

A Comparative Analysis of the Adaptation of Christianity to Korea and the Islamization of Indonesia

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I. Root Paradigm Analysis: The Method

This paper continues a line of investigation developed in two previous papers, the first (Biernatzki 1984), a study of the introduction of Buddhism into China to try to ascertain how its adaptation to China and its acceptance by the Chinese met with greater or lesser success depending upon whether certain fundamental and unquestioned assumptions inherent in Indian and Central Asian forms of Buddhism either reinforced or conflicted with corresponding assumptions in the existing Chinese culture, and the second (Biernatzki 1986), an effort to initiate the development of a general methodology for the analysis of similar movements of complex institutions — particularly religious institutions — from their civilization of origin into a different civilization, using the approach of the earlier study.

The central methodology of this series of studies is based on the concept of "root paradigm" developed by Victor Turner (Turner 1974 ; Turner and Turner 1978). A root paradigm can be defined as a pattern of unquestioned assumptions about the fundamental nature of the world and humanity which underlies and influences all social actions within a particular cultural context (cf., Turner 1974 : 37-44). Root

paradigms, functioning at the level of culture, can be thought of as analogous to habits, at the level of individual action. Although neither habits nor root paradigms “determine” action, in the strict sense, they do condition action to follow particular lines or patterns by making them seem more “natural” or “obvious” to the actor than their alternatives.

As Turner pointed out (1974:33-42), the root paradigms of a culture are best discerned in the historical development and resolution of conflict situations, which often can be seen to go through a cycle, seemingly according to a kind of “script” dictated by the unquestioned assumptions of the root paradigms. These “social dramas” play themselves out over and over again in the history of conflicts within the culture, with much the same expectations governing the conduct of the actors as, first, a breach of normal relations occurs, followed by a phase of mounting crisis leading to a phase of redressive action finally resulting either in reintegration of the group or formalization of an irreparable schism(pp. 38-42). However, Victor and Edith Turner later carried the idea further, in their study of patterns of Christian pilgrimage (1978), wherein root paradigms characteristic of a world religion can be seen influencing in similar ways the religious behavior of co-religionists in widely different cultures. Root paradigms, then, underlie not only conflict situations but also other kinds of customary social behavior.

In the study on Buddhism in China (Biernatzki 1984) I tried to show that, while some Buddhist paradigms derived from Indian and Central Asian cultures fit well with Chinese root paradigms, others — such as the paradigm or paradigms which imposed celibacy on monks and nuns — conflicted so fundamentally with existing Chinese root paradigms — such as those which demanded marriage and the procreation of children to carry on the line of ancestral descent unbroken into the future — that accommodation proved impossible, and Buddhism never became fully “respectable” among China’s elite.

The most characteristic patterns of a culture obviously involve more

than paradigms for action. They also include some values so basic that their worth can be questioned only with great difficulty by individuals raised in that culture and certain symbols which carry with them such a great loading of meanings and emotions for the members of that culture that they can truly be said to occupy a dominant role in that society's total experience. These three elements—root paradigms, fundamental values and dominant symbols—obviously inter—twine, reinforce and express each other in complex ways. Other analytical approaches might validly choose to concentrate on values or symbols, treating paradigms only in function of their contribution to the expression of the fundamental values and dominant symbols of the culture. In the line of analysis I am exploring, however, the root paradigms are posited—at least hypothetically—as the more fundamental elements, governing, to a large degree, the manner in which fundamental values are expressed and manipulating the ways in which even the most dominant of symbols find their expression in the culture. Although the clarity and usefulness of the method depends heavily on discriminating clearly among root paradigms, values and symbols, sharp distinctions are not always possible. In some cases, the exact pattern assumed by the root paradigm itself cannot be discerned, and can be described only roughly, in terms of the values and symbols which express it in particular cases.

Despite such conceptual limitations, the characterization of cultures and cultural institutions by analyzing their root paradigms holds promise of becoming a valuable tool for studying institutionalized behavior, for drawing cultural comparisons, and especially for investigating aspects of the process by which complex institutions, such as world religions, move from one culture into another with varying degrees of success or failure.

In the study of Chinese Buddhism, previously referred to, I used the method of root paradigm analysis to explore some of the reasons for and against acceptance of a sophisticated foreign religion by people of a complex civilization. In doing so, I relied heavily on the presumed

accuracy of the reports of historians and others about the ways in which Buddhism and Chinese culture interacted, as well as upon the opinions of serious scholars as to the meaning of the events they reported. Although that approach obviously makes the accuracy of the analysis depend on the credibility of those opinions, as well as on the data on which the analysis is based, there seems to be little alternative to proceeding in that manner in research of this kind, if the research is to be attempted at all. The same element of risk is involved in the present study of Indonesian Islam and Korean Christianity, where essentially the same method will be used; although the closer proximity in time of the events discussed makes a wider range of sources available and may otherwise somewhat change the situation. The application of the method hopefully will help develop it beyond the earlier studies as a research tool, in the effort to compare a similar process working itself out in two Asian countries, involving two different world religions.

II. The Islamization of Indonesia

Several factors make an attempt to study the entry of Islam into Indonesia different from the earlier effort to deal with the movement of Buddhism into China. One of these is the kind of data available. In the Chinese case, both the Buddhist and Confucian sides of the confrontation were represented by highly literate protagonists, and records of the arguments advanced in favor of each side have been relatively well preserved, since institutions and their libraries on both sides have survived intact to recent times. The nature of Islamic penetration into Indonesia, not to mention the character of Islam itself — at least in its Southeast Asian manifestations — obscures much of the detail in the process; and opposition arguments, if set down in writing at all, have survived much less well than in the Chinese case.

The earliest records of Malay and Indonesian Islamic contacts come from Chinese historians, who tell of an Arab invasion and/or colony

in east Sumatra in 674 A.D. (al-Attas 1971:1218 ; Tjandrasasmita 1978 :141), and the flight of large numbers of Arab and Persian traders to Kedah, north of modern Penang, on the west coast of the Malay peninsula, in 878 A.D., after a massacre of some 120,000 to 200,000 of their confreres in south China (al-Attas 1971:1218). Despite those early influences and later, sporadic Arab settlements, systematic Islamic penetration seems to have begun only with the arrival of Gujarati traders, near the beginning of the fifteenth century (U.S. Army 1964: 32), although some scholars argue in favor of a more significant Arab role (Tjandrasasmita 1978:143). Conquest by Moslem armies often was important, but there is little doubt that intermarriage between Indian or Arab merchants and the daughters of Indonesian merchants and nobles played a more important role in planting Islam firmly in the archipelago (Coedes 1968:22). The Islam brought by the Gujaratis, and probably Tamil Moslems as well, probably was already a Hinduized Islam, contrasting greatly with the strict practice of the Arabs. Of the "Five Pillars" of Islam — Confession of Faith in One God, prayers five times a day, fasting, pilgrimage, and the religious tax (Geertz 1960:122 -123) — only the first seems to have achieved much widespread acknowledgement and practice among early Indonesian converts, who often were illiterates instructed in the faith by other merchants who were equally illiterate, or at least had little detailed or specialized knowledge of what they were trying to communicate. One of the most attractive characteristics of Islam for Indonesian merchants may have been its egalitarianism (U.S. Army 1964:32), which, contrasting as it did with the stylized hierarchicalism of the dominant nobility and their culture, may easily have had more appeal for the upwardly — mobile, profit — oriented Indonesian merchant class, which conceivably could have felt greater affinity with other merchants, from whatever nation, than with other classes in their own land. At any rate, in the view of Clifford Geertz (1960:125), the Islam which entered Indonesia and with which a majority of Indonesians had contact for hundreds of years, "provided

