

Communism and Korean Communism: A Juxtapositional Comparison*

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In the eyes of the true believer, people who have no holy cause are without backbone and character.... the true believers of various hues, though they view each other with mortal hatred and are ready to fly at each other's throat, recognize and respect each other's strength.... All the true believers of our time--whether Communist, Nazi, Fascist, Japanese or Catholic--declaimed volubly (and the Communist still do) on the decadence of the Western democracies. The burden of their talk is that in the democracies people are too soft, too pleasure-loving and too selfish to die for a nation, a God or a holy cause. This lack of a readiness to die, we are told, is indicative of an inner rot--a moral and biological decay. The democracies are old, corrupt and decadent. They are no match for the virile congregations of the faithful who are about to inherit the earth. Eric Hoffer, *The True Believer* (New York: Perennial Library, 1951), p. 147.

"When I think about socialism, the image that comes to mind is an abyss between the ideology and its implementation," another (Polish high school senior) student wrote.... The imprint on Central-Eastern Europe of 40 years of socialism is nothing like what communism's intellectual founder, Karl Marx, had in mind. His utopian ideology has been virtually obliterated as a motivating force. Dan Fisher, *The Los Angeles Times*, on July 22, 1984.

I. Introduction

The aims of this paper are to clarify the meaning(s) of Korean

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communism and communists in the general context of communism and communists. The main foci of this study are three-fold. First, it will identify both common and peculiar features of Korean communism and communists in comparison with Marxism and Leninism. Second, it will shed light on the vicissitude of Korean communism in North and South Korean politics from 1945 to the present. Third, it will differentiate the two dimensions of Korean communism--the theoretical and the political. The theoretical dimension of communism involves the *promises*, and its political dimension, the *practices*. In exploring these two dimensions of Korean communism, extensive references will be made to the Soviet and/or Chinese models. Although these two dimensions are often not easily separable, a distinction of the two is still warranted.

II. Communism: General Meanings and Korean Variations

Communism has been one of the most frequently used, abused, and misused yet least understood terms in political lexicon. Communism may refer to a body of "universal" political doctrine, a historical movement, a certain stage of human societal development, a political regime associated with a particular country, or some combination of all. Likewise, Korean communism may denote a body of "universal" political doctrine, the Korean communist movement, a certain stage of [North Korean] development, the present North Korean political system, or some mixture of all these.

From Theory to Dogma

Narrowly defined, communism as a political doctrine may mean Marxism and Leninism. The theoretical underpinnings of communism developed by Karl Marx (1818~1883) and Friedrich Engels (1820~1895) consist mainly of the dialectical materialism, the materialistic interpretation of history and class struggle, the dictatorship of the proletariat

and withering away of the state, and the theory of surplus value.¹⁾ Major political and theoretical contributions by Vladimir Lenin (1870~1924) were represented by the vanguard theory of party and democratic centralism, the weakest-link-in-the-chain theory and violent proletarian revolution and the theory of imperialism.²⁾ Broadly, communism has spawn numerous offshoots and hybrids of Marxism and Leninism such as Stalinism, Khrushchevism, Titoism, Maoism, and even Kim Il Sungism.

1. As a Political Dogma

Marxism-Leninism is not merely an "ideology."³⁾ It is a mixture of political myth, political doctrine and political formula.⁴⁾ If the ideology is the political myth functioning to preserve the social structure, and the utopia, to supplant it, Marxism-Leninism is an admixture of ideology and utopia.⁵⁾ To its "true believers," Marxism-Leninism is not

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- 1) A good bibliography on Marx's own writing on these "theories" as well as other scholars' critical analyses of his works is found in Isaiah Berlin, *Karl Marx: His Life and Environment* (London: Oxford University Press, 1973), pp.285-289. Also, William Ebenstein, *Great Political Thinkers: Plato to the Present* (Hinsdale: Dryden Press, 1969), pp.977-985.
 - 2) A recent useful anthology of Lenin's works is edited by Robert C. Tucker. See his *The Lenin Anthology* (New York: W.W. Norton, 1975).
 - 3) The term "ideology" may be defined broadly or narrowly. Recently, Seliger, for instance, advocated the usefulness of the inclusive definition of ideology as a political belief system. By contrast, Carlsnaes questioned Seliger's all-inclusive definition and supported, instead, the restrictive definition, i.e., the Leninist explications of the politicizing nature and function of ideology as a belief system involving mass action and organization. For details, see M. Seliger, *Ideology and Politics* (New York: The Free Press, 1976), Walter Carlsnaes, *The Concept of Ideology and Political Analysis: A Critical Examination of Its Usage by Marx, Lenin, and Mannheim* (Westport: Greenwood Press, 1981).
 - 4) The definitions of political myth, political doctrine and political formula are found in Harold D. Lasswell and Abraham Kaplan, *Power and Society* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1963), pp.116-123.
 - 5) *Ibid.*, p. 123.

