes formally assign responsibility for making decisions to a series of institutions operating together through some formal procedure, while auth-

3) Samuel P. Huntington and Joan M. Nelson, *No Easy Choice* (Harvard University Press, 1976), pp.17~27.

4) Guillermo O'Donnell, *Modernization and Bureaucratic-Authoritarianism: Studies in South American Politics* (Institute of International Studies, University of California, Berkeley, Politics of Modernization Series, No. 9, 1973).

authoritarian regimes concentrate such responsibility in the hands of the authoritarian ruler(s); (2) To control political dissidence, liberal regimes depend on consensus-backed legal procedures, while authoritarian regimes employ repression emanating from the "will of the ruler(s)"; (3) Liberal regimes are pluralistic, with the participation and consultation of more and more diverse interests and groups than the "limited pluralism" of the authoritarian regime; (4) Liberal regimes encourage the articulation of many points of view, injecting diverse and conflicting information into the policy process, whereas authoritarian regimes sharply restrict the information flow, particularly its public form.⁵⁾

The above mentioned four theories deal with the transformation and evolution of a one-party system (Huntington and Sartori), the political development of a developing country (Huntington and Nelson), and the liberalization of an authoritarian regime (Charlmers and Robinson). Although they deal with various aspects of political development, these four theories converge upon a central theory which, simply put, states that an authoritarian and exclusionary party will become a pragmatic and inclusionary party and an authoritarian regime will be somewhat "liberalized" when socio-economic development becomes well advanced. Together they shed light on Taiwan's case and provide the theoretical framework for this paper. The central theory directs our attention to a number of political variables which are said to change as development proceeds. The present research focuses on six key variables in particular for investigation in the Taiwan case: inclusiveness, technocratic power, participation, party vs. government role, interest articulation, and political competitiveness.

5) Douglas A. Charlmers and Craig H. Robinson, "Why Power Contender Choose Liberalization: Perspectives from South America," *International Studies Quarterly*, Vol. 26, No. 1, (March 1982), pp. 3~36.

III. Empirical Findings and Answers to the Key Questions

1. Has the KMT changed its policies of political recruitment? Has it become more inclusive? The answer is a definite yes. The KMT used to recruit from among elites only (mainly intelligentsia, military officers, and government officials) in its mainland period (before 1949). In the 1950s and 1960s, although the KMT's membership had been increased and an effort was made to recruit members from other sectors in the society and local Taiwanese elite. In 1968, party membership amounted only to 6.89% of the population, 60% of the membership were still composed of politicians, civil servants and military officers, and 61% of all the members were mainlanders. The KMT in the first two decades in Taiwan remained elite-oriented and predominantly a mainlanders' party. However, in the 1970s and 1980s the party's membership has greatly increased (average annual growth rate exceeded 20%) and people from all walks of life have been recruited. By the end of 1983, KMT membership had reached 2,120,979, or 11.37% of the population and 19.45% of the electorate with 70% of them Taiwanese. The makeup of the membership has become younger, better educated and more balanced. In short, the KMT has transformed itself from an exclusionary party into an inclusionary party and from an elite party or cadre party into a mass party.

In addition to party membership, the KMT has also expanded other channels of political recruitment. Elections have been the most important (other than party membership) and hotly competed channel of political recruitment. Hundreds of thousands of people have been recruited into official positions through the electoral process. Through public services in local government, some recruits have become candidates for national leadership. Most elected officials and representatives have been Taiwanese, thus enhancing the representativeness and legitimacy of the ROC government. Examinations are open, fair and more equitable way of

recruitment. From 1968 to 1980, more than 200,000 people had passed civil service examinations and had been employed by various governmental agencies or government owned enterprises. As a result of these civil service examinations, government employees or bureaucrats have become better educated, more qualified and younger. As more competent personnel join the government, the capacity and performance of the government have been strengthened. The military is another important channel of political recruitment. In the past three and half decades, about 80,000 people have graduated from military and police academies. They continue to serve in the Armed Forces and civilian police stations. The older military officers have gradually been replaced by young, well educated, professionally minded, military academy graduates. Beginning in 1970, more Taiwanese became cadets and the number of middle and lower ranking Taiwanese officers increased. Some of these officers have now retired from military service and transferred into party or government service. In short, these three channels of political recruitment have reinforced the expansion of party membership by making the political system more inclusive.