but a minimal contrast" to the earlier, longstanding religious culture, a syncretized melange of animism, Buddhism and Hinduism.

One strong root paradigm easily discerned in all Malay societies must have gone far to prepare the ground for acceptance of this simple form of Islam. This is the paradigm which urges a quest for balance among mutually conflicting forces and interests. It implies a certain pragmatic relativism and a world view which assumes that a fluid interaction of such forces and interests is natural, but which also seeks their harmonization, as both an ideal and a practical goal. In accordance with this ideal of harmony and balance, the One God of Islam must have appeared attractive to most Malaysian peoples as a guarantee of spiritual harmony which the often-warring gods of Hindu mythology could not offer. At the same time, the concept of one God, like the idea of rule by one king in an area then divided among small principalities, whose princes often had to share their power with *orang kaya* ("great men") (Kumar 1980:16), must have seemed somewhat unrealistic, so that popular belief in spirits and lesser gods continued—as it had done even in Arabia, the home of the most strict Islamic belief, in the form of *jinn*, *genii* and angels.

Consequently, despite the potential for conflict inherent in Moslem exclusivism, asceticism, concern with doctrine, opposition to iconic symbols, ethical concern and general intolerance—all of which went against the grain of the traditional attitudes or natural inclinations of most Indonesians (Geertz 1960: 123)—little actual conflict occurred because of widespread lack of concern for the fine points of Islamic practice among most of the archipelago's Moslems. Exceptions to this developed, notably in Sumatra, eastern Java and some of the trading cities of Java's north coast, whose very growth as ports and urban centers has been attributed to their conversion to Islam, by at least one authority (Tjandrasmita 1978:141).¹⁾ Even there, however, up to the

1) The growth of Southeast Asian port cities, including those in Java, had begun before significant Islamic religious influence entered the region,

late nineteenth century, Moslem practice would not have begun to equal the strictness of that in the Middle East.

Therefore, although the adaptation of Islam to Indonesia was genuine and gradually came to influence the deepest levels of Indonesian national character (Geertz 1960:124, citing Hurgronje 1906:280), the process was so slow that our search for the root paradigms which influenced the manner and degree of the religion's acceptance can safely be extended to the study of events in the nineteenth century, and even into the twentieth century, when historical documentation is more adequate to the task than during the earlier period. Improvements in sea transportation during the eighteenth century had encouraged pilgrimages to Mecca, and immigration of Arabs, especially from the conservative Hadramaut area of southern Arabia from the late eighteenth century through 1820 created a significant fundamentalist element in Indonesian Islam (Carey 1980:99). Coinciding as it did with the fundamentalist revival movement and the growth of "scripturalism" in world-wide Islam (Geertz 1968:65) this increasing contact with the Islamic homeland introduced forms of Islamic belief and practice into Indonesia which, for the first time on a significant scale, manifested sharp contrasts with the pre-Islamic culture.

Geertz (1960:160) stresses that, despite the many dimensions in which it appears to conflict with traditional Javanese outlooks, Islam has become important to Javanese life, especially among the *santris*, students of Islamic theology and law and, by extension, all devout Moslems, whose orientation to the world is described as

but it accelerated concurrently with the spread of Islam. The major cause of growth was the increasing spice trade, however, and Islam benefited incidentally from that trade, since it happened to be the religion of those who controlled the trade routes. Had the Arabs been Buddhists, Hindus or Christians, it is likely that Indonesia would have been subjected to the influence of Buddhism, Hinduism or Christianity, rather than Islam. Kenneth R. Hall (1985) has described pre-Islamic trade and state development in the region.

...The idea of a distant and powerful God who is concerned with the moral worth of the individual believer; the idea that secular behavior must somehow be justified in terms of religious doctrine; and the idea that among the proposed paths to religious understanding, one is correct and all the others are wrong. (*Ibid*)

Geertz implies that these views of the santris are in direct opposition to comparable outlooks in the traditional, pre-Islamic Javanese culture, which he designates as *abangan* and *priyayi* (or *prijaji*), representing the little and great traditions, respectively.

In discussing the slametan, the characteristic ritual of abangan society, Geertz (1960:14) notes that maintenance or restoration of social and spiritual equilibrium seems to be its main purpose. On the one hand, to promote social unity by making everyone feel equal, and on the other by pacifying the spirits with food so they will not disturb people and the desired state of *slamet*, which means that "nothing is going to happen to anyone," is ensured.

Turner, as has been noted above, found root paradigms by analyzing the "social dramas" evident in the patterned development, conduct and resolution of conflict situations. The series of revolts which took place in Central Java during and following the Java War, of 1825-1830, provides similarly fertile ground for observing the paradigms governing Javanese involved in situations of intense conflict precisely at a time when the newer forms of Islam were beginning to make their presence felt in Java. A recurrent theme of the revolts of this period is the messianic symbol of the *Ratu Adil*, or "Just Prince," who will institute a reign of truth and plenty after a period of decline (Carey 1980:70, citing Drewes, 1925). Although the origins of the Ratu Adil theme can be traced back to Hindu times, it continued to be expressed in the *wali*, or original apostles of Islam, who were credited with converting Java in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries. Foremost among the wali was Sunan Kalidjaga, a Central Javanese of the sixteenth century who is traditionally regarded as the most important apostle of the peaceful

conversion of Java to Islam (Geertz 1968 : 25-27). A member of the nobility of the crumbling Hindu-Buddhist kingdom of Madjapahit, Kalidjaga was converted, after a period spent as a profligate and bandit, became a central figure in the rise of the new Islamic state of Mataram, and successfully preached the Islamic faith in Central Java. Kalidjaga was converted in the course of an epic meditation, during which he is said to have achieved such a thorough knowledge of the Koran that his teacher, Bonang, told him he now knew more than Bonang himself, and sent him off to preach (Geertz 1960 : 325-326). Geertz notes that Kalidjaga became a Moslem because he *willed* to reform his life (1968 : 25-27), and his story epitomizes the Indonesian values of "inwardness, imperturbability, patience, poise, sensibility, aestheticism, elitism, and an almost obsessive self-effacement, the radical dissolution of individuality" (Geertz 1968 : 54).