simply correct and scientific but inevitable and moral. It is not only an infallible 'science,' but its victory "in the whole world is a historic necessity."⁶⁾ Marx revealed that his ultimate aim is to discover the economic *law* undergirding the development of contemporary society.⁷⁾ Engels branded Owenites in England and Fourierists in France as "sects" and other socialists who professed to redress social grievances outside the working-class movement, as "social quacks."⁸⁾ In his *Socialism: Utopian and Scientific*, Engels called the early socialist thinkers such as Thomas Muenzer, Babeuf, Morelly, Mably, especially Saint Simon, Fourier and Owen as "utopians." By contrast, he hailed Marx's materialistic conception of history and the revelation of the secret of capitalistic production through surplus value as the "two great discoveries."⁹⁾ Similarly, Lenin called Marxism as a "scientific" socialism and attacked Plekhanov, Kautsky and others as "opportunists," "vulgarizers of Marx" or "renegades."¹⁰⁾

Similarly, Kim Il Sung during his anti-Japanese guerrilla years advocated communism's "scientific truthfulness." For instance, the authenticity of authorship of the treatise on "the Tasks of Korean Communists" aside, Kim Il Sung allegedly remarked on November 10, 1937 that "first, we must teach them [Korean communists] Marxist-Leninist

6) Frederick Engels, *Socialism: Utopian and Scientific* (New York: International Publishers, 1935), p. 53. See also, Karl Marx, *Capital: A Critical Analysis of Capitalist Production* (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1975), Vol. I, p. 19.

7) For a full account of Marx's theory of surplus value, see Marx, *Capital*, Vol. I, pp. 173-530.

8) See, for instance, Engels' preface (London, February 10, 1892) in *Manifesto of the Communist Party* (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1965), p. 29.

9) Engels, *Socialism: Utopian and Scientific*, p. 53.

10) See V.I. Lenin, *The Proletarian Revolution and The Renegade Kautsky* (Peking: Foreign Languages Press, 1965) and "Left-wing" Communism, and Infantile Disorder (Peking: Foreign Languages Press, 1965) and *State and Revolution* (New York: International Publishers, 1932, 1943), pp. 86-100.

principle." He, then, attacked renegades such as "national reformists," "right and left opportunists" and "sectarian-flunkeys." He also urged the Korean communists "to maintain a constant and high degree of vigilance and *hatred* for the class enemy, to prevent the penetration of sectarianism and to detect and smash the sectarian-flunkey's subversive and wrecking activities."¹¹⁾ Kim was (and still is), in short, no different from other "true believers" of communism for his belief in Marxism-Leninism's moral self-righteousness and "scientific truth."

2. As an Official Ideology

With the emergence of a socialist state, communism can no longer be considered an ideology. Beginning with the Soviet Union, communism has become the *official* ideology of the socialist countries which outlawed all other contending ideologies and political theories. The preamble to the present (1977) Soviet Constitution, for example, is replete with phrases such as "socialism and communism," "the leading role of the Communist Party, the vanguard of all the people," "a society of true democracy," "a natural, logical stage on the road to communism" and "the ideas of scientific communism." Article 6 specifically stipulates the *official* character of Marxism-Leninism. The Communist Party of the Soviet Union is "the leading and guiding force of Soviet society and the nucleus of its political system, of all state organizations and public organizations." It is "armed with Marxism-Leninism, determines the general perspectives of the development of society and the course of home and foreign policy of the USSR, directs the great constructive work of the Soviet people, and imparts a planned, systematic and theoretically substantiated character to their struggle for the victory of communism."¹²⁾

11) Kim's full text is found in Kim Il Sung, *On the Building of the People's Government* (Pyongyang: Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1978), Vol. I, pp. 3-40.

12) The English text of the Constitution (Fundamental Law) of the U.S.S.