2. Has the KMT and the ROC government changed their leadership composition? Has the national political elite makeup changed from party and military veterans to mainly technocrats? The answer is again a positive one. The members of the KMT's Central Standing Committee(CSC) and other decision-making bodies in the 1950s and 1960s were mainly revolutionary party elite and generals who specialized in ideology, propaganda and mobilization, and who excelled through hierarchical party apparatus and the armed forces. They were ideology oriented and concerned with national security and social stability. However, along with rapid economic development and social change, the national political elite has undergone a structural transformation. The technocrats who specialized in management and climbed up through government bureaucratic ladder began to emerge in the late 1960s. They became a mains-

trepreneur in the CSC in the mid 1970s and have dominated the CSC ever since. The technocrats first captured the cabinet (the Executive Yuan), then the CSC and then the other decision-making bodies. They are development oriented and concerned mainly with the development of Taiwan into a modern industrialized country.

The second most important structural change in the makeup of a political elite is the trend toward "Taiwanization." In the 1950s and 1960s, Taiwanese were encouraged to participate in local elections and politics but they were virtually excluded from national politics. Only a few Taiwanese who had had ties with the KMT during the mainland period were allowed to join the national elite. Even in the Taiwan Provincial Government Council, Taiwanese were the minority among the council membership. However, in the 1970s and 1980s, the number of Taiwanese members in the CSC (14 out of 31) and the cabinet (6 out of 18 now) has gradually increased. The Taiwan Provincial Government Council (TPGC) members and elected national level representatives since 1972 have been mostly Taiwanese. Taiwanese politicians with voter support owe their political prominence to various elections. They must respond to the demands from the electorate and favor a faster pace of democratization and liberalization. In addition, some prominent young social and natural scientists have been coopted into the elite circle and are now positioned in the second echelon of the national leadership. Since most of them have studied abroad and have been influenced by Western democratic theories, they also tend to favor democratization and liberalization. These two groups together are still a minority in the CSC (7 of the 14 Taiwanese members are technocrats and have never gone through electoral politics), but their influence will be felt in the near future.

3. Has the KMT changed its policies governing mass political participation? Has participation been expanded? The answer is that the KMT has gradually expanded political participation in Taiwan by its decisions

to hold various elections. Although the ROC government began to implement local self-government and to hold elections in 1950, political participation for the majority of Taiwanese in the 1950s and 1960s was limited due to the KMT leaders' concern for political stability and their mentality of political tutelage. Only the provincial assembly and local governments were open for Taiwanese participation. National elections were suspended for two decades (1948~1968). However, political participation in the 1970s and 1980s has been gradually and greatly expanded. In 1968, the KMT decided to hold a supplementary election for the National Assembly, Legislative Yuan and Control Yuan, thus broadening electoral participation to the national level. Five more national elections have been held since then, and the seats being contested have greatly increased.

The rate of participation, in terms of the number of candidates to the number of contested seats, both within the KMT and among the non-partisans increased manyfold. Electoral turn-out has steadily climbed. The electorate have become intensely interested in the electoral process and the outcome of the elections. Campaign speech rallies have had record turnouts. Campaign literature has been eagerly sought after and read voraciously. The KMT has changed its nomination policies and processes. Originally all KMT candidates were designated by higher echelon. Later the evaluation of local cadres was taken into consideration. Now the grass roots party members' opinions are solicited and beginning with the 1983 elections, a kind of "quasiprimary" system has been established to nominate party candidates. The "explosion" of participation has occasionally erupted into social unrests such as the Chungli Incident (1977) and Kaohsiung Incident (1979). However, these destabilizing events did not deter the KMT from further broadening the scope of participation.

