

Nationalism, Communism and Democracy in Post-Mao Mainland China

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I. Defining Characteristics of Sino-Centrist Nationalism and Liberal Nationalism

For the past seven decades Chinese elites and intellectuals have been divided by two major kinds of nationalisms and of nationalist democratic appeals. One is the Sino-centrist nationalism. People who fall into this category of nationalism advocate that China can restore its former strength either through a meritocratic economic development strategy and the introduction of western technology and capitals or through self-reliance, hard-working and at most limited imports of western technology and capitals. The former can be called the reformist nationalism and the latter the conservative nationalism.¹⁾ The reformist nationalism can be traced to the last century and to such notables as Zhang Zhidong, who urged the use of foreign technology while preserving the traditional system of China, and Yan Fu, who advocated a western-style modernization programme for purposes of national survival. The conservative nationalism can be best represented by Mao Zedong, and Deng Liqun and Hu Qiaomu in the post Mao era.

The other is the liberal nationalism. People who fall into this category of nationalism advocate imitating western-style democracy in addition to the adoption of meritocratic economic development and the introduction of western technology and capitals. Only in this way, they assume, can

1) Michael Oksenberg presents a similar classification of Chinese nationalism, namely the confident nationalism and the assertive nationalism, in his "China's Confident Nationalism," *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 65, No. 3, (Winter 1986/87), pp. 501~523 and particularly pp. 501~505.

China restore its former greatness. The liberal nationalism can be traced to the May Fourth Movement and to such liberals as Hu Shi and Ching Monlin who advocated western-style democracy and election system.²⁾

Before China was liberated in 1949, the Sino-centrist nationalism dominated the political and economic scenes. While the conservative nationalism prevailed in most times of Mao's era, the reformist nationalism seems to have flourished in the post-Mao era (1977~1986). Both the conservative nationalists like Mao Zedong and the reformist nationalists like Deng Xiaoping advocated "democracy" while launching their social, economic, political and revolutionary programmes. The term "dictatorship of people's democracy" was presented by Mao because it could help strengthen the leadership of his own and of the party. For Deng, the motivation of advocating the so-called "socialist democracy" has been much more complicated. In addition to strengthening the leadership of the party by means of "dictatorship of people's democracy," it seems that the Deng group has attempted to improve the functions of political institutions through the enhanced mutual communication between the ruling class and the ruled, and the separation of power between the party and government. The purpose of advocating "democracy" is either to more effectively strengthen the leading position of the party and/or to more efficiently push for the party's social, economic and political programmes, not to entail any significant change in the political relationship between the ruling class and the ruled. Therefore, both two types of Sino-centrist nationalism are anti-democratic in nature.

Since 1949, the liberal nationalists have been either utilized by the political leaders to serve their own political purposes or suppressed by the regime when their demands for more democracy were deemed as a threat to the leading position of the party. The campaign of "letting one hundred flowers bloom and letting one hundred schools contend" was

2) Chow Tae-tsung, *The May Fourth Movement: Intellectual Revolution in Modern China* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1960), p. 216.

used by Mao to locate who the liberal nationalists or the "enemies of the people" were in late 1956 and early 1957, and these liberal nationalists were crashed down in the 1957 anti-rightist campaign. During the Cultural Revolution, those who called for more democracy and greater freedom in the guise of Mao Zedong thought were sent to prison. In 1978~79, the liberal nationalists who called for political and democratic reforms were used by the reformist nationalists led by Deng Xiaoping as a weapon to opposed the so-called "whatever" group led by Hua Guofeng. Eventually, the voices of liberal nationalists were stifled by Deng in March 1979, as his goal was realized.

The purposes of this article are thus (1) to identify the latest division of opinions on democracy between the Sino-centrist nationalism and the liberal nationalism on the one hand and between the conservative nationalism and the reformist nationalism on the other hand, and (2) to examine to what extent the current campaign against bourgeois liberalization will have impact on the post-Mao development of political reform and of democracy.

II. Arbitrary Nationalism v. Liberal Nationalism in 1986

In the summer of 1986, a series of heated discussion on political reform attracted the attentions of Chinese intellectuals and students at home and abroad. Two schools can be identified in the course of discussion. One was the so-called "official school," which was led by Deng Xiaoping, composing of his reformist associates and pro-party intellectuals. The other one was led by a group of intellectuals with some university students as their main followers.

In May 1986, the editorial boards of *Zhongguo Shehui Kexue* (Chinese Social Sciences), *Qingnian Shehui Kexue Luntan* (Forum of Youth Social Sciences, a publication of China's Academy of Social Sciences) and *Zhengzhixue Yanjiu* (Studies of Political Science) jointly held a conference on "Reform and Development of China's Political

System" in Beijing. The conference concluded that reform of economic system will inevitably cause changes and developments in the political, ideological and cultural arenas. The conclusion went on: "In the face of this complicated and sensitive question, we cannot passively take an evasive attitude. Instead, we should positively take the initiative. Otherwise, we will fail to make good use of the chance created by economic development and reform of economic system to form an irreversible social progress." According to a Hong Kong-based Chinese monthly, the participants of the conference agreed among themselves on the following viewpoints.³⁾

1) To secure socialist democracy is one of the primary goals of the reform of political system, but China's low level of economic development should be taken into consideration as a reality in pushing for the reform of political system.

2) Democracy and centralization are not in two opposing directions. The opposite of democracy is dictatorship; the opposite of centralization is diffusion of power. Non-scientific dictatorship should be opposed and diffusion of power prevented so that all the forces can be centralized to embark upon key-point construction.

3) Horizontal integration of enterprises requires a fairly competitive environment and effective legislative and judicial systems. Therefore, to push for horizontal integration of enterprises will form a pivot to link the reform of economic system and that of political system.

4) Since the reform of political system is a highly sensitive problem and the studies of political science lags far behind not only the needs of real life but economics and other sciences, it is imperative to strengthen the studies of theories in political science and the recruitment of political scientists.

Apparently, the discussion of how to reform political system was encouraged by the party and top leaders. A *Renmin Ribao* (*People's*

3) Xu Xing, "The Struggle Between Party's Power and People's Power," *Zhengming* (*Contending*) (Hong Kong), No. 107, September 1986, p. 15.