North Korea, too, incorporated Marxism-Leninism into its 1972 Constitution. Unlike the Soviet Constitution, however, the North Korean Constitution placed Kim Il Sung's *Juche* (self-reliance) idea¹³⁾ as the symbolic banner. The *Juche* idea embodied "a creative application of Marxism-Leninism to the conditions of our country." (Article 4). In addition to the *Juche* idea, the North Korean constitution gave also official sanctions to the Ch'ongsan-ri spirit and the Ch'ongsan-ri method," "the Ch'ollima Movement," and "the Tae'an work system" as a uniquely North Korean version of communist experimentations.¹⁴⁾ Above all, in the midst of the Kim Il Sung cult, the so-called Kim Il Sungism or Kim Il Sung's "revolutionary thought" coexist with Marxism-Leninism. Still, Kim Il Sung's *Juche* idea and other political tracts cannot measure up to political doctrines formulated by Marx, Engels and Lenin. Kim Il Sungism, if such a thing exists, consists, in short, of a body of disparate policy guidelines and operational manuals rather than a coherent system of political ideas.

As Marx, Engels and Lenin defended their communist "orthodoxy" against those "renegades," "opportunists," and "vulgarizers," today's defenders of the "official line" attack their internal political enemies and foreign rival socialist countries as being "deviationists," "revisionists," "dogmatists" and "capitalist roaders."¹⁵⁾

Ever since he seized power in North Korea, Kim Il Sung, too, has launched an assault against his political enemies within as the "reactionaries," "right and left deviationists," "revisionists," "dogmatists," "an-

R. is found in Vadim Medish, *The Soviet Union* (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice Hall, 1985), Second Revised Edition, pp. 317-340.

13) For a detailed discussion of Kim's *Juche* idea, see Sung Chul Yang, *Korea and Two Regimes* (Cambridge: Schenkman, 1981), pp. 197-205.

14) *Ibid.*

15) For a case study of the CCP mass campaign to suppress counterrevolutionaries, see, for instance, John Gardner, "The Wu-fan Campaign in Shanghai: A Study in the Consolidation of Urban Control," in A. Doak Barnett (ed.), *Chinese Communist Politics in Action* (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1969), pp. 477-539.

ti-party factionalists," and so on.¹⁶⁾ It is noteworthy that he applied different labels to his political enemies over the years.

During the mid and late 40s, his attacks were directed primarily against the "reactionary nationalist elements." In the 50s and 60s, after his nationalist enemies were liquidated, all the anti-party factionalists--the South Korean Workers' Party, Soviet and/or Yenan factions--became his chief political target. From late 60s to the present, with no clearly identifiable political enemies within North Korea, his "political enemies" have become more abstract. He now attacks "enemies of revolution," whoever and wherever they may be.¹⁷⁾

3. Chasm Between Theory and Practice

Official sanctioning of Marxism-Leninism is one thing and its faithful implementation in the socialist countries is quite another. Is Marxism-Leninism simply an empty political rhetoric? Is Marxism dead? Are the political and economic realities in socialist countries today anything like what Karl Marx had in mind? Does only Leninism thrive in socialist countries? How substantial or marginal are the political and economic variations among socialist countries, such as the Yugoslavian model, the Hungarian experimentation, the Chinese reform or the North Korean control mechanism? [Anatoliy Butenko, for one, called China's reform a "military-bureaucratic degeneration of power," and Hungarian experimentation, a "distortion of socialism"]¹⁸⁾

Instead of providing a direct answer to the above questions, two "views" on the Soviet Union today may be provided here. Both Richard Pipes and Jerry Hughes agreed that Marxism-Leninism as "a doctrine promising freedom and democracy on a scale not seen in the West"¹⁹⁾

16) Sung Chul Yang, *op. cit.*, pp. 183-188.

17) *Ibid.*, pp. 195-197.

18) Quoted in Ernst Kux, "Contradictions in Soviet Socialism," *Problem of Communism* (November-December 1984), p. 23.