4. Has the KMT changed its relationship with the government? Has the KMT reduced its role in decision-making vis-a-vis the government?

During the mainland period, the principle of party-government relationship was "to rule the state by the party," with the party's position above the government. In the 1950s and 1960s, the principle was "to guide the politics by the party," the party receded to the role of behind-the-scenes policy-making, but its dominant position over the government remained the same. Since the Tenth National Congress held in 1969, the KMT has changed its principle into "the separation between the party and the government" and since then the party (apparatchiki) has (have) gradually become policy coordinator(s) rather than policy maker (s). Members from the government sector (14) and representative bodies (5) have become the majority in the CSC (31 in total), and members from the party sector (3) have become the minority. The institutionalization of constitutional arrangement with a strong Executive Yuan (cabinet) responsible to the Legislative Yuan has gradually taken shape.

Election regulations have been drafted for every kind and for every level of elections. Some of these regulations (not laws) for local elections were drafted by the Taiwan Provincial Government and approved by the Taiwan Provincial Assembly. But the regulations governing central level elections in 1969, 1972 and 1975 were initiated by the party and drafted by the National Security Council (NSC), an extra-constitutional institution set up according to "Temporary Provisions," and by passed the legislature. The Election of Public Officials and the Recall Law, which were promulgated in 1980 and revised in 1983 and governs all elections, was drafted by the Ministry of Interior and enacted by the Legislative Yuan. The due process of enacting laws has been followed and the position of the legislature has been respected. The Labor Standards Law promulgated in 1984 is an even better case in point. During the protracted drafting, revising and legislative processes, the KMT legislators representing management and the KMT legislators representing labor fought a vehement battle in the Legislative Yuan. In addition, within the go-

vernment, the Ministry of Interior had championed the cause of labor and the Ministries of Economic Affairs and Finance had spoken for the interests of management. During the whole process, the party played the role of coordinator or mediator between the two sides. The Law was a result of compromise.

5. Has the KMT changed its policies toward interest groups? Has the KMT loosened its control over interest groups and allowed subgroup autonomy? In the past, interest groups were created, licensed, and subsidized by the KMT and the government; gradually, their formation has become more spontaneous and their functioning has become more autonomous. As economic development leads to social changes, many new interest groups have mushroomed, e. g. the consumer protection groups, environmental protection groups, public hazard prevention groups, etc.. Many existing groups, such as youth chambers of commerce, Lion's Clubs, and Rotary Clubs, have become more assertive in articulating their interests. These new and old interest groups have been active in lobbying activities. The KMT and the government must provide some channels for the articulation of these interests. The KMT can no longer claim to be the sole articulator of diverse interests. In fact, the KMT regime has gradually been transformed from a corporatist system in which major interest groups are incorporated into the system, only to be controlled and mobilized to achieve the overall goals set by the party, to a pluralist system in which the party becomes the representation and aggregation of diverse social interests, albeit the transformation is just beginning to take shape.

In response to pressures from rank and file union members as exemplified by the 1986 elections in which two KMT candidates were defeated by DPP candidates, the KMT and the government have adopted many liberal policies toward labor unions. The ban on strike was lifted. The four-level indirect election system for choosing union officials was changed into direct elections. The formation of new unions, unionization

of workers, and merger of small and weak unions into larger and stronger unions have been encouraged to make the unions more self sufficient. The government agency in charge of labor affairs has been elevated from the Department of Labor affairs under the Ministry of Interior to the Council for Labor Affairs under the Executive Yuan in order to provide better service to labor. It will soon be elevated again to the Ministry of Labor Affairs. When all these policies are put into effect, labor unions will certainly become more independent and autonomous.

In response to a series of spontaneous student movements and protests that occurred recently at the National Taiwan University, the KMT and the University authorities have also adopted many new policies toward student associations. The president of the United Student Association will be directly elected by all students. The Regulations on Training and Guidance (which regulates students' extra-curricular activities) will be revised to ensure the rights of assembly and association for the teachers and students. Articles in student magazines will be reviewed only by teachers. Students can have original articles printed without revision. A Taiwan University Forum was set up to allow students to deliver speeches on any issue without censorship. Finally, the KMT party office at the university has moved off campus. With many of these liberal policies already enacted, the university campus has already become much more free and democratic.