Daily) commentator's article agreed with the opinions of a low-level cadre that the supervision of the masses over cadres and the role of the people as the masters should be strengthened.⁴⁾ In a speech to the Politburo's standing committee on June 28, 1986, Deng Xiaoping urged his colleagues to pay more attention to the problem of reform on political system and the separation of power between the party and government. Giving an example to describe the separation of power the party and government in the legal arena, Deng said that the party should only handle the problems of discipline within the party, leaving the state and government to rule by the law.⁵⁾ In addition to such typical problems of bureaucratism as red-tape and overexpansion of government and party institutions, Deng warned that, while the party's line is to continue the decentralization, many of the party and government institutions have reasserted their power by means of setting up corporations. He went on:

The separation of power between the party and government is a question we have presented since the Third Plenary Session of 11th Central Committee. The Party should be adept at leading, and it should not intervene too much. The separation of power should start from the top level. I do not think that it will weaken the Party's leadership because we insist on the leading position of the Party....Reform on political system and economic reform should be interdependent and complementary. In the absence of reform on political system, there is no way for economic reform to succeed because a lot of people will be on the road to oppose us.⁶⁾

4) Commentator, "In the Absence of Socialist Democracy, There Will Be No Socialist Modernization," *Renmin Ribao (People's Daily)*, May 8, 1986, p. 1.

5) *Zuzhi Renshi Xinxi Bao (Organizational and Personnel Gazette)*, cited by Luo Bing, "Deng Xiaoping Criticizes Chen Yun," *Zhengming*, No. 108, October 1986, p. 9.

6) *Zuzhi Renshi Xinxi Bao (Organizational and Personnel Gazette)* (Early August 1986), cited by Xu Xing, "The Struggle Between Party's Power and People's Power," *Zhengming*, No. 107, September 1986, pp. 15~16; and Qi Xin, "Young Reformists Are Pushing History Forward," *Jiushi Niandai (The Nineties)* (Hong Kong), No. 200, September 1986, p. 37.

Chinese leaders also disclosed that political reform would proceed in a faster pace. When interviewed by a Yugoslavian correspondent on July 7, 1986, Zhao Zhiyang said that governmental functions would be transformed and political institutions and cadre system gradually reformed.⁷⁾ On July 14, when Deng Xiaoping received a delegation from North Korea, he said with confidence that China would complete overall reform of economic system, including several reforms of political system.⁸⁾ Wang Zhaoguo, secretary of Central Committee's Secretariat, pointed out in a speech at the Central Party School on July 16 that reform of political reform was "self-improvement of socialism." To establish a socialist political system, Wang said, China must retrench its political institutions, raise efficiency, better cadre system, improve socialist legal system and implement the separation of power between the party and government.⁹⁾

From 10th to 12th in July 1986, the Central Party School held a large conference on reform theories of political system in Beijing. Invited participants included Gong Xiangrui, professor of Law School at Beijing University, Gao Fang, professor of Department of International Politics at China's People University, Chen Yizi, Director of the Institute of China's Economic System Reform and more than 130 senior officials and research associates of the Central Committee of the Party and of the State Council. In this conference, the most controversial issue was how to concretely implement the reform of political system, particularly the problem of how to find a breakthrough in the process of political reform. A number of participants argued that the reform of political system should start with the separation of power between the party and government and a reasonable redistribution of political power. Some of other participants contended that only after a highly democratic socialism is established, can the problem of democracy and centralization be solved.

7) *Renmin Ribao*, July 11, 1986, p. 6.

8) *Renmin Ribao*, July 15, 1986, p. 1.

9) *Renmin Ribao*, July 17, 1986, p. 1.

Some others asserted that the reform should begin with "jingying min-zhu" ("elite democracy") by granting the elite with the right of speech and political power in the power structure. Still others believed that "kaifang minzhu" ("open democracy") i.e., allowing the people or the whole society to exercise democratic rights and supervisory functions-is the best way to fundamentally reform the current over-centralized political structure. In a speech to the conference, head of Department of Propaganda of the Party's Central Committee Zhu Houze urged the participants to further study the reform theories of political system, saying that Deng Xiaoping had recently talked about the "necessity and emergency" of political reform.¹⁰⁾

At a conference on "Long-term Coexistence, Mutual Supervision" sponsored by the Department of United Front of Party's Central Committee and the National People's Political Consultative Conference on July 11, 1986, Yan Mingfu, head of the Department of United Front, also made an unusual remarks on political reform. He pointed out that, in the absence of corresponding political reform, it would be very difficult to keep the already-made achievements, much less to say making further progress. The success of overall reform, he asserted, depends upon whether the reform of political system will take effect.¹¹⁾ The discussion of political reform and of democracy reached its peak when Wang Li called for respecting the people's freedom of speech in his report. In that report, Wang said that the leaders should respect the democratic right of the people and should not be afraid of different opinions of the people--even the opinions are unfavorable to the leaders. He further advocated that the government should thoroughly grant the people with the freedom of speech according to the Constitution. As long as the policies of leadership are correct, he asserted, a socialist country with a population of one billion will not be disturbed by diffe-

10) *Ta-Kung-Pao* (Hong Kong), July 21, 1986, p.1.

11) *Renmin Ribao*, July 12, 1986, p.1.

rent opinions of the people or sabotage of a few people.¹²⁾ The strong support from the top and the enthusiastic discussion on political reform by intellectuals and scholars seemed to indicate that a democratic reform programme of political system would be presented soon.

With a few exceptions (e.g., those who advocate "open democracy"), most of the advocacies presented at the conference were confined to the reforms of political institutions. Their purpose was to improve and strengthen the functions of these institutions, not to entail any significant change of political relationship between the ruling class and the ruled, much less to say the western-style democracy. What they advocated and suggested in the summer of 1986 were by and large not beyond the scope of what Deng Xiaoping said in August 1980.¹³⁾

With the dominance of reformist nationalism in the post-Mao era, there emerge a handful of liberal intellectuals who almost whole heartedly accept the thoughts of western-style democracy. Among others, Fang Lizhi, was the most outspoken intellectual who advocated consolidating people's power in the summer of 1986. Fang, a prominent astrophysicist and then vice president of Chinese University of Science and Technology in Hefei, Anhui province, argued that the problem of whether the people or the authorities are the masters of the country must be solved before discussing reform of political system. This, as he pointed out, is also a problem of whether the people depend upon the authorities or of whether the authorities depend upon the people, he said. According to him, China's long-standing ideology has been that the authorities are superior to the people and it is the authorities that decide whether they should grant the people with more autonomy and freedom. He

12) Cited by Dong Hu, "Illusional Rejoicings of the Intellectuals," *Zhengming*, No. 109, November 1986, p. 13.