19) Jerry F. Hughes and Merle Fainsod, *How The Soviet Union Is Governed*

have not been actualized in the Soviet Union and all other socialist countries, including North Korea. To the contrary, the citizens' freedom is severely limited, and the party, state and military elites are corrupt and maligned. Again, Pipes and Hughes concurred on the necessity of reforms in the Soviet regime, and they offered the Chinese and the Hungarian models as their respective alternative for the Soviet Union. Among the three alternatives--reversion to Stalinism, intensified external aggression leading to a general war, and internal reform--the Soviet Union faces, Pipes preferred the internal reform option. It can be realized, according to him, by restoring legality, widening the scope for private enterprise and decentralizing administrative apparatus. Although he admitted that the Soviet Union is not China, he still believes that China's post-Mao reform is applicable to the Soviet Union's internal reform.²⁰⁾

Hughes, too, identified the preponderance of pressure in the Soviet Union to be "in the direction of liberalization:"

Complete freedom of speech is likely to be frightening to many for nationalist reasons, and strong reliance on market mechanism is likely to be even more frightening because of a fear of inflation. Nevertheless, liberalization in the sense of a relaxed censorships and freer debates, more access to Western culture and consumer goods, more tolerance of iconoclasts, and greater freedom to travel abroad--in short, movement towards a system like Hungary today--are goal that seem to command fairly strong support within the professional-managerial strata--within the much-maligned "bureaucracy."²¹⁾

Can North Korea emulate either the Chinese-style or the Hungarian-type reforms? There have been some movements and indications of

(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1979), p. 572.

20) Richard Pipes, *Survival Is Not Enough: Soviet Realities and America's Future* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1984), pp. 199-208.

21) Jerry F. Hughes and Merle Fainsod, *op. cit.*, pp. 570-571.

reforms in North Korea. They seem not to be internal but external, in an attempt to shed its heretofore isolationist mantel in relation to the outside world.²²⁾ North Korea is not like the Soviet Union or China. Lenin, the first communist ruler in the Soviet Union died more than sixty years ago, and its Stalinist rule ended more than a generation ago. Even in China, the current Teng-Hua-Zhao trio replaced Mao's rule nearly a decade ago. But in North Korea, the first ruler Kim Il Sung still holds power. Ironically, his claims of "uninterrupted communist revolution" notwithstanding, only his one-man/one-party dictatorship has endured in North Korea for the past forty years. Moreover, father-son, the Kim Il Sung-Kim Chong Il, political succession has yet to be realized. Unlike in the Soviet Union or in China, where the reversions to Stalinism and Maoism are options, in North Korea the Kim Il Sung rule is not an option but a *political reality*.

In brief, Marxism-Leninism has transformed itself from a political ideology to an official political doctrine. There is even a possibility of it becoming an empty political rhetoric. It is probable that except for those in power, the majority of people in socialist countries today do not believe in the Marxism-Leninism's *tour de force*. Even those in power began to see *limitation* of Marxism-Leninism. Marxism-Leninism is no longer an unquestionable "truth". Yuriy Andropov, during his brief rule as head of the CPSU, stated that "the specific historical ways of the emergence of socialism have proved to be not in all respects what the founders of our revolutionary theory expected."²³⁾ The editorial in China's *People's Daily* on December 7, 1984, was even more iconoclastic:

Studying Marxism means a study of universal laws, elaborated by general

22) The passage of the so-called Law of Joint Venture by the Standing Committee of North Korea's Supreme People's Assembly on September 8, 1984, was the typical example.

23) Yuriy Andropov, *Kommunist*, No. 3, 1983, pp. 9-23. Quoted in Ernst Kux, *op. cit.*, p. 8.

writings and opinions on how to solve problems. We can never rigidly adhere to the individual words and sentences or specific theories. Marx died 101 years ago. His works were written more than 100 years ago. There have been tremendous changes since his ideas were formed. Some of his ideas are no longer suited to today's situation because Marx never experienced these times, nor did Engels or Lenin. And they did not come across the problems we face today. So we cannot use Marxist and Leninist works to solve our present-day problems.

In fine, the chasm between communism and the political reality in socialist countries today, including North Korea, has been widening rather than narrowing. The contradictions are numerous: between the moral superiority of communism and the corrupt behavior of the Communist "new class"; between the constant propagandizing of the working classes' leading role and the actual weakening of their influences and power in social and economic life; and between the officially proclaimed ideology of social justice and the rapidly increasing discrepancy in wages and incomes with a privileged position given to the leading communist cadres and their cohorts. Still, the state ownership of property, state control and management of major means of production, consumption and distribution, one-party totalitarian dictatorship and democratic centralism continue to prevail in all socialist countries. North Korea's claims of Kim Il Sungism notwithstanding, similar Marxist-Leninist principles persist. The Kim Il Sung cult, the Kim Il Sungism and the Kim Il Sung-Kim Chong Il succession formula are peculiar to North Korea, but they have taken place within the Marxist-Leninist economic and political straitjacket.