6. Has the KMT changed its policies toward opposition forces? Has the political system in Taiwan become more competitive? The answer here is also a positive one. The KMT's policy toward opposition forces has gradually changed from repression to toleration and now it has come to the threshold of legalizing the existence of an opposition party. The KMT's previous policy toward opposition forces was quite heavy-handed. During its mainland period, the KMT adopted policies of "no party outside the party" and "no faction within the party". It was organized and functioned as a non-competitive party-state system. It did not rec-

ognize the legal status of any other party until the war against Japan. In the 1950s and 1960s, except for the two minor "friendly" parties, the formation of new parties was banned by the imposition of martial law. There was virtually no organized opposition or competition in the various local elections. Electoral competition was limited between the KMT candidates and a handful of independent non-partisan candidates. In 1960, a few liberal mainlanders intellectuals involved with the journal *Free China* tried to unite with these independent Taiwanese local politicians in an attempt to form the China Democratic Party. However, the organizers Lei Chen and Fu Cheng were arrested, *Free China* was suspended, and the China Democratic Party aborted.

In the late 1960s and early 1970s, a new generation of young Taiwanese politicians who had grown up and received their education under KMT rule entered into politics. The TW (Tangwai or outside of the party) emerged in the 1972 elections. They won an unexpected victory in the 1977 election. They have received 25% to 30% of the votes in recent elections. The opposition forces have grown up through electoral competition. The KMT, by holding various elections and gradually expanding political participation from local to national level, tolerated the growth of the opposition forces. The TW has been allowed to publish magazines and books which were very critical of KMT policies. On September 28, 1986, the TW finally formed the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), a genuine opposition political party. Instead of banning the DPP and arresting opposition leaders, the KMT has speeded up a series of political reforms including legalizing the formation of new parties and has held regular communication meetings with the DPP leaders. The non-competitive party-state system has finally changed into a competitive party system.

N. Theories Confirmed and Disconfirmed by Taiwan's Case

1. The Taiwan case does confirm Huntington's analysis of the evol-

ution of one-party systems. The KMT regime went through transformation and consolidation periods in the 1950s and 1960s and since 1968 has entered the adaptation phase. An innovative technical-managerial class did emerge in the late 1960s and became the dominant political elite in the 1970s and 1980s. A complex group structure, typical of a more industrial society, has developed in Taiwan. Professional, industrial, commercial, labor, and other socioeconomic groups play a more and more important role in society and increasingly demand some channels for the articulation of their interests in the decision-making process. A critical intelligentsia alienated from the institutionalized structure of power reemerged after the consolidation of one-party regime. Critical journals such as *Free China*, *The Intellectual* and *The Taiwan Political Review* were all published by liberal intelligentsia. Most of the TW magazines were published and run by young, radical intellectuals, who graduated from graduate schools of social sciences. Finally, the demand by local and popular groups for participation in and influence over the political system is manifested in recent elections.

In short, the KMT has transformed itself from a revolutionary or exclusionary party (Huntington made a distinction between these two types, but the author thinks that the KMT at the beginning possessed characteristics of both types) into an established or inclusionary party. In addition to the four phenomena mentioned above, expanded party membership and other channels of recruitment provided even more convincing evidence of the transformation. However, Huntington predicted that the post-revolutionary party, no longer justified by an ideologically inspired mission, would be threatened with a legitimacy crisis. The most likely response by an established party, asserted Huntington, is institutionalization in an authoritarian rather than a democratic tradition. He said that "most established single-party systems, assaulted by the new problems and groups of a modern society, will remain undemocratic and fail to develop a political formula whereby power is dispersed and gr-

oup autonomy encouraged.”⁶⁾ The recent political development in Taiwan has refuted this pessimistic prediction. The development of interest groups has tended to be more spontaneous and autonomous than the “corporate centralism” suggested by Huntington. In addition, not the entire intelligentsia has been alienated and critical, most of the intellectuals are identified with the present system (they demand reform within the system, not reform the system) and some of them have been co-opted by the KMT into the circle of political elite. Most importantly, contrary to Huntington’s assertion, the KMT has tolerated the growth of the TW and the formation of the DPP. The political system in Taiwan has become more competitive and is now undergoing a democratization transition.