13) See Deng Xiaoping, "On the Reform of the System of Party and State Leadership," a speech to an enlarged meeting of the political Bureau of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China on August 18, 1980, *Deng Xiaoping Wenzuan* (Selected Works of Deng Xiaoping) (Beijing Renmin Chubanshe, 1983), pp. 280~302.

considered the dominance of the party in politics one of the severe flaws in China's political system, saying that whether the people has the real power to supervise the government is the key of reform of political system.¹⁴⁾ Apparently, what Fang promoted is the western-style democracy in which sovereignty rests with the people.

Fang is not alone in advocating western-style democracy. Ding Richu, Director of the Institute of Economic History at Shanghai Academy of Social Sciences, contended that democracy is more than the concept of allowing people to have a say. He pointed out that to grant the people with the right of speech is not equal to democracy because it involves problems of when the authorities allow the people to have such a right and of whether the authorities take the advice of the people. The authorities, it is argued, may grant the people with the right of speech today, but they can retract this right tomorrow. They may take the advice of the people at discretion, but they can ignore the advice of the people regardless of whether the advice is good or not. Therefore, Ding believed that democracy is a problem of power, saying that only when sovereignty rests with the people and the people who have the real power, can a country be called a democracy.¹⁵⁾

A similar view was expressed by Wu Shaozhong, deputy editor in chief of the Publisher of Shanghai Academy of Social Sciences. Wu argued that the saying "yanzhe wuzui" ("blame not the speaker") was an incorrect one. He said that "blame not the speaker" actually means that the speaker is found guilty but tolerated by the authorities by not prosecuting him. This is not fair because the people are real masters of the country and the authorities are only servants of the people. Thus, he argued, it is time to readjust the relationship between masters and servants.¹⁶⁾

14) Xu Xing, "The Struggle Between Party's Power and People's Power," *Zhengming*, No. 107, September 1986, p. 16.

15) *Ibid.*

16) *Ibid.* The so-called "saying" "Yanzhe Wu zui" is actually only half of the

It is clear enough that both Ding and Wu ruled out the possibility that China under the four cardinal principles (i.e., upholding socialist road, people's democratic dictatorship, Party's leadership and Marxism-Leninism and Mao Zedong Thought) can still be called a "democracy."

Shang Ding, editor of the Publisher of Shanghai Dictionary, was a prominent intellectual who called for "open power structure." He described China's current political system as a closed power structure in which command is passed to the lower levels through certain channels. Had China wanted to become a democracy or to reform her political system, it is argued, the transformation from a closed power structure to an open one should have been taken into consideration.¹⁷⁾ Apparently, Shang's purpose to advocate "open power structure" is to push China to open up her command system as a first step to break the traditional political system in which the party dominates everything. What he advocated clearly contradicts the socialist democracy in which the party's leading role is not allowed to be challenged according to the four cardinal principles.

Yan Jiaqi, Director of the Institute of political Science at China's Academy of Social Sciences, is another outspoken intellectual who dares to challenge the authority of the party. In an interview with the correspondent of *Guangming Ribao* (*Enlightenment Daily*) in late June 1986, Yan Jiaqi viewed thorough changes of over-centralization of the party and government as the central problem in the reform of political system. In addition to demanding for the freedom of academic studies and of creation in artistic and literary fields, he proposed four realms of reforms of political system, including (1) the horizontal decentralization of various levels of government; (2) the vertical decentralization between the central and local governments; (3) the transfer of partial

saying as it is always followed by "wenzhe zu jie." As a whole, the saying means "blame not the speaker but be warned by his words."

17) Xu Xing, "The Struggle Between Party's Power and People's Power," *Zhengming*, No. 107, September 1986, p. 16.

jurisdictions of government to social institutions; and (4) the improvement of the system of National People's Congress.¹⁸⁾ When he attended the 3rd Conference on the Strategy of Cultural Development in Guangzhou, Guangdong province held from 10th to 13th September 1986, he was interviewed by a correspondent of *Guangzhou Ribao* (*Canton Daily*). He advocated that the people should have not only academic freedom but the freedom of discussing politics, saying that these two are inseparable. Had the problems of politics been prohibited from discussing, he said, there should have been no progress in political science, much less to say the right of supervising politics and political participation of the citizens. Since the politics of socialist system is the politics of the people, he argued, the politics of socialist system must be open. He also criticized the system of selecting cadres, saying that selecting cadres in a secret way does not accord with the principle of socialist democracy. With regard to the problem of political system, he pointed out that the people are increasingly aware of the need of establishing a sound political system in the post-Mao era, saying that the key problem of democracy is a question of the relationship between the party and government. He thus advocated that People's National Congress should become the real national power institution.¹⁹⁾

Intellectuals like Fang, Ding, Wu, Shang and Yan are not so naive that they do not know the essential difference between what Chinese leaders called "socialist democracy" and the western-style democracy. But why did they still advocate the concepts such as "sovereignty resting with the people," "the people having the real power to govern," "the people being the masters of the country" and "open power structure"? They do not expect that China will be transformed into a western-style

18) *Guangming Ribao* (*Enlightenment Daily*), June 30, 1986, p. 1.

19) "Reform of Political System and the Strategy of Cultural Development," an interview with Yan Jiaqi, Director of the Institute of Political Science, China's Academy of Social Sciences, *Guangzhou Ribao* (*Canton Daily*), September 11, 1986, p. 1.

democracy overnight. Their purpose is to urge both the authorities and the people to embark upon some bold changes in the process of reform of political system. In today's China, the liberal nationalists are destined to fail because they are not strongly backed by the authorities, and because most of the people are not ready to support them yet. There is no wonder that they were silenced after the demonstrations led by their admirers in university campuses were crashed down in December 1986.