From Movement to Power Seizure

In his preface to the 1888 English and 1890 German editions of the *Communist Manifesto*, Engels characterized "socialism in 1847" as a "middle-class movement," and communism, as a "working-class move-

ment.²⁴⁾ In the *German Ideology*, Marx and Engels identified communism as "the real movement which abolishes the present state of things," and "the real communists" as those who overthrow the existing state of things." They stressed that communism differs from "all previous movements in that it overturns the basis of all earlier relations of production and intercourse." It involves "revolutionizing the existing world, of practically attacking and changing existing things."²⁵⁾ Has communism been a working-class movement? Who led the communist movements in the Soviet Union, China and North Korea? Were these movements purely the making of the working-class for the working-class? These are some of the questions which need to be addressed.

1. The Soviet Example

The first Marxist-Leninist regime emerged in Russia in 1917 sixty nine years after the publication of the *Communist Manifesto* in 1848. It took just 19 years from the founding of the Russian communist party in 1898 to its seizure of power in 1917. Marx was involved in the First International, which was founded in London in 1863.²⁶⁾ Following the 1917 communist take-over, Lenin created the Communist International (Comintern) in March 1919 as a response to the foreign intervention in the civil war.

Not unlike planting seeds, the beginning of the communist movement was rather uneventful and even casual. In Russia, for instance, Georgi Plekhanov (1856~1918) and a handful of Russian revolutionary exiles living in Switzerland began to embrace Marxism in 1883 as an alternative to the Tsarist Russia. During 1895 and 1896, two young intellectu-

24) Karl Marx and Frederick Engels, *Manifesto of the Communist Party*, p. 19 and p. 30.

25) Karl Marx and Frederick Engels, *The German Ideology* ed. by R. Pascal (New York: International Publishers, 1947, 1966), p. 26 and pp. 33-34.

26) For a discussion of Marx's involvement in the First International, see Isaiah Berlin *Karl Mark: His Life and Environment*, pp. 220-235.

als, Lenin (Vladimir Ulyanov) and Martov formed the first city-wide Marxist organization in St. Petersburg (Leningrad). A year later, Jewish Marxists in Russia founded the "Bund." The first meeting of the Russian Social-Democratic Workers' Party, known as the first Party Congress (of the CPSU), was held secretly in early 1898 in Minsk, Byelorussia. The meeting was attended by nine delegates representing no more than 1,000 members.²⁷⁾

At the 26th Party Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union in 1981 in Moscow, 5,002 delegates representing 17 million members attended [as of 1983 the USSR claimed 18,331,000 CPSU members]. It means that in 33 years the number of party delegates increased more than 556 times (9 to 5,002), and the party membership multiplied more than 17,000 times (1,000 to 17,000,000).

2. The Chinese Example

In China it took 28 years from the founding of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) in July 1921 to its seizure of power in October 1949. The first complete Chinese translation of the *Communist Manifesto* was published in 1920 in China. The first meeting of the Chinese Communist Party in Shanghai was represented by less than a dozen founding members with little more than fifty members in attendance.²⁸⁾ When the Chinese communist triumphed in October 10, 1949, the number of CCP members rose to some 4.5 million. By 1961 the figure

27) One of the most recent account of the CPSU's origin is found in Robert V. Daniels, *Russia: The Roots of Confrontation* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1985), especially Chapter Four. See also, Vadim Medish, *op. cit.*, pp. 92-94.

28) For a discussion of the CCP's early years, see C. Martin Wilbur, "The Influence of the Past: How The Early Years Helped To Shape the Future of the Chinese Communist Party," in John Wilson Lewis (ed.), *Party Leadership and Revolutionary Power in China* (London: Cambridge University Press, 1970), pp. 35-68. See also Edgar Snow, *Red China Today* (New York: Vintage Books, 1971), p. 67 and pp. 147-150.

reached 17 million. At the 12th Congress of the CCP in September 1982, the CCP membership reportedly reached 40 million.²⁹⁾

The CCP, as conceived in Shanghai during the spring and summer of 1920 with the advise of Gregory Voitinsky, a Soviet Comintern agent, was a political spinoff from the May 4th Movement. In Shanghai ten radical reformers, ranging in age from 20 to 40, participated in the discussion with Voitinsky. At least six were Returned Students from Japan. When the first CCP Congress was convened in Shanghai in July 1921, there were about sixty members but within a year six centers opened for Communist Party activities in China. Some sixty years later, the CCP has the world's largest communist membership with forty million in 1982.