2. Sartori allows “system change” or “continuum” in the one-party or “party-state” system in an order of decreasing intensity of repression from totalitarian to authoritarian and then to pragmatic single party. From the data analyzed in this paper, the KMT has transformed itself from an authoritarian party into a pragmatic party. It has changed its policy toward opposition and dissent from repression to toleration. It has adopted inclusionary or aggregative policies, and it has allowed some subsystem and sub-group autonomy.

However, Sartori asserts that there is a discontinuity or a boundary between “party-state systems” and “party systems.” While a one-party system can be transformed into a hegemonic party (like the PRI in Mexico), the step that follows is a most difficult one. Sartori predicts that unipartism cannot transform itself “by itself” and “successfully” into a competitive system.⁷⁾ Yet, the formation of the DPP in September 1986 and the KMT’s accelerated pace of reform to legalize the opposition party (martial law was formally lifted in July 1987) have transformed the political system from a party-state system to a competitive party

6) Samuel P. Huntington and Clement H. Moore, *op cit*, p. 517.

7) Giovanni Sartori, *op cit*, pp. 273~284.

system (in which dissent is recognized and opposition is institutionalized, according to Sartori's definition). The DPP has achieved some degree of integration since its formation. A ruling party with a strong opposition party is not a hegemonic party system like Mexico. Although it is still far from a two-party system because the KMT still controls most of the political resources in Taiwan, a kind of one-and-a-half competitive party system is emerging.

3. The pattern of development in Taiwan in the 1950s and 1960s did approximate the autocratic model as outlined by Huntington and Nelson. During that time, mass political participation in Taiwan was limited to the local level, economic growth was enhanced, and land reform was carried out to promote socio-economic equality. However, Taiwan in the 1970s and 1980s did not follow either the technocratic model or the populist model. So far Taiwan has not gone through either one of the vicious circles predicted by Huntington and Nelson. Some electoral participation explosions and social unrests such as Chungli and Koahsiung Incidents did occur. However, these explosions did not overthrow the existing political system and alter fundamentally the social and economic structure. There has been a trend toward "depoliticization" and "professionalization" in the military. The chance for a participation implosion, in which the military seizes power and suppresses participation, is very minimal, if not impossible. Although the technocrats have become the dominant group among the political elite, they have not adopted the "technocratic" model. The technocrats in Taiwan have tried to promote both economic growth and income equality at the same time and have tried to maintain stability by gradually expanding participation.

4. A trend toward liberalization (increasing competitiveness) and democratization (increasing participation) as defined by Chalmers and Robinson has been taking place in Taiwan. The process has been going on slowly, cautiously and with twists and turns. The outcome will depend on many variables, domestic and international, and most impo-

rtantly on a debate among different groups within the political elite. As the situation stands now the trend seems to be irreversable. Decision-making responsibility has been shared by a series of institutions—the CSC, the cabinet, the NSC, the Party Work Conference, the Legislative Yuan, the Taiwan Provincial Government Council—operating through some formal procedures, rather than concentrated in the hands of the authoritarian ruler. The National Security Law has been reviewed and debated in the Legislative Yuan so that future control over political dissidence will depend on consensus-backed legal procedures. More and more diverse interests and groups have been consulted in the decision-making process, as the enactments of Labor Standards Law and the Election of Public Officials and the Recall Law attested. Political journals which are very critical of the KMT policies have been allowed to publish and the newspaper ban was lifted at the beginning of this year to encourage the articulation of many points of view, injecting diverse and conflicting information into the policy process. In short, the political system in Taiwan recently has shown some of the characteristics of liberal regimes outlined by Chalmers and Robinson and the policy making style has changed from an exclusionary or “bureaucratic” approach to a more inclusionary or “political” approach.