Ⅲ. Impact of the Struggle against Bourgeois Liberalization on China's Democracy

As a matter of fact, the resolution adopted by the 6th plenary session of the 12th Central Committee of CPC has already showed which course China will take in the next several years. From the whole context of the resolution, it is clear enough that the so-called "socialist construction of spiritual civilization" has priority over the reform of political system. The resolution is widely believed as a compromised document containing many seemingly contradictory assertions, but there is little doubt that it is anti-democratic. Although the resolution called for the reform of political system along with economic reform, it is asserted that spiritual civilization of socialism must be constructed under the guideline of Marxism and of four cardinal principles, calling for forcefully opposing capitalism and feudalism to prevent the people from going astray.²⁰⁾ In other words, the resolution denied the possibility that the reform of political system would go beyond the four cardinal principles. Sensitive readers might have been carefully watching how far China would go

20) "CPC Central Committee's Resolution Regarding the Guideline of Socialist Construction of Spiritual Civilization," adopted by the 6th Plenary Session of the 12th Central Committee of CPC, *Renmin Ribao*, September 29, 1986, pp. 1~2.

in opposing capitalism and western-style democracy.

One of the direct results of student demonstrations in late 1986 was the nationwide campaign against bourgeois liberalization launched by the conservative nationalists. Although the reformist nationalists dominated the politics in most times of post-Mao era, the assertive nationalists remain active whenever the reform is in trouble in one way or another. This time, in the eyes of conservative nationalists, the vivid discussion of political reform and particularly of democracy in the summer of 1986 directly contributed to the student demonstrations for greater democracy and greater freedom in late 1986. And the social unrest caused by student demonstrations was intolerable.

Zhao Ziyang was generally regarded as a reformist nationalist, but his view at the time strongly reflected that of the conservative nationalists. In a speech at the 14th session of Standing Committee of the National People's Political Consultative Conference(NPPCC) on March 15, 1987, Zhao warned against student unrest and bourgeois liberalization, saying: "To prevent such things from happening again, the Communist Party should give a clear-cut message to the whole nation that we treasure the people's hope for stability and unity, and that we will never allow bourgeois liberalization to go unchecked again, nor allow any social unrest to interrupt our drive for socialist modernization."²¹⁾

At the same time, however, Chinese leaders reiterated that their reform and open-door policy would not change during the campaign. When U.S. Secretary of State George Shultz visited China in March 1987, Deng Xiaoping, President Li Xiannian and Zhao Ziyang all assured him that a shift from the present policies is out of question. Deng even told Shultz: "We will never change our set policies. Why should we change the policies that have been so effective in recent years?"²²⁾ In remarks made in talks with Cameroon President Paul Biya in Beijing

21) *Renmin Ribao*, March 16, 1987, p.1.

22) "Shultz Finds An Unchanged China," *Beijing Review*, Vol. 30, No. 11, March 16, 1987, p.5.

on March 26, 1987, Zhao also said that China's current struggle against bourgeois liberalization does not mean denial of democracy and freedom, but more momentum for the development of socialist democracy. According to Zhao, China's policy of opposing bourgeois liberalization simply means implementing the political line since the Third Plenary Session of the 11th Party Central Committee in 1978 in a better and all-round way. He said: "It by no means entails any change in China's political line, principles or policies." He went on:

Our general principle is to persist in building the socialist system on the one hand, and to invigorate every field of work on the other. But bourgeois liberalization denies the leading role of the Party and the socialist system.²³⁾

Despite Chinese leaders' repeated denials of changes in political, economic and social lines, the nationwide campaign against bourgeois liberalization have far-reaching impact on the future of China's democracy, no matter what it is a socialist democracy or Western-style democracy.

By the end of 1986, as we have seen in last section, Chinese intellectuals had vividly discussed the reform of political institutions, democracy (or socialist democracy) and the separation of power between the party and government. Although democracy was still in the discussion stage, China earned a reputation of a reforming socialist country which was prepared to transform itself into a socialist democracy. Under the current campaign against bourgeois liberalization, nevertheless, both the quantity and the quality of discussing reform of political system and democracy seem to have been undermined. Since early 1987, Socialist democracy and political reform have been thought by both reformist nationalists and conservative nationalists to be discussed and developed in a guided and planned way.

23) *Renmin Ribao*, March 27, 1987, p. 1.

(1) Socialist Democracy and Political Reform in a Guided and Planned Way

Since the campaign against bourgeois liberalization was launched in late December 1986, the Chinese authorities have changed their tones. In late February 1987, a Chinese theoretician asserted in the leading official newspaper that Chinese cannot enjoy full democratic rights because of economic and cultural limitations, and a "Great Leap Forward" in democratization would only hurt the country. Echoing the official statements during the current campaign against dissenting opinions, the author listed several reasons to show why China is not ready for full democracy.

First, China can not be compared to developed countries because of its feudal past and large size of population. Second, the socialist system which has already been established in China is still in its initial stage. Without stable development of productive forces, it will be difficult for China's economic and political reforms to succeed. If people are preoccupied by making a living, they will not have time to concern about politics. "Only if productive forces are developed on a large scale and only if the time spends on producing daily needs is greatly reduced can there be enough time to participate in the management of national and social affairs and to fully exercise one's democratic rights," the author argued. Third, still about 20 percent of population are considered semi-literate or literate in China and these people are more often than not ignorant of law, science and democracy, constituting an obstacle in the road of democratization. Large-scale development in production is also a prerequisite for scientific and cultural progress and educating the people to take on managerial work, as well as fully utilize one's right to supervise, right to vote, and right to be elected.²⁴⁾

In the first detailed pronouncement on political reforms since the start

24) Li Jiapeng, "Democratization from a Perspective of Overall Modernization Strategy," *Renmin Ribao*, February 23, 1987, p. 5.

of anti-bourgeois liberalization campaign, a top party official listed three areas scheduled for political reform in March 1987, but the idea of separating the party from the government was not mentioned. According to this unidentified official, the three targets set for China's political reform in the next 15 years include: (1) the reinvigoration of party and state cadres; (2) the enhancement of efficiency and the eradication of red tape; and (3) the mobilization of the masses of workers, peasants and intellectuals.²⁵⁾

Among these targets, the reinvigoration of cadres is a priority issue. "Years ago, we talked about 'four modernizations of cadres'--that is, revolutionization, rejuvenation, professionalization and knowledge. We have done something, but this is just a start. They cannot be fulfilled in three or five years but within 15 years. We will be fine if there are politicians, economists, scientists, intellectuals of 30 to 40 years of age," the official was quoted as saying.