3. The Korean Case

The Korean Communist movement shares some commonalities with the Soviet and the Chinese models. It took some 23 years from the first founding of the Korean Communist Party (KCP) in April 1925 to the emergence of the official communist regime in North Korea in 1948. At the first Congress of the KCP in 1925, the number of party members comprised two to three dozens. At the time of the congress of the North Korean Branch of the KCP, held from October 10 to 13, 1945, its member reportedly jumped to 4,530. To put it another way, from the First Congress of the KWP on August 28-30, 1946, to its Sixth Congress on October 10-14, 1980, the party membership has grown about ten times from 366,339 to 3 million [this figure is North Korea's official claim].³⁰⁾

Not unlike the Soviet and the Chinese communist movements, the beginning of the Korean communist movement was rather uneventful

29) The figure is found in Richard F. Starr, "Checklist of Communist Parties in 1983," *Problem of Communism* (March-April 1984), pp. 41-51.

30) *Ibid.*

and inconspicuous. Generally, two origins of the Korean communist movement were recognized. One was the *Hanin Sahoe-dang* ("Korean People's Socialist Party") founded by Yi Tong-hwi and a handful of Korean exiles in Khabarovsk, Soviet Siberia, in June 1918 and the other, the Korean section of the Irkutsk Communist Party organized by Nam Man-ch'on and other Koreans in Irkutsk. The *Hanin Sahoe-dang*, later renamed the *Hanin Kongsan-dang* ("Korean Communist Party"), moved its headquarters to Shanghai via Vladivostok in January 1921. From the outset, therefore, the Shanghai and the Irkutsk groups vied for the hegemony of the Korean communist movement, especially for the approval and support of the Comintern.³¹⁾

Within Korea, numerous left-wing organizations made their appearance. The first Korean labor organization called *Choson Nodong Kongje-hoe* ("Korean Labor Fraternal Association") was organized by Ch'a Kum-bong and others on April, 1920. Beginning in early 1920s, numerous left-wing youth study groups such as *Shin Sasang Yongu-hoe* ("New Thought Study Group"), *Hwayo-hoe* ("Tuesday Society") and *Ilwol-hoe* ("January Society") came into existence. The first Korean Communist Party led by the Tuesday Society, was officially established on April 17, 1925. Although the accurate figures of the KCP's membership and its delegates to its First Congress vary, they never exceeded a few dozens. In March 1926, for instance, the KCP had 130 members and 104 candidate members within Korea.³²⁾

31) For a discussion of early Korean Communist movements, see Dae-sook Suh, *The Korean Communist Movement, 1918~1948* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1967), especially pp. 3-52. Robert A. Scalapino and Chong-sik Lee, *Communism in Korea* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1971), Vol. I, especially pp. 3-65. Also, Chong-sik Lee, *The Korean Workers' Party: A Short History* (Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 1978), pp. 1-32. Il-won Pak, *Namno-dang Ch'ongbip'an* ("The Criticism of the South Korean Workers' Party") (Seoul: Kukto-ngjongbo-sa, 1948) and Nam-sik Kim, *Silrok Namno-dang* ("The True Account of the South Korean Workers' Party") (Seoul: Sinhyonsil-sa, 1975).

Due to the severe suppression and sophisticated surveillance system of the Japanese colonial authorities, the KCP was dissolved after its Fourth Congress, which was held in a jail in July 1928. Attempts to reactivate the KCP were made twice: by Kim Ch'ol-su, who organized the KCP Reestablishment Preparation Association in June 1929 and again by Kwon T'ae-hyong, who created the KCP Reestablishment Council in February 1931. Both attempts failed. In 1939 the so-called "Kyongsong Com Club," an underground communist secret society, was organized by Yi Kwan-sul and a handful of Korean leftists but it, too, became inactive after the Japanese authorities' crackdown in 1940 and 1941. The KCP, thus, remained dormant until the end of the Japanese rule in Korea in August 1945.

After the Korean liberation from Japan in 1945, Pak Hon-yong, a former member of the Tuesday Society and the Kyongsong Com Club, revived the KCP. First, Pak created the KCP Reconstruction Preparatory Committee on August 20, 1945, and drafted his so-called "August Theses"³² Earlier, the Seoul Group (*Changan-p'a*) led by Yi Yong, Ch'oe Ik-han and Chong Baek, had launched its communist activities a day after liberation on August 16, 1946. But on August 24, four days after the release of Pak's August Theses, which, inter alia attacked factionalism, the Seoul Group decided to dissolve itself to join Pak's KCP Reconstruction Preparatory Committee. On September 8, the two groups held a meeting to merge and Pak was chosen to lead the unified KCP. Thus, Pak emerged, though for a short duration, as the chairman of the newly reactivated KCP in Seoul. For a while, Pak led both the northern and the southern branches of the KCP.