The leader of the Javanese rebel forces in the Java War, Prince Dipanagara, combined noble birth, in the palace, or *kraton*,²⁾ of Yogyakarta, with intensive study of Islamic law and Koranic exegesis and frequent contact with Islamic scholars during his youth (Carey 1980 : 64). Although the isolated life of the *kraton* was nominally Moslem, Dipanagara could not have gotten such an intensive exposure to Islamic scholarship if he had not been taken out of Yogyakarta at an early age to live with his great-grandmother on her estate at Tegalreja, because the dominant *Weltanschauung* of the *kraton* was focused on the person of the sultan as *sakti*, one who is in command of supernatural powers, rather than on Islamic doctrine, according to Soemardjan (1978 : 222-223). *Sakti*, in Yogyakarta, bears a striking resemblance to *mana*, in Polynesian cultures; and the occurrence of similar patterns among tribal people speaking Malayo-Polynesian languages as far afield as northern Mindanao (Biernatzki 1973 : 18-29) suggests

2) For a discussion of the significance of the *kraton* in Central Javanese life from the eighteenth through the early twentieth centuries, see Soemardjan (1978).

both great antiquity and the presence of a root paradigm, which might be described as the assumption that certain leaders have powers which derive from their intermediary position between the human and spirit worlds and their privileged access to personal spirits, who give them special knowledge along with the power (Soemardjan 1978 : 223-224). The Ratu Adil, of the messianic tradition, must certainly have been a *sakti mandra guna*, or master in the benevolent use of supernatural powers. The same root paradigm found an effortless adaptation to Islam in the mythology surrounding the wali, Kalidjaga. Despite his strongly Islamic education, Dipanagara, too, could not have escaped the effects of the same root paradigm. Among his "santri" influences were *hadjis*, who had made the pilgrimage to Mecca and, thus, were direct sources of fundamentalist ideas, including that of the *jihad*, or "holy war" (Carey 1980 : 64-65).

As the son of an unofficial wife of Sultan Hamengkubuwana III, Dipanagara was passed over for the Sultanate in favor of his younger brother, who ruled from 1814 to 1822, but he willingly took the role of moral critic of the regents and court officials who really controlled the court, subject to increasing Dutch domination. Although he became co-guardian for his three-year-old nephew, who took the throne in 1822, Dipanagara effectively retired to Tegalreja in 1823, which then became a rallying point for disaffected elements, including nobles who had been impoverished by Dutch policies and the maladministration of the regent and other kraton officials. Also involved in the developing resistance were religious leaders, who, like Dipanagara himself, were disturbed by the wasteful luxury of the court and by the increasing westernization promoted by the Dutch presence. (Carey 1980 : 66-69).

After the outbreak of war, Dipanagara attracted widespread support, including that of a descendant of Kalidjaga, Pangeran Serang, and his poorly-equipped army won victories throughout Java. There can be little doubt that the symbol of the Ratu Adil, with its underlying root paradigm of controller of supernatural power, was instrumental in

attracting many to his cause, including many from the priyayi and abangan traditions, who might not have been swayed by an explicitly Moslem call to "holy war" (Carey 1980 : 70). Dipanagara used his identification with the Ratu Adil to the fullest, taking the title "Sultan Erucakra" (Messiah), early in the fighting (*Ibid.*). Dipanagara seriously miscalculated the extent to which the paradigm could be pushed, however, when he demanded, in a peace proposal to the Dutch, that he should be "recognized as an independent spiritual prince," having full powers in religious matters in the central Javanese kingdoms. This suggestion conflicted with the desire of Kyai Maja, his most important santri ally, to become *Imam* of both Yogyakarta and Surakarta. Here, perhaps, is an instance of conflicting personal ambitions being reinforced by a conflict of underlying root paradigms. In the case of Dipanagara, the root paradigm underlying the Ratu Adil symbol — explicitly reinforced by his references to Sultan Agung (1613-1646), the priest-kings of Giri (fifteenth and sixteenth centuries), and other historical embodiments of the Ratu Adil tradition — matched the Malay root paradigm by subsuming both temporal and spiritual power under one messianic figure, while the more modern, and more Middle Eastern, paradigm underlying the role of Imam was foremost in the mind of the more radical Moslem fundamentalist, Kyai Maja, who assumed that he should have a spiritual leadership position, separate from the temporal role of the revolution's leader, Dipanagara (Carey 1978 : 73-74). The cause of the rebels was hurt, in 1827, by the premature surrender of Kyai Maja and the defection of some of Dipanagara's priyayi followers, as well as by the arrogance of his best general, a nobleman, towards the religious leaders, which was barely compensated for by Dipanagara's charisma, as both "Just Prince" and Islamic zealot. Popular support for the guerrilla war remained strong, however, until the leader's capture, through deceit, at a peace conference in March 1830 (Carey 1978 : 75-76).

Carey (1978 : 77-78), points out that both the attractions for Moslems, as such, of Dipanagara's rebellion as a religious movement and the

religious requirements demanded of his followers—belief in God and circumcision—were minimal. Much more important was the dominant symbol of the Ratu Adil, embodied in Dipanagara, and the social drama which worked itself out in terms of the traditional root paradigm of the spiritual prince, wielding in the temporal world powers obtained from supernatural sources. Dipanagara's own Islamic faith was real enough, but it only filled functions in the social drama of the rebellion which might have been filled as well by Hindu or animistic sources of supernatural power in an earlier phase of Javanese culture history.

This case of an Indonesian social drama is one example of the way Islam has interacted with the root paradigms of the older Indonesian culture, and it reveals some of the strengths and weaknesses the new religion brought to that interaction.

On the positive side, in terms of Islam's ability to fit into Indonesian culture, the simplicity and undemanding character of its doctrines certainly favored its acceptance. The zeal and conviction manifested by proselytizers must have made an impression on potential converts due to the very contrast between them and the normal tranquility of daily life. At least as important was the mystical tendency in Islam, which resonated with the strong mystical bent in the Indonesian national character (Geertz 1960 : 182-184; 309-352). Centering on intimate knowledge of the One God, Islamic mystical goals are quite compatible with the quest for, or better "opening to," tranquility and *rasa* (feeling/meaning) which is at the heart of traditional Javanese mystical meditation (Geertz 1960 : 238-239 ; 310-312). The root paradigm underlying both mysticisms can be stated generally to be the assumption that valuable spiritual knowledge can be achieved through passive meditation. As I noted earlier, the Indonesian world-view assumes that a quest for harmony and balance among the opposing forces in the world is a desirable goal, and this root paradigm is clearly consistent with the doctrine of One God, Who by His omnipotence can bring order to all His creation.