Referring to the second target, the official pointed out that the problem embedded in the present bureaucratic mechanism are, to a large extent, due to the overlapping of party and state organizations. He pointed out: "We raised this question years ago. But how could we do it? Many problems have yet to be sorted out." Like many other Chinese leaders to which Deng Xiaoping is included, however, he added: "We have to uphold the dictatorship of the Chinese Communist Party over China. This cannot be discarded. The problem is that the Party has to improve its leadership."

As for the third target, the official said that from past experience democratization and decentralization were keys to the mobilization the masses of peasants, workers and intellectuals. To mobilize the peasants and to carry out agricultural reforms, it is argued, that power has to be decentralized. So is the mobilization of intellectuals and workers

25) *Ta-Kung-Pao* (Hong Kong), March 11, 1987, p. 5. An excerpt reprinted from *Lilun Xinxi bao* (*China's Theory and Information News*).

who should be encouraged to actively participate in the management of enterprises.

Discussing political reform without citing the separation of power indicates that China appears to have dropped the idea of keeping the Party and the administration separate, something which has been hinted at during the last two years. And even political reforms in the three areas are not mentioned without reservation--i.e., the upholding of the dictatorship of the Party, reflecting the conservative position. It also reflects that the reformist nationalists appear to have made some compromises by not citing the separation of power which is deemed by some conservative nationalists to cause their loss of political power.

The pronouncement on political reform by the unidentified top party official was elaborated by Zhao Ziyang. Speaking to a group of scientists on March 14, 1987, Zhao pointed out that China will not oppose bourgeois liberalization at the expense of democracy.²⁶⁾ In a speech at the 14th session of Standing Committee of the National People's Political Consultative Conference on March 15, 1987, he further pointed out that the current drive against bourgeois liberalization will not affect the Party's policy toward the normal democratic life of the country. He asserted that while fighting bourgeois liberalization China will continue to implement all its established policies. Referring to the struggle against bourgeois liberalization, he pointed out that it is a major event in China's political life. "Some foreigners do not understand the situation in China and think it is a new campaign," he was quoted as saying. "Infact," he went on:

the Chinese Communist Party has repeatedly stressed reforms, the open policy and economic growth as well as adherence to the four cardinal principles of socialism, the people's democratic dictatorship, leadership of the Communist Party and Marxism-Leninism and Mao Zedong thought. The Party has always opposed adopting an attitude of concession and toleration toward bourgeois

26) *Renmin Ribao*, March 15, 1987, p. 1.

liberalization.²⁷⁾

In a talk on political reform on March 25, 1987, Zhao said that a high level of "socialist democracy" with Chinese characteristics has always been China's consistent objectives. Socialist democracy in the political, economic and social life, it is argued, should be continuously developed in a guided and planned way by proceeding from China's realities and adopting practical measures. According to him, the way how socialist democracy with Chinese characteristics is implemented is as follows: First, leading government departments at all levels and personnel in charge should take the initiative in opening up various channels for regular dialogue with the masses. Second, these departments and personnel should explain the principles, policies, work plans and achievements in construction and reform as well as the difficulties and problems that have been encountered. Third, the voices and opinions of the masses should be carefully heeded and their criticism and rational suggestions should be accepted. Only through dialogue between the leadership and the masses, can they exchange ideas, know each other better and get rid of any possible misunderstanding, thereby establishing and developing, under socialist conditions, a new-type of relationship among the people characterized by democracy, solidarity, mutual assistance and a common desire for progress. Zhao called this an important task in the development of socialist democracy. Fourth, as a state system of a new type, socialist democracy has to be progressively improved through reforming the political structure from top to bottom in an orderly way.²⁸⁾

Speaking of political reform, Zhao disclosed that China is now making thorough and systematic investigations and studies and will, on this basis, formulate a feasible political reform scheme which will define the principles, contents, priorities and steps pertaining to political restructuring.

27) *Renmin Ribao*, March 16, 1987, p. 1.

28) *Renmin Ribao*, March 26, 1987, pp. 1~2.

ring. On socialist legalism, he said:

We should steadily perfect the socialist legal system and see to it that laws are observed and strictly enforced and lawbreakers are brought to trial, our firm principles being that all are equal before the law, thus we will be able to ensure the sound progress of our all-round reform and China's long term political stability and the inviolability of its citizens' legitimate rights and interests.²⁹⁾

While asserting that China will not oppose bourgeois liberalization at the expense of political reform, Zhas stressed at another meeting that the importance of building up a contingent of Marxist theoreticians, who uphold the four cardinal principles (socialist road, people's democratic dictatorship, Party's leadership, and Marxism-Leninism and Mao Zedong Thought) and oppose bourgeois liberalization.³⁰⁾

The problem, however, is that any meaningful discussion on political reform cannot be brought forth in a guided and planned way. If there emerged a vivid atmosphere in the course of discussion on political reform in 1986, it was because the four cardinal principles that had been presented by Deng Xiaoping in 1979 were not cited as a guideline of discussion. Given the atmosphere under the official emphasis on four cardinal principles and the current drive against western ideas, it is almost impossible to expect any valuable ideas on political reform from the people. If the campaign against bourgeois liberalization are to last 10, 20, 50 or even 70 years as some Chinese leaders suggested, meaningful discussion on political reform will be stifled.

(2) Intellectuals in Desperation

While chinese leaders reiterated the important role of intellectuals in the process of socialist democratization, it is worthy nothing that many

29) *Renmin Ribao*, March 26, 1987, p. 1.

30) "Established Policies To Continue," *Beijing Review*, Vol. 30, No. 12, March 23, 1987, p. 6.

prominent intellectuals who advocated western-style democracy and expressed concern over the dark side of Chinese political system were attacked or even purged by the party. After the student demonstrations were kept under control in January, three intellectuals were singled out by Deng Xiaoping at party meetings to feel the chill of the clampdown. At the top of the list was scientist Fang Lizhi, 51, a prominent astrophysicist and then vice president of Chinese University of Science and Technology in Hefei, Anhui province; his lectures in favor of democratic reform were often cited on posters during student demonstration in December 1987. Also named were Wang Ruowang, 68, a Shanghai writer who had been critical of Party abuses and failing of socialism, and Liu Binyan, 62, a senior writer for *Renmin Ribao* who specialized in uncovering corruption.