V. The New Hypotheses Generated by This Case Study

The Taiwan's case confirms many elements of the abovementioned four theories, yet it also disconfirms some elements. Contrary to Huntington and Sartori's assertions, the non-competitive party-state (or one-party) system in Taiwan is changing into some kind of competitive party system. In contrast with Huntington and Nelson's predictions, Taiwan has followed neither the technocratic model nor the populist model but has steered a middle way between the two models. If these theories do not apply to Taiwan, then some new hypotheses must be

generated to explain the uniqueness or deviance of the Taiwan's case.

One of the hypotheses generated is that technocrats, being pragmatic in mentality and oriented toward efficiency, can not repress participation and tolerate inequality for long. In contrast with the ideology oriented party apparatchiki and security conscious generals, the technocrats are development oriented. Their main concern (and responsibility) is economy, the questions of stability, equality and participation interest them in so far as these affect the economy. They favor peaceful and gradual steps toward democratizing and liberalizing the political system because economy grows best in a free and open society. However, they are against drastic and swift political changes because the economy will be rocked if social stability is greatly disturbed. The technocrats in Taiwan have come to believe that stability is best maintained through socio-economic equality and expanded political participation. A widening gap between rich and poor combined with restrictions on political participation will build up tensions and pressures which may be even more destabilizing. Thus, in order to avoid the vicious circle of "participation explosion" and "implosion" the technocrats may favor gradual and controlled expansion of political participation. Huntington and Nelson assume there is inherent incompatibility between growth and equality and between stability and participation. However, the relationship need not be so. Land reform, implemented in Taiwan in the 1950s, increased socio-economic equality, which in turn greatly enhanced agricultural development. In fact, growth, equality, stability and participation are all important goals of development. The technocrats, if they want to achieve successful development, must find a dynamic point of balance among these goals and not choose one at the expense of the other.

As for the question of competition, the KMT elites have gradually come to accept it as not only inevitable but also desirable. As the society has become more complex and diverse interests and groups have mushroomed, conflicts, negotiation and compromise have gradually become

accepted values. In fact, the KMT has gradually become a party primarily concerned with electoral victory like an ordinary democratic party after the 1980 election. Although the result of any election, even if the TW (now the DPP) won, would not change the power structure in Taiwan, the KMT leaders felt that the party must win the majority of votes in every election in order to maintain its legitimacy to rule. As the TW forces grew, the KMT gradually came to view itself and act like a competitor rather than a dominator in various elections. The TW and the DPP with strong communal consciousness and local sentiment pose a real problem of integration. The KMT leadership must have thought that it is better to channel the activities of the opposition forces toward electoral and parliamentary competition than to force them toward street protests and demonstrations. The KMT elite has changed the emphasis on participation from its "educative" function to its "integrative" function. The KMT authority may even have thought that, by giving the opposition a legal status, the opposition activities can be regulated by consensus-backed legal procedures and the liberalizing and democratizing reforms may in the long run lead to a more stable political system.

As for the causes of democratization and liberalization, the hypothesis is that although political development is constrained and spurred by socio-economic development, it is initiated by the ruling elite or pressurized by the counter elite. In Taiwan's case, democratization and liberalization have been both initiated by the KMT and pushed by the TW (now the DPP) leaders. However, the initiation of recent political reforms was mainly originated from within the KMT elite. It is a unity between the technocrats, Taiwanese politicians with voter support and young social and natural scientists (usually called the liberal coalition) that favors greater expansion of participation and competition. Furthermore, Chiang Ching-kuo's timely decision and influence were instrumental in ironing out differences within the party and put down oppos-

ition from the conservative. The political reforms have been anticipatory, i.e., in the beliefs of KMT leaders that demands for participation were bound to arise and that it would be wise to expand it to prevent the harm that may be brought about by its explosion. These hypotheses may be tested among other cases in the future. Taiwan is the first case where a party-state has successfully transformed itself into a democratic and competitive party system.