The U.S. occupation authorities outlawed Pak and his KCP activities in the South, immediately after the Chongp'an-sa Incident in May 19

32) Scalapino and Lee, *op. cit.*, p. 73.

33) For a full discussion of Pak Hon-yong's August Theses, see Il-won Pak, *op. cit.* pp. 30-39; Nam-sik Kim, *op. cit.*, pp. 7-16.

46.³⁴⁾ From then on, he lost his leadership to the North Korean branch of the KCP. On October 15, 1945, still working from underground, Pak reorganized the KCP into the South Korean Worker's Party (SKWP) under the guidance of the North Korean Communist Party. At the end of the year he fled to the North.

In Pyongyang, Kim Il Sung was involved in the founding of the North Korean Bureau of the KCP on October 10-13, 1945. On December 17, 1945, the North Korean Bureau of the KCP was renamed the North Korean Communist Party, and Kim Il Sung was chosen its secretary. During the joint meeting of the North Korean Communist Party and the New People's Party (NPP) in August 28-30, 1946, both parties merged under the name, the North Korean Worker's Party (NKWP), and Kim Tu-bong, head of the NPP, was its elected chairman and Kim Il Sung, its vice-chairman. After the creation of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea on September 9, 1945, Kim Il Sung emerged as the chairman of the Korean Worker's Party (KWP), created when the North Korean Worker's Party merged with the South Korean Worker's Party. Thenceforth, Kim Il Sung has been the head of the KWP.

In understanding communism, in general, and Korean communism, in particular, as a historical movement, six points are noteworthy:

First, contrary to Marx-Engels' proclamation that the proletarian movement is an independent movement initiated by the immense majority, i.e., of the proletariat, the lowest stratum of the society, the Bolshevik Revolution of 1917 was "led and organized by brilliant young intellectuals from a middle-class background."³⁵⁾ Likewise, the CCP

34) Che-do O, who dealt with this case as a prosecuting attorney, contended that the KCP was involved in counterfeit money-making scheme, while the KCP denied it. For O's account, see Che-do O, *Pulkun Kunsang* ("The Image of the Red Masses") (Pusan: Namgyong Munhwa-sa, 1951). For the KCP's denial of this charge, see *Choson Haebang Nyonbo* (The Yearbook of the Korean Liberation), 1946, p. 244.

35) For details, see George K. Schueller, "The Politburo," in Harold D.

leaders, like those of Kuomintang, were "the sons of landlords, merchants, scholars, or officials." And all received higher education and most had studied abroad.³⁶⁾ The Korean communist leaders were no different in their social backgrounds from their Soviet and Chinese counterparts. To that extent, what Lenin called the "professional revolutionists"³⁷⁾ were the ones who led the communist revolution. To repeat, the leaders of communist revolution may be *with* and *for* the masses, but they usually belonged to the middle and upper social strata and they seldom came *from* the lowest stratum of the society.

Second, Russian, Chinese and Korean communist movements were outlawed by the establishment authorities, be they Imperial Russia, the Kuomin-tang government or the Japanese colonial authorities in Korea. Under such circumstances, the communists in these countries had two options: to go underground and/or to choose foreign exile. It is no accident, therefore, that the founding of the Russian, Chinese, and Korean communist parties had *foreign* origins and/or connections. Also, at least in their initial stage, both the Chinese and Korean communist movements had been closely linked to the Comintern and their agents.

After the seizure of political power, the communist parties in socialist countries attempted to decimate virtually all political oppositions within, as they themselves suffered the same fate under the erstwhile power-holders. It is a political irony par excellence that the communist parties in socialist countries today, including North Korea, once the *victims* of political suppression by the establishment authorities, have adopted the same oppressive measures against their political opposition. Worse

Lasswell and Daniel Lerner, *World Revolutionary Elites* (Cambridge: the M.I.T. Press, 1966), p. 140.

36) Robert C. North and Ithiel De Sola Pool, "Kuomintang and Chinese Communist Elites" in Lasswell and Lerner, *op. cit.*, pp. 319-455. especially p. 376.