What is important here is that the encircled criticism and attacks of intellectuals in the campaign against bourgeois liberalization are reminiscent of the initial periods of the 1957 anti-rightist campaign and the Cultural Revolution. Fang Lizhi, for example, was removed from his post as vice-president of the Chinese university of Science and Technology. The decision was announced on January 12, 1987, at the University by Zhou Guangzhao, member of the CPC Central Committee and vice-president of the Chinese Academy of Sciences. Fang was said to have made many erroneous bourgeois liberalist statements and deviated from the four cardinal principles over a considerable period of time. He was also accused of having a bad influence on students as shown in the recent student unrest. In addition to expressing his full support of the party's decision, Li Guixian, secretary of the Anhui provincial Party Committee, said: "Fang Lizhi advocated bourgeois liberalization, defamed the Party's leadership and party's official, negated the achievement of the Party over the past decades, and slandered the socialist system....It is intolerable."³¹⁾ Editorials or commentators, articles of other newspapers

31) *Renmin Ribao*, January 13, 1987, p. 1.

also expressed similar opinions toward Fang, making him one of the focuses of criticism in the campaign against bourgeois liberalization.³²⁾ Fang's colleague Guan Weiyan was removed from his post as the president of the university, deputy secretary of the university party committee and dean of the university graduate school. Guan was accused of turning a deaf ear to the word and deeds in favor of bourgeois liberalization.³³⁾ Fang was expelled from the Party later on.³⁴⁾

Wang Ruowang, the outspoken writer, was the second prominent victim in the current drive against bourgeois liberalization. The Shanghai municipal Party disciplinary inspection committee decided on January 13, 1987, to expel Wang from the party, saying that he advocated bourgeois liberalization and opposed four cardinal principles. In the decision of the committee, he was said to have defamed the socialist system and advocated capitalist road. He described China's socialist system as an "illusion," something "feudal or semi-feudal in essence," "coated with Marxism-Leninism and socialism." At the same time, he called for going through a stage of capitalism which he said China had skipped. He was also accused of negating the party's leadership by saying that "the Party is keen on power struggles and that "party secretaries know nothing but persecuting others." He opposed party's leadership in the artistic and literary circles and tried to do away with it by saying "you (the party) have nothing to do now that people have freedom to write and pick whatever theatrical performances they like." According to him, the foundations of ultra-leftist culture and ideology still stand rock firm, for there has been no change in this regard since the over-

32) For examples, see Editorial, "Resolutely Clear the leading Representative Fang Lizhi Out of Party," *Anhui Ribao* (*Anhui Daily*), January 20, 1987, reprinted on *Renmin Ribao*, January 21, 1987, p. 1; Editorial, "Communist Party Members must Go to the Front Against Bourgeois Liberalization," *Hongqi* (*Red Flag*), No. 3, 1987, p. 2; and Commentator, "Adhere to the leadership of Communist Party," *Hongqi*, No. 3, 1987, pp. 3~4.

33) *Renmin Ribao*, January 13, 1987, p. 1.

34) *Renmin Ribao*, January 20, 1987, p. 1.

throw of the gang of four in October 1976. He described the party's efforts to oppose ideological contamination and attack economic crimes as "a political movement in essence but not in name."³⁵⁾ Like Fang Lizhi, Wang was also sharply criticized by the official press.³⁶⁾

Liu Binyan, a staff writer at *Renmin Ribao*, is famous for his reportage, which exposes malfeasance and corruption within the party. His recent work is entitled *The Second Kinds of Loyalty*, suggesting that one can be critical of the party while remaining a loyal citizen. Since this book was prohibited from circulating, he has been one of the most controversial writers in China. After the decision of expelling him from the party was announced on January 24, 1987, a commentator's article of *Renmin Ribao* urged a return to the first kind of loyalty. The decision said that he attacked the four cardinal principles as "outdated, rigid and dogmatic concepts and wornout phrases that have led China to calamities several times." He was accused of refusing to accept party leadership after the party criticized him for his mistakes on many occasions, saying that for a journalist to accept party leadership is degrading.³⁷⁾ In the following days, Liu became the focus of criticism in the official press.³⁸⁾

35) *Renmin Ribao*, January 15, 1987, p. 1.

36) Commentator of New China Agency, "Never Allow A Privileged Party Member Who had Advocated Bourgeois Liberalization And Insisted on Correcting His Stand," *Renmin Ribao*, January 15, 1987, p. 1; Editorial, "Communist Party Members must Go to the Front Against Bourgeois Liberalization," *Hongqi*, No. 3, 1987, p. 2; Commentator, "Adhere to the leadership of Communist Party," *Hongqi*, No. 3, 1987, pp. 3~4; and Xi Yusheng, "Party Discipline Tolerates No Opposition of Four Cardinal Principles," *Jiefang Ribao (Liberation Daily)*, January 16, 1987, p. 2.

37) *Renmin Ribao*, January 25, 1987, p. 1.

38) A report of *Guangming Ribao* claimed that Liu Binyan's three reportorial books--*The Second Kind of Loyalty*, *My Diary* and *Unfinished Burying*--were inconsistent with the facts, January 30, 1987, pp. 1~2; Editorial, "Communist Party Members must Go to the Front Against Bourgeois Liberalization," *Hongqi*, No. 3, 1987, p. 2; Yu Shuwen, "How Liu Binyan Defame the Party and Socialism," *Renmin Ribao*, January 26, 1987, p. 4.

Ironically enough, it was Prof. Fang Lizhi who discussed the role of intellectual and intellectual ideology in a dialogue with a *Guangming Ribao* correspondent several months ago. Their dialogue was reprinted in an official English-language weekly, *Beijing Review* in December 1986. Fang, then vice-president of the China University of Science and Technology, pointed out that "scientists must express their feeling about anything in society, especially if reasonable, wrong and evil things emerge."³⁹⁾ Fang, along with Wang Ruowang and Liu Binyan, are the most out-spoken intellectuals receiving wide respects from the Chinese at home and abroad.