Negatively, Islam's adaptation to Indonesian culture could only have been temporarily promoted by the manifestations of too much zeal. *Alus*-behavior and appearance which is "pure, refined, polished, polite, exquisite, ethereal, subtle, civilized, smooth"—is preeminently a mark of the *priyayi* (Geertz 1960 : 232), but it set a standard for all Javanese, even the most *kasar* ("vulgar") peasant, at least to appreciate, if not to emulate. To exhibit too much or too sustained excitement, even for the sake of religion, probably would prove disturbing to anyone raised in a culture influenced by the root paradigms underlying *alus*. Thus, while the zeal of the convert maker might initially attract attention, few Indonesians could live comfortably in the atmosphere of sustained religious excitement which at least some manifestations of Islam appear to require. Indonesian Islam could, and did, adapt to this exigency, but seemingly at the cost of some of the vigor seen in the Islam of other countries. Furthermore, the very simplicity which made Islam easy to accept may work against the acquisition of a manifestly Islamic character by Indonesian culture. Despite the numerical preponderance of Islam as a religion, the distinctively Indonesian culture seems much more fundamentally determined by traits common to other parts of the Malay culture area, overlaid by Indian influence and only thinly veneered by clearly Moslem traits, except among a *santri*-oriented minority.

Modern developments illustrate further the limitations of Islamic adaptation and the underlying strength of pre-Islamic paradigms in Indonesian life. The Islamic revival, which has gathered momentum throughout the Moslem world from the middle of the nineteenth century to the present, has been marked, at various times and in various places, by puritanism, fundamentalism and scripturalism—often all three. It coincided with the growth of the anti-colonialist movement in Indonesia and served, at times, as a powerful unifying force for that movement. However, the parallel developments of westernization and secularization were not inconsiderable, especially among the *priyayi* class, which furnished most government officials and intellectuals under the Dutch

colonial administration. Geertz discerns two tendencies in the modern Javanese priyayi: the "literati," typically from the inland sultanates, who self-consciously tried to preserve as much as possible of the old court culture, and the "intelligentsia," who turned heavily to western ways and interests; although he stresses that the two groups overlap considerably (1960 : 235-238).

Many clues suggest that the old root paradigms have remained constant under both tendencies, no matter how radically ways of life.... and even dominant symbols and fundamental values may have appeared to change. One outstanding example is the survival of the "spiritual prince" paradigm into the post-colonial period to be re-expressed in terms of the symbols and values of the Republic of Indonesia. Geertz (1968 : 74-75 ; and 86-87) has traced this continuity in the case of President Soekarno, who patterned his style of government much along the lines of the "theater state" of the Mataram kingdom and created for himself a public image reflecting the values of the India intellectual tradition. The paradigm perhaps was more to be expected as a guiding assumption for Soekarno than it might have been for most other Indonesian political leaders, because his father came from the lower priyayi class and his mother came from Bali, where the Hindu tradition remained strong; but it was precisely this background which gave him much of his wide charismatic appeal and consequent ability to unite members of ideologically diverse factions in support of the nationalist movement. Along with other elements of the Ratu Adil symbolism, Soekarno emphasized the mystical, and even the magical, in prophesying the course the independence movement was destined to take (Van Niel 1980 : 150).

While depending on this paradigm from the priyayi tradition, Soekarno was simultaneously able to appeal, in his sympathy for Marhaen, the "common man," to the latent, but powerful paradigm of egalitarianism, which he used to promote the nationalist movement as it had earlier contributed to the spread of Islam (Van Niel 1980 : 149-150).³⁾ In

3) It is something of a paradox that this underlying thirst for equal treat-

recognition of the powerful santri element in the independence movement, Soekarno also called upon more specifically Islamic symbolism, especially in his June 1, 1945, enunciation of *Panca Sila* (or "Pantjasila") the "Five Pillars" of Indonesian nationalism (Abdulgani 1978 : 268-271), a seemingly intentional analogy to the "Five Pillars" which summarize the essentials of the Islamic faith (Geertz 1960 : 122-123).⁴⁾

In summary, we can conclude that Islam has been accepted by Indonesians and has become an integral component of Indonesian culture aided by its complementarity with the root paradigms underlying that culture. Among those paradigms are the Indonesian assumption that a sense of harmony and equilibrium can be achieved through mystical and religious means, a desire for at least a degree of recognition of human equality, and a tendency to seek simplified statements of principles which can be applied flexibly in meeting the challenges of life. Islam at least was compatible with the deep-seated Indonesian (and Malay, Filipino and Polynesian) root paradigm which assumed that political and religious leadership arose from a quasi-shamanistic and mystical encounter between a messianic "spiritual prince" and a source of spiritual knowledge and power, thereafter controlled by the prince to use as he willed. On the other hand, Islam had to be considerably modified to adapt to certain Indonesian root paradigms which it simply could not displace from the established cultural assumptions. Among these were a need for a close

ment can so often be found coexisting, in traditionally highly stratified East Asian societies, with a desire for clearly-defined authority structures. An example of the way this tension is manifested in a Korean village has been well described by Vincent Brandt (1971:91-93, 102-107, and *passim*).

- 4) Abdulgani (1978:270) summarizes Soekarno's Five Pillars as follows: Belief in God as the source of both rights and duties for all human beings; Humanitarianism which must be brought to bear on all international human problems; Nationalism and Patriotism as the means of achieving these ends; and Social Justice as the individual and national goal.

relationship with familiar spirits, in contrast to a coldly rational and somewhat distant relationship with one patriarchal God, a desire for tranquility which worked against a sustained state of zealous religious expression, and a world-view which assumed a fluid interaction of opposed forces in the world and could not quite be reconciled with the doctrinaire, intolerant, exclusivist approach to life frequently seen in the Middle East. The same Indonesian paradigms prevented an extreme preoccupation with ethical concerns and greatly reduced the potential for interest in *jihad*, or "Holy War." Islam therefore has achieved a more integral adaptation to Indonesian culture than Buddhism has to the culture of China, but at a cost of considerable abridgment of its core doctrines.