The response of conservative nationalists to the democratic notions of these prominent intellectuals has been the strongest one since Mao's death in 1976. A *Far Eastern Economic Review* article said in early May that a crackdown of liberal thinkers and writers had been planned as early as August 1986, a few months after the incident of Liu Zaifu. By then, the conservative nationalists had already set up a "writing group" to produce articles attacking those they considered to be dangerously liberalists.⁴⁰⁾ In a speech in January 1987, when the campaign against bourgeois liberalization was launched, Peng Zeng, the president of National People's Congress called for a literary policy that served socialism. In mid-May 1987, a speech of Peng, honorary president of the Yanan Literary and Artistic Society, was read at a meeting celebrating the 45th anniversary of Mao Zedong's famous "Talks at the Yanan Forum on Literature and Art." In an apparent effort to show that the "tolerant and harmonious" atmosphere promoted by ousted party leader Hu Yaobang was an aberration, Peng said: "Mao showed the way for intellectuals by stating that literature and the arts should be at the

39) A dialogue between Dai Qing, correspondent of *Guangming Ribao*, and Scientist Fang Lizhi, *Guangming Ribao*, translated in *Beijing Review*, Vol. 29, No. 50, December 15, 1986, pp.16~17.

40) Linda Jaivin, "Lingering Gusts of That 'Evil' Vapour from the West," *Far Eastern Economic Review*, May 7, 1987, p.46.

service of the people, especially workers, peasants and soldiers....The basic spirit of the 'Talks' is still valid today." Added Wang Zhen, another conservative party elder: "For 45 years, the literary and artistic theories of our party have not strayed from the foundation laid by the 'Talks.'"⁴¹⁾

At the same time, China's propaganda organs have engaged in a uniform and relentless campaign against "bourgeois liberalization." In particular, *Guangming Ribao*, the leading newspaper for intellectuals, showed the importance of clinging to the party line. A commentator's article of the newspaper on January 21, 1987, urged the party's artists and writers to adhere to the party line. "All party writers and artists," the newspaper said, "no matter how great their achievements and no matter how high their reputations, must as party members accept the party program and observe party discipline."⁴²⁾ Minister of Culture Wang Meng, who until lately advocated experimentation in arts and literature, urged writers and artists to serve socialism at a meeting attended by directors of cultural departments of various provinces, municipalities and autonomous regions.⁴³⁾

Despite an editorial of *Renmin Ribao* to assure its readers that the campaign against bourgeois liberalization should not be linked to artistic and literary circles,⁴⁴⁾ the propaganda drive was accompanied by a series of persecutions and shutdowns of publications. In February, the novelist Liu Xinwu was forced to make self-criticism and dismissed from his post as chief editor of *Renmin Wenxue* (*People's Literature*). He had been one of the intended targets in the eyes of the conservatives. This time, he was named because his journal carried a young writer Ma Jian's story which "hurt the feelings of Tibetan compatriots," though

41) *Guangming Ribao*, May 11, 1987, p. 1.

42) Commentator, "Party's Writer Must Act as Party Member First," *Guangming Ribao*, January 21, 1987, p. 1.

43) *Renmin Ribao*, January 21, 1987, p. 1.

44) Editorial, "Continuously and Healthfully Conduct the Campaign Against Bourgeois Liberalization," *Renmin Ribao*, February 2, 1987, p. 1.

he had not been responsible for the story's selection. His deputy Zhou Ming also made a self-inspection on behalf of the journal.⁴⁵⁾ Liu De, the editor of *Jiannan Wenxue* (*Literature in the South of Yangtze River*), in the city of Mianyang in Sichuan province, was sentenced to seven years in prison for crime of counter-revolutionary agitation, because he had "desperately trumpeted democracy and freedom of capitalist countries." In February, the Chinese authorities ordered three publications closed in Shenzhen, the special economic zone near Hong Kong, apparently because they expressed too much enthusiasm for democratic notions. They were the bi-weekly *Shenzhen Youth Journal*, the daily *Workers' Journal* and the monthly *Literature*. The editorial boards of other liberal publications, including the Shanghai-based *Shijie Jingji Daobao* (*World Economic Herald*), have been shaken up staffed with politically reliable conservatives.⁴⁶⁾

By the end of February 1987, a loose and pleasant atmosphere in the circles of art and literature, which was created by what the officials in charge of culture and propaganda last year said had all but disappeared from the horizon. In July 1986, Wang Meng, a novelist and Minister of Culture, commented that cultural officials should not adopt an aggressive and oversensitive attitude toward different viewpoints of artists and writers.⁴⁷⁾ Earlier, Zhu Houze, then head of the Party Central Committee's Propaganda Department, said that it was in the national interest to "be tolerant of different views and to be generous toward those who hold them," when commenting on the incidents of Ma Ding and Liu Zaifu.⁴⁸⁾

On the surface, U.S. Secretary of State George Shultz's visit to China

45) *Renmin Ribao*, January 21, 1987, p. 1.

46) "More Publications Closed," *South China Morning Post*, March 18, 1987, p. 9; and William R. Doerner, "Putting Limits on Thought," *Time*, February 23, 1987, p. 17.

47) *Renmin Ribao*, July 17, 1986, p. 3.

48) *Renmin Ribao*, April 25, 1986, p. 1.

in early March 1987, seems to have represented a turning point in the current anti-bourgeois liberalization campaign. A few days after Shultz's visit, political reform was presented again by an unidentified top party official. One of the goals the Chinese official set for China's political reform in the next 15 years is to continue mobilizing the intellectuals so that they can contribute their expertise to the construction of socialist China.⁴⁹⁾ This official's viewpoints were confirmed on March 14, 1987 by Zhao Ziyang. In a speech to a group of scientists, Zhao pointed out that China will not oppose bourgeois liberalization at the expense of intellectuals and democracy. He noted that the more intellectuals a unit has, the more attention it must pay to its building of democracy. Scientific research institutions and other units where many intellectuals work together should be one step ahead in democratization. "Channels," he said, "must be opened for discussion and dialogue between leading officials and intellectuals so that intellectuals can have outlets for their views and contribute more to socialist modernization with ease of mind."⁵⁰⁾

Speaking at the 14th session of Standing Committee of the National People's Political Consultative Conference on March 15, 1987, Zhao further pointed out that the current drive against bourgeois liberalization will not affect the Party's policy toward intellectuals nor the normal democratic life of the country, emphasizing that the great majority of intellectuals do endorse the Party and socialism. "To esteem knowledge and expertise" and "to let a hundred flowers bloom and a hundred schools of thought contend," he said, are the Party's established policies which will be earnestly implemented in the years to come. According to Zhao, all those who actively contributed to the socialist modernization effort will be encouraged.⁵¹⁾ Although several more publications--including *Hubei Youth Journal*, *Anhui Science Journal* and *Anhui Journal of*

49) *Ta Kung Pao* (Hong Kong), March 11, 1987, p.1.

50) *Renmin Ribao*, March 15, 1987, p.1.

51) *Renmin Ribao*, March 16, 1987, p.1.

Scientific News--were ordered to shut down in March for carrying articles promoting "bourgeois liberalization,"⁵²⁾ it seems that the intellectuals have been no longer persecuted because of "bourgeois liberalization," since March 1987.

Nevertheless, the problem remained unresolved in the wake of Shultz's visit is that the intellectuals have feared to speak out or to make any constructive suggestion as many of their colleagues were either criticized or expelled from the Party or both in the current drive against bourgeois liberalization. Before the suppression of student demonstrations by the government in December 1986, most of the intellectuals were optimistic about China's future as China has been moving into the direction of modernization, though in a zig-zag way in most times. Although some of the intellectuals were also criticized by the Party or by the conservatives at different times in the post-Mao era, there is simply no such case in which so many intellectuals have been punished or expelled from the Party in such a short period. Deng Xiaoping and other Chinese leaders said that the current anti-bourgeois liberalization campaign would last 10, 20, 50 or 70 years on different occasions. It seems that none of Chinese leaders knows when the campaign will end, much less to say the intellectuals. Given this uncertain political climate, few intellectuals dare to speak out what they think they should say in the ordinary times.

The phenomenon that intellectuals are no longer willing to provide constructive suggestions because of fear of being attacked or victimized may last for a long time, perhaps even longer than their older generation did between the 1957, anti-rightist campaign and the 'Cultural Revolution'. In the wake of anti-rightist movement, most of the intellectuals were more careful as they eventually understood that the goal of Mao's "Double Hundred policy" in 1956, was to locate those who had opinions different from him in his power and line struggle with Liu

52) "More Publications Closed," *South China Morning Post*, March 18, 1987, p. 9.

Shaoqi. Intellectuals were persecuted in the name of class struggle during the 'Cultural Revolution' not because of their lack of political alertness but largely because of Mao's hatred of intellectuals and his manipulation in politics. By the end of 1986, Chinese leaders had been generally considered more recognizable than their predecessors of the role of intellectuals in the process of modernization. As a result, intellectuals had been more willing to contribute their expertise to the socialist construction. Although the suppression of intellectuals as well as students in the current drive against bourgeois liberalization was much smaller than that of political campaigns in Mao's era in terms of the scale of campaign and the degree of violence, it amounts to a heavy shock to both intellectuals at home and visiting scholars and students abroad. Few people know whether the current drive will evolve into a more violent class struggle campaign against them, nor can people ascertain whether political tempest like the 1957, anti-rightist campaign and the 'Cultural Revolution' will fall on China in future. The fear of being accused and attacked will in turn lead the intellectuals to devote less energy and expertise to modernization in China which like any other country demands the dedicated service of the intellectuals, much less to say the democratization in china.

IV. Conclusion

For the past seven decades Chinese intellectuals have been divided by the conflicting opinions on democracy between the Sino-centrist nationalism and liberal nationalism. Since 1949, they have further been involved in the power and line struggles between the reformist nationalists and conservative nationalists. Whenever there was a struggle between the group of reformist nationalists and that of conservative nationalists, the liberal nationalists became the victims or scapegoats after the goals of either group was realized, as shown in the cases of 1957, anti-rightist campaign and of 1979, suppression of democratic movement. And whe-

never there was a division of opinions on democracy between the Sino-centrist nationalists and the liberal nationalists, the liberal nationalism was destined to fail because it was backed neither by power center nor by the masses of people, as shown in the cases of May Fourth Movement and subsequent calls for political reforms and democracy in the 1910s and 1920s and of democratic movement in the last years of 'Cultural Revolution.'

The heated debate on democracy in the summer of 1986, and the subsequent student demonstrations demanding for more democracy and greater freedom in late 1986, provides a vivid evidence to show that the division of opinions on democracy between the Sino-centrist nationalists and liberal nationalists on the one hand and between the conservative nationalists and the reformist nationalists on the other has not only continued to exist in the post-Mao era but increasingly evolved into an increasingly visible struggle between them.

Deng Xiaoping, Zhao Zhiyang and other Chinese leaders asserted that China will not oppose bourgeois liberalization at the expense of political reform and socialist democracy. But the problem is that meaningful ideas on political reform can be mainly initiated from the people as shown in the case of 1986 summer, not from the party. Given the atmosphere under the official emphasis on four cardinal principles and the current drive against bourgeois liberalization, it is almost impossible to expect any valuable ideas on political reform and socialist democracy from the people.

By 1987, intellectuals in most times of the post-Mao's period had been more willing to contribute their expertise to socialist construction than they did in Mao's era. Part of the reason is that they were encouraged to speak out what they thought to be useful in socialist construction and socialist democracy. Although it is officially asserted that the current drive against bourgeois liberalization will not affect the party's policy toward intellectuals, they have feared to speak out or make any constructive suggestion as many of their colleagues were under encircled

criticism and even expelled from the party in the current campaign. The fear of being accused and punished will in turn lead the intellectuals to devote less expertise to socialist modernization and socialist democracy.

In the summer of 1986, China was considered a Marxist-Leninist socialist country which was prepared to transform itself from an authoritarian state into a socialist democracy. Nevertheless, the current campaign against bourgeois liberalization represents a severe retreat in post-Mao China's reform in political institutions and policy toward the intellectuals. Had the campaign against bourgeois liberalization lasted a long period as some Chinese leaders suggested, the reform of political institutions should have been stagnant in development and the intellectuals alienated. To be sure, the longer the current campaign lasts, the more distant post-Mao's China is from the socialist democracy advocated by the arbitrary nationalists, much less to say the western-style democracy advocated by the liberal nationalists.