III. Christianity in Korea

Three phases can be distinguished in the history of the penetration of Christianity into Korea, the conditions of each of which were radically different from the others politically and socially. In the first phase, beginning about 1777 and lasting until 1886, Christians—almost exclusively Catholics—were a hated and persecuted minority, leading a catacomb—like existence thoroughly marginal to the mainstream of Korean culture. In the second phase, from 1886⁵⁾ to 1945, political conditions allowed for somewhat more free evangelization and religious practice, with only sporadic persecution, under both the later Yi Dynasty and Japanese colonial rule (1910-1945). During that period, Protestants joined Catho-

5) The treaty establishing diplomatic relations with France, in 1886, provided explicitly for free missionary work by French Catholics, but Protestants also benefited. In fact, both Presbyterian and Methodist missionaries had arrived the previous year, and Horace Allen—in effect a medical missionary, though nominally with the American embassy—came in 1884; but all had to be extremely circumspect in their contacts with Koreans until after the French treaty was signed (Kim and Chung 1964:313; Clark 1971:88-101; and Maryknoll 1926:61).

lics in the country and were more successful than the latter in attracting social leaders and in being identified as "modern" in the view of most Koreans. During the third phase, from 1945 to the present, both Protestants and Catholics have achieved full insertion into Korean society and are moving towards numerical dominance in the South Korean population. At present, Protestants far outnumber Catholics but enjoy considerably less cohesiveness, shading off into a plethora of sects and cults which often have been heavily syncretized with animistic, shamanistic, Buddhist and Confucian traits.

Since systematic opposition by the Communist government makes the overt practice of Christianity essentially impossible in North Korea, this discussion will deal exclusively with the Republic of Korea when it refers to the period after 1945.

The introduction of Christian influence during the first phase depended on relatively few individuals, most of them Korean, since missionaries tended to have a very low life-expectancy once they had entered the country. Perhaps the most noteworthy contrast between the converts of that period and the overwhelming mass of the Korean people was the individualism shown by the former, in the face of an ultra-centralized monarchy and bureaucracy, replicated in microcosm by the patriarchal clan and family. The individual had little independent value in such a system, except for the functional contribution he could make to his family, his clan and the state. In practice, of course, there were ameliorating circumstances and compensations which made life more liveable than this bare description may suggest; but the fact remains that an important root paradigm which was especially evident during that period was the assumption that the good of the larger social entities should always take precedence, and that interests of any individual always should be subordinated to the interests of the group. The Christian converts, however, often willingly faced martyrdom, even though their resistance was interpreted almost universally as treason to the state, and even though it frequently involved alienation from, and disgrace

to, family and clan and disobedience to parents and other elders.⁶⁾

During this early period, Christianity evidently made a strong appeal to some, but its contact with the general population was so limited and political conditions so adverse that it is impossible to draw any conclusions, from data from the first phase alone, about the compatibility or incompatibility of Korean and Christian root paradigms. It is evident, from the court records of the persecution, that Korean converts experienced a violent conflict of paradigms in their personal lives. Their perseverance, once they had made their choice to resist the authorities, fits not only the Christian paradigm of martyrdom but also a strong Korean paradigm which would identify as personal disgrace the abandonment of a commitment if that commitment had been accompanied by a certain level of social trauma and by symbolism with high affective content for the individual and others immediately involved, as would have been true of almost any conversion at that time. That reinforcement of paradigms says nothing about the acceptability or unacceptability of the religion by Koreans, but it does suggest that the Christian "martyrdom" paradigm might later become a strong factor in giving Christian identity a higher value in the eyes of Koreans and that it might become an important legitimating factor, offsetting the seemingly "illegitimate" violations committed against both the political structure and "filial piety" (*hyo*) in the act of resisting.

The Korean equivalent of China's mandarin class were the *yangban*. Apart from close relatives of the royal family, yangban status was determined by an individual passing the civil service examinations and

6) The best western-language source on the persecutions probably still is Dallet (1874). The most complete English source is Kim and Chung (1964). The Committee for Bicentennial Commemorative Projects of the Catholic Church in Korea produced a volume containing summaries of the lives of the 103 martyrs canonized in 1984 (Committee for Beatification and Canonization 1984), and the Maryknoll Fathers also produced a brief English account (Maryknoll 1926) which is essentially a translation of French sources.

being promoted to high government office. Yangban identity thereafter adhered to that official's descendants to the fourth generation. Although not hereditary, in the strict sense, the yangban came to comprise something like a class more or less closed to outsiders because only sons of yangban ordinarily had access to sufficient educational resources or leisure for study to enable them to pass the higher levels of civil service examinations (Yi 1970 : 28 ; Henderson 1968 : 37-46, and 387 footnote 3).⁷⁾ The yangban class tended to shape the root paradigms, fundamental values and dominant symbols, not only of their own class but also of the commoners and slaves, who probably comprised about ninety percent of the total population (Osgood 1951 : 134). They also established and enforced the laws of the realm, according to their strict interpretation of Confucian doctrine; so that the overt dimensions of the initial encounters between Christianity and Korea were characteristically encounters of Christianity with the paradigms, values and symbolic system of the yangban.

Certain Korean paradigms, symbols and values were used by the underground Korean Christians to accomplish their own purposes. For example, the elaborate Korean mourning complex was exploited to disguise French priests and to enable them to move undetected from place to place and administer the sacraments. One traditional form of mourning garb included a large, basket-like hat and a hand-held screen which men in mourning used to "hide their faces from Heaven," in shame that they had allowed a parent to die, but which also amply concealed the distinctive features of the foreign priests. The avoidance

7) The examination system first appeared prominently in Korea in 788 A. D., during the Unified Silla period, probably as a borrowing from T'ang China (Lee Ki-baik 1984:83), and the class structure acquired much of its later form during the Koryo Dynasty (918-1392) (*Ibid.* 111-113). Henderson (1968:387) notes that substantially more clans were represented among Yi Dynasty examination passers prior to 1606 than in the last three centuries of that dynasty, indicating a hardening of class lines and a reduction of social mobility during the later period.

of conversation with such a mourner, out of respect for his grief, also kept even the police from questioning a person thus garbed (Yi 1970 : 188-189, and photographs on p.158). The first Korean priest, Saint Andrew Kim (1821-1846), also was disguised as a yangban at the time of his capture, in the belief — which had proven correct up until that event — that his free movements would therefore not be impeded by the relatively lowly rural officials he would ordinarily encounter on his travels (Yi 1970 : 190-191). The identification of the priest as “yangban” became legally founded by the treaty with France, in 1886, which stipulated that the missionaries should be accorded the rights of travelling yangban by local officials, but such rights sometimes were not acknowledged by mobs, and permanent residence by missionaries outside certain ports and major cities only gradually came to be allowed (Maryknoll 1926 : 61-65).

The extra-territorial rights acquired by the missionaries sometimes appear to have been pushed by them to the limit, as in the construction of Myong-dong Cathedral, in Seoul, during the 1890s. It was a redbrick gothic structure which towered triumphalistically over a city of approximately 200,000 people in which only palace buildings and a few guild halls exceeded one storey in height—in order to avoid the possibility of men looking down into the courtyards of homes and thereby causing serious loss of status to any unveiled yangban woman whose face they might see there (Osgood 1951 : 137). Such cultural insensitivity was compounded by the prohibition of ancestor rites—the central feature of Korean ritual life and the chief symbolic expression of the group solidarity of both family and clan (Janelli and Janelli 1982) —which directly contravened the fundamental value Korean culture placed on family and clan, as well as violating the root paradigm of subordination of the individual to the group, mentioned earlier.

Protestantism contained within it much the same potential for conflict with Korean ways as did Catholicism, but it was able to appeal to the emerging desires of modernizing Korea much more quickly and efficiently

than Catholics seemed able to do. The entry of Catholicism into Korea in the 1770s and 1780s had been a byproduct of the *Silhak* (or "Sirhak"), "practical learning," movement. Silhak began among out-of-power scholars, many of whom were connected with the *Namin* ("southerners") political faction. Their inability to gain political power, over an extended period, was at least partly due to the progressive concentration of political power in the hands of a few clans, mentioned previously (Lee Ki-baik 1984 : 233). Their very impotence in the political sphere had the effect of freeing them from having to concentrate their studies solely on Chu-hsi neo-Confucianism and enabled them to pay attention to other branches of learning—some of the most exciting of which involved the few glimmers of western science, technology, philosophy and theology which reached them through China. Consequently, it was a group of Silhak scholars who met in a Buddhist temple, Ch'on-Ji Am, in 1777, to discuss the various Catholic books they had obtained, and it was the same group who made the first contact with the Church in Peking (*ibid.*, 232-240). This initial identification of Christianity with modernization was frustrated by the conflict which immediately arose between Catholicism (called *Sŏ-hak*, "Western Learning") and the royal government, due to identification of the new converts with the *Namin* faction, which was out of power, to the prohibition of ancestor rites by the Church, and in 1801, after the persecution had begun, to an appeal for foreign military intervention on behalf of the persecuted Christians, by some of the converts (*ibid.*, 240). Thereafter, Korean Catholics took on a catacomb mentality which centered on the secret Catholic communities, one of whose main tasks was to hide the few priests who were able to enter the country and to move them secretly from place to place. This outlook was not fully abandoned after the end of the persecution, and Catholic life throughout the Japanese colonial period and even past the Korean War (1950-1953) remained focussed on the local parish and its pastor, with little opening to the larger Korean community (Biernatzki, Im and Min 1975 : 3-13 and 22-25).

In marked contrast to Catholic reticence, the first Protestant missionaries plunged directly into the work of establishing modern medical and educational institutions, earning for themselves a reputation for temporal utility as well as for giving religious succor, especially among the most avantgarde of the Korean intelligensia (Clark 1971 : 88-95 ; Lee Ki-baik 1984 : 334-335). The Protestant effort was timed fortuitously. Public confidence in old institutions was crumbling due to internal stagnation and their inability to cope with foreign aggression just at the moment when awareness of the outside world was blossoming. Silhak had expressed a paradigm of progress through intellectual initiative and adventurousness (Lee Ki-baik 1984 : 240-242) which reemerged in the modernization movement. Perhaps this paradigm has never been general enough among Koreans to qualify as the sort of general cultural assumption about correct behavior which would make it a root paradigm, but it was important among the dissatisfied intellectuals. Coupled with the deeper paradigm of the Confucian scholar and gentleman as an ideal type worthy of emulation by all through education—probably a truly “root” paradigm—the progress paradigm of Silhak prepared fertile ground for Protestantism in the forms in which it initially entered Korea—characteristically an American Calvinism, whose unquestioned “ethic” (Weber 1930) was founded on the bedrock of the Augustinian assumption of progress which underlies most Christian thought in the West (Nisbet 1980 : 47-76). Some of the “avantgarde” had chosen to put their hope for modernization on the Japanese; but this amounted to a betrayal of Korean national interest and ended in a deadend street in 1945, when the Protestant pattern—as the leading edge of a larger, mostly American pattern of modernization—achieved supremacy in South Korea with the American victory over Japan.

A thorough study of the ways root paradigms interacted during the final phase (1945 to the present) of Christian adaptation to Korea would require a careful analysis not only of pre-existing Korean paradigms—complicated by the trauma of national collapse and colonialistic attempts

to uproot Korean culture itself — but also of the even more complicated paradigms which underlaid the behavior of foreign missionaries from various denominations, of Christians who had lived in Korea throughout the Japanese occupation, and of returning Christian exiles, whose political and social impact was enormous, especially between 1945 and 1960. This would be a daunting task, requiring the assignment of a correct weighting to each of the widely diverse influences which can be called “Christian” and also giving consideration to enormously complex national and international political factors, and to do justice to it would require several books, not merely a brief research paper. Here, I can only sketch two or three of the most obvious Christian complexes of symbols and values, attempt to discern the root paradigms supporting them, suggest how they might have interacted with the most evident Korean root paradigms, and leave more extended exploration to whoever might be interested in pursuing it in the future.

The “education for progress” paradigm of Protestant education did not quite match the “education for the gentleman” paradigm of the neo-Confucian tradition. The tradition-minded rural population which formed the core of the Korean population from 1945 through the 1960s had little interest either in Protestantism or progress, but education still beckoned to them as the only ladder of success by which their sons could climb out of rural poverty and drudgery, to pull their families up after. “Education” above all meant literature, history, law, political science and, to some degree, theoretical economics. Such mundane subjects as the physical sciences, engineering and business were below the interest of the true gentleman-scholar, according to the dominant set of educational values, even though they might be of more use to a reconstructing nation and might provide literally golden opportunities for men willing to get their hands dirty and gain an advantageous position to profit from the Korean “economic miracle” which, at least by the mid-1960s, already was beginning to take shape. Nevertheless, any education was preferable to none, and the early Protestant emphasis

on schools paid off in terms of prestige and a gradual acceptance of at least the chief denominations as part of the cultural mainstream.

Although Catholics soon followed the Protestant lead in developing modern medical facilities and, in the 1950s, a medical college, they continued to lag in the educational field, and still have few primary or secondary schools in Korea. Higher education for lay people, other than the medical school and some nursing schools, began with a girls' college (Hyo-sung) in the 1950s, and was greatly augmented in the early 1960s by another girls' college (Song-sim) and a co-educational university (Sogang). Some of the Catholic lag in higher educational influence was quickly made up for by daring innovations which were copied by other universities and became part of government educational policies, and by the university's recruitment of particularly economists, high-quality faculty members, several of whom went on to become important shapers of Korea's successful economic development policies and came to be called "The Sogang School" of economics.

Another Protestant advantage over the Catholics in any competition which might arise between them for Koreans' sympathies is the fact that Protestant ministers marry, while Catholic priests and religious do not. Clerical celibacy has been a draw back to Catholics in Korea from the very beginning (Diaz 1984 : 203 and 226)⁸⁾, much as it has proven to be for Buddhists in Korea and China (Biernatzki 1984 : 164-167 and 177-179), violating, as it seems to do, the root paradigm which requires that the individual marry to continue the ancestral line of descent. This is a close corollary of the root paradigm, mentioned earlier, which calls for the subordination of the individual to the good of larger social entities, such as the family, clan and state. While the dedicated work of priests and religious is appreciated, it remains very difficult — even in the 1980s

8) The dissertation by Hector Diaz (1984) is an analysis, with translation, of the *Chu-Gyo Yo-ji*, an exposition of Catholic theology written in Korean slightly before 1796, by Augustine Chŏng Yak-jong, the elder brother of the famous Silhak scholar "Ta-san" (Chŏng Yak-yong) (*Ibid.*, 58). Chŏng Yak-jong died in the persecution of 1801.

— for many non-Catholic Koreans to value their celibacy as a socially legitimate way of life.

In contrast, Catholics have fared better than Protestants with regard to the ritual behavior which is demanded by deep-seated Korean root paradigms. The rituals — ancestor rites, in particular — generally have been approached at a rather shallow, symbolic level by both Catholics and Protestants, but Catholic practice seems to have met more successfully the requirements of the paradigms which underlie the symbols. Although both initially forbade the ancestor rites, Catholic authorities allowed a degree of participation, under Japanese pressure, during the 1930s. According to a survey conducted in 1970, 84.5% of Korean Catholics reported some degree of participation in ancestor rites of the traditional form (Biernatzki, Im and Min 1975 : 46). Although no comparable data exist for Protestants, the usual Protestant attitude seems to be avoidance of the traditional ancestor rites altogether, substituting Bible services for them, when possible. Since the substitution is likely to be acceptable only when most of the relatives are Christians, the result would tend to be alienation of Protestants from more traditional-minded non-Christian members of their families. The elaborate Catholic funeral rituals and Masses for the dead also provide an attractive alternative ritual expression of the underlying need to remember the deceased in some way, even though the Catholic symbolism diverges from the traditional Korean pattern. In fact, however, the custom of remembering the ancestors in any way, after the funeral service, appears to be showing some deterioration under modern conditions of urban disruption of close family ties. For example, priests tend to report that relatively few Catholics have anniversary Masses said for their deceased relatives, even though this is a readily available means for manifesting the root paradigm of filial piety, which calls for the ritual expression of solidarity with departed ancestors.

Ritual expressiveness is a strong element in Korean life. Whether it should be called a root paradigm or a dominant complex of symbols, it

has worked closely with the traditional paradigms of the individual's subordination to the group, filial piety, and others, to stabilize the social order. Co-existing with ritualism, however, and in strong tension, sometimes conflict, with it in individual psychology as well as group behavior, is a bent towards emotional expression. This seems to grow out of the desire for equal treatment, which we saw existing in Indonesian society (Van Niel 1980 : 149-150), as well as in Korean society (Brandt 1971 : 91-93 and 102-107). Often the strongest expressions of this in Korea are seen to be in support of non-traditional groups' solidarity — parties, student demonstrations, religious services, etc. — where the individual seems to give emotional expression to his free membership in the voluntary group, one might almost say as an apparent sign of contrast to his "unwilling" membership in more traditional groups—e.g., family, school, state, etc. The tension between ritualism and egalitarian emotionalism in Korean culture has had its Christian counterpart in the tension, or polarity, between Catholic ritual and Pentacostal Protestant spontaneity in religious expression. Both have achieved a certain legitimacy within their own denominations—in Korea as in the West—but Korean Catholicism has had to make a place within its fold, in the form of the Catholic charismatic movement, for a substantial expression of the egalitarian emotionalistic tendency, which suggests that the latter may have a certain preponderance, at least in some ways, in contemporary Korean society.

One Korean root paradigm which has been identified as an important component of the Korean national character by Korean literary and art critics (Kim Yöl-kyu 1980 and 1982 ; Sö Nam-dong 1984 ; and Ch'ön Kyöng-ja 1972) is *han* (恨), which carries such a heavy loading of emotion and symbolic references that it is very difficult to translate adequately. The dictionary meanings, "discontent," "regret" and "unsatisfied desire" come closest (Martin, Lee and Chang 1968 : 1791), but they require further explanation. The most accurate English equivalent may be "generalized resentment." Han is said to arise from Korea's

history of exploitation, colonial repression and impotence in the face of foreign aggression; but it probably also owes something to the crushing of individual hopes and ambitions by the traditional social structure. Together with this, *han* suggests a tendency to take pleasure in the wistful sadness of regret, but it also implies harsher feelings of "grudge" or "rancor," as the primary dictionary meanings indicate (Martin, Lee and Chang 1968 : 1791 and Mathews 1952 : 310), even though those elements should not be overemphasized in treating *han* as a root paradigm. *Han* definitely is related to the egalitarian pole of the tension between subordination of the individual to the group and egalitarianism, mentioned above, since the strength of Korean demands for equal treatment seems to stem mainly from individual resentment against the strictures of the social system. *Han* also supplies a certain vehemence to intra-institutional disputes which often precludes compromise. This has led to multiple schisms within Korean Protestantism (Moffett 1962 : 80 and 113-118 ; Clark 1971 : 274-277 and 306-317), and less fundamental, but no less traumatic confrontations in the Catholic Church.⁹⁾

In summarizing the traditional Korean root paradigms which have had special relevance for the way Christianity has been received into Korean culture, the following seem to emerge, although some remain difficult to disentangle from symbols and fundamental values. No priority among them is intended by their numbers, which are supplied only for ease in referring to the paradigms.

1. The good of individuals is subordinate to the good of larger social entities.
2. Filial piety.
3. Equality and freedom of individuals in matters which are not clearly subordinated to authority structures by tradition or some

9) One example of this is the religious orders, several of which have been established in Korea but, almost without exception, have seemed inevitably to reach a point where their work is seriously threatened by personality clashes and other, seemingly insignificant disagreements which become major crises due, at least partly, to *han*.

other unquestionable source of legitimation.

4. Individual and social self-respect is to be retained by adherence to public commitments.
5. Social hierarchy is part of the natural order.
6. Han.

The first five of these "root paradigms" are difficult to state in ways which are clearly distinguishable from "fundamental values," but other fundamental values of Korean culture seem not to be as closely linked to the determination of patterns of social action as are the above, nor are they as likely to be assumed as part of the "natural order" of things by most Koreans. Other elements touched on previously are better regarded as "dominant symbols," rather than root paradigms. Ritual expression and deference are dominant symbols which enter into the expression of root paradigms 1, 2 and 5, in particular. Emotional expression of small group solidarity through various symbols is particularly related to numbers 3, 4 and 6. Education, in general, seems to be a fundamental value, but it usually is thought of as an instrument, to be used in achieving other values, according to the behavior patterns dictated by various root paradigms, such as 1, 2, 5, and often even the individual self-expression dictated by number 3.

Several relevant root paradigms are especially evident in the kinds of Christianity which have been introduced into Korea, but they are not necessarily present in all denominations, and they even may vary widely for the same denomination at different periods.

1. Individual, rather than group, as the principal object, and subject, of the process of salvation.
2. Martyrdom as the ultimate expression of value.
3. Social hierarchy.
4. Progress.

Numbers 1 and 2, on this list, are common to both Catholics and Protestants, within the Korean historical context, although 2 has been more strongly emphasized by Catholics. Number 3 is almost exclusively

Catholic. Number 4 is common to both in the strictly spiritual order, as "progress towards salvation," but "temporal progress with implications for the spiritual life," as a strong American root paradigm, has been more characteristic of Protestant missionary activity in Korea, even though American Catholic missionaries also have been strongly affected by it. Martyrdom, of course, also can be considered to be a symbolic expression of individual commitment to Christ, but it also can be stated more generally, as a root paradigm. Celibacy is a dominant symbol, among Catholics, especially expressing root paradigm number 1, but also important in expressing number 3. Deference is an important symbolic expression of number 3, for Catholics; and education is valued as an instrumental means to achieve both spiritual and temporal progress (number 4).

Conflicts between the traditional and Christian root paradigms are especially evident between the paradigms numbered "1" on the two lists, for both Catholics and Protestants, who as Christians must always prefer the individual's ultimate good to that of the social group. Traditional root paradigm number 2 clashes with the Catholic dominant symbol of celibacy, and therefore with the Catholic interpretation of Christian paradigm 1, to a greater degree than with the Protestant interpretation, at least in terms of the requirement of procreation to maintain the continuity of the consanguineous group. Traditional paradigm 3, by contrast, supports Christian paradigms 1 and 2, and does not seriously conflict with any of the four Christian paradigms, although it does conflict with number 1 on its own list. Traditional paradigm 4 is strongly supportive of Christian paradigm 2. Traditional paradigm 5 favors Christian paradigm 3, which is characteristically Catholic, and contributes to the high status priests enjoy in the Korean Church, but it tends to conflict with both 1 and 4 on the Christian list. Although education is seen both as instrumental and as a value, rather than as a root paradigm, in relation to both lists, it enters so strongly into the expression of several traditional and Christian root paradigms that its

potential for reinforcing the Christian paradigms cannot be ignored. Traditional paradigm 6, han, is the only one on the traditional list which cannot be restated as a fundamental value, and consequently it tends to contradict other paradigms on both the traditional and Christian lists. It aggravates the tension between traditional paradigms 1 and 3, and it tends especially to contradict Christian paradigms 3 and 4; though it may lend support to Christian paradigms 1 and, particularly, 2—lending to the ideal of martyrdom the emotional support of its own glorification of sadness.

The tension between ritual expressiveness and spontaneous (or anti-ritual) expressiveness, present in both traditional and Christian contexts, can be seen as providing a rather wide "window" of possibilities for Christian expression in Korea, and the wide diversity of the Christian organizational forms which have entered Korea seems to have exploited that advantage quite effectively.

This analysis could go on indefinitely, and even the few paradigms treated above could be subjected to more fruitful and deeper analysis; but what has been said will help illuminate at least some phenomena which have in the past been particularly obscure, and in so doing will illustrate the value of the methodology I am suggesting.

IV. Concluding Comparison

The Indonesian experience with Islam has extended over more than five centuries, during which time the religion has achieved a gradual but relatively complete penetration of Indonesian society. Christianity's work in Korea, on the other hand, has been going on for only slightly over 200 years, but at an accelerating rate, especially during the most recent period, so that its penetration of Korea shows signs of becoming as complete as has been Islam's into Indonesia and in a much shorter time. Although both penetrations have been successful the root paradigm analysis suggests significant differences in the reasons for their

success and in the ways in which the two religions have been accepted into, and adapted to, the two cultures.

Islamic doctrine is simple, being reducible to the "Five Pillars" of Islam, and it entered a culture, that of Indonesia, which tended to appreciate simple statements of principle. However, it encountered a strong agrarian civilization with a substratum of powerful root paradigms which required significant changes in Islam's symbolism, if the religion was to communicate itself successfully to Indonesians, and which worked against the full expression even of the already-minimal Five Pillars. Many elements in the old, priyayi culture were given Islamic meanings, but the root paradigms remained essentially untouched, as did many of the symbols and values of the earlier civilization. Although Islam "conquered" Indonesia, it did so at the expense of the loss of much of its Middle Eastern rigor, both in belief and practice.

The traditional root paradigms Christianity encountered in Korea were, in some ways, already in conflict with each other, particularly in the form of the tension between group values and the value of the individual and in the root paradigm *han*, which aggravated that tension and encouraged a vague dissatisfaction with the *status quo*. Furthermore, the traditional Korean system had been badly shocked by the inability of its yangban leadership either to adapt to modern needs or to resist the inroads of foreign aggression. The Korea which Christianity encountered had a culture far less consistent or integrated internally than the culture found by Islam in Indonesia. With the traditional order in such disarray, Koreans were receptive to new modes of behavior, particularly since they did not definitely or unambiguously conflict with the root paradigms. Although Christian doctrine is much more complex than that of Islam, it reached Korea under such diverse forms that most Koreans seem able to find some religious pattern which is compatible with their own inclinations and which still can be called "Christian." Even the most doctrinally rigorous form of Christianity, Catholicism, has been able to offer multiple avenues of symbolic expression, and points at which it

conflicts most strongly with root paradigms—such as the opposition between celibacy and filial piety—affect only a small proportion of believers, the clergy, and in any event are no longer serious problems for believers, since after conversion they are inclined to accept doctrinal explanations which explain the Catholic paradigms in ways consistent with the traditional Korean paradigms.

In this analysis, the Korean traditional root paradigms proved more difficult to isolate and clearly describe than the Indonesian root paradigms. This may be due to the direct colonialism Korea suffered under Japanese occupation, in contrast to the less disruptive indirect Dutch rule, through the *priyayi* class, in Indonesia. Although this factor seems to have obscured the Korean root paradigms, and to have made it necessary to describe most of them more in terms of the fundamental values they underlie, rather than as clearly describable fundamental assumptions about the nature of man and the world, I do not believe that a transient historical event such as a period of colonial rule could have had a serious distorting effect on such fundamental cultural patterns, nor is it likely to have accelerated their rate of change. On the other hand, the tension noted between the evaluation of the group and the evaluation of the individual — a tension present but not to as disruptive a degree in Indonesia — appears to represent a genuine conflict between the root paradigms which underlie the two sets of conflicting values. Manifestations of this tension therefore can be expected to continue, not only in religion but in all other dimensions of Korean life.

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