37) Lenin's discussion of "professional revolutionists" is found in his *What Is To Be Done* (New York: International Publishers, 1929, 1943), especially pp. 105-138.

still, such suppression has been far wider in scope and magnitude than that of their previous oppressors.

Third, despite the phenomenal increase in party membership, the communist parties in socialist countries are still the "party of minorities" [As of 1983 there are 97 countries with communist parties whose membership totals nearly 80 million. There are 15 to 17 countries which have socialist systems today.³⁸⁾ In the Soviet Union, for instance, 17 of 270 million people belong to the CPSU which constitute about 6% of the total population. China's some 40 million party members constitute less than 5% of its 1.2 billion people. North Korea's 3 million party members represent about 16% of its 19 million populace. Contrary to the *Communist Manifesto's* claim that "the proletarian movement is the self-conscious, independent movement of the immense majority, in the interest of the immense majority,"³⁹⁾ the communist parties in socialist countries, including North Korea's KWP, are not the party of the immense majority but that of tiny minority. These parties are, in short, not a Marxist, but rather a Leninist. Namely, they are "the vanguard of the proletariat." Or, more accurately, they consist of a tiny minority who rule *in the name of* the proletarian majority.

Fourth, the Russian communist movement succeeded in overthrowing the Tsarist Russia by a short, coup-like assault on the central machinery of the Kerensky government. By contrast, the Chinese communist were engaged in a protracted guerrilla warfare and a civil war before it removed the Kuomin-tang regime from the mainland China. In North Korea, Kim Il Sung and his KWP's seizure of power was completed under the auspices of the Soviet occupation authorities. In Thomas T. Hammond's typology, the North Korean case belong to "Type 2," that is, installation of a communist regime outside Russia by the Soviet Army.⁴⁰⁾ It may be more accurate to say that the emergence of a

38) For details, see Richard F. Starr, *op. cit.*

39) Marx and Engels, *Manifesto of the Communist Party*, p. 57.

40) Thomas T. Hammond (ed.), *The Anatomy of Communist Takeovers*

communist regime in North Korea was the result of Kim Il Sung and his partisan groups' successful political manipulation with the blessings from the Soviet occupation authorities.

Fifth, the first seeds of Korean communism were scattered in foreign soils--Soviet Siberia, China or Japan. In Korea itself, due to the repressive measures of the Japanese colonial authorities, communism failed to take root, notwithstanding the efforts of various groups to salvage it, especially during the 1920s and 1930s. Perhaps, its root could not germinate in the hard and dry soil of Korea under the harsh Japanese rule. When some communist groups sprouted, they were promptly uprooted by the Japanese authorities.

With the Japanese exit in 1945 and the subsequent occupation of the North by the Soviet forces and the South by the American military, the Korean political soil, too, was divided into two entirely different types overnight. In the North, Korean communism was nurtured by the Soviet occupation authorities, while in the South it wilted under the U.S. occupation forces. In brief, the North sanctioned communism as its official ideology, while the South outlawed it once again. The fate of Pak Hon-yong and his SKWP, which failed in the South and the fortunes of Kim Il Sung and his KWP, which has succeeded in the North, are closely linked to the contrasting conditions of political climate in the North and the South.

Sixth, the failure of the SKWP was, also, partially of its own making. The overnight creation of the "people's republic," the support of the trusteeship plan, the formation of *minjon* ("people's front"), the Chongp'an-sa Incident, the September Labor Strikes, the October Riot, and the opposition to the National University plan were the notable examples. Above all, the Korean public lost confidence in the SKWP

(New Haven: Yale University Press, 1975), pp.1-4. and pp.638-648. See also, Dae-sook Suh, "A Preconceived Formula for Sovietization: The Communist Take-over of North Korea," in Hammond, *op. cit.*, pp. 475-489.

when they learned of its conspiratorial and anti-nationalistic nature.⁴¹⁾

Seventh, the South Korean hostility toward communism was intensified by the fratricidal war instigated by the North in 1950. Furthermore, South Korea's legal and political framework prohibits all communist and left-wing activities. Various North Korean communist propaganda and other rhetoric may appeal to the South Korean youth, who have not witnessed the agony and suffering created by the fratricidal proxy war, but such danger can be easily averted by providing them with an access to the real totalitarian political picture of North Korea and other socialist countries.

From Utopia to Totalitarianism

As a stage of human societal development, communism may stand for either an idealized society portrayed in the writings of Marx, Engels, Lenin and others or a political reality under a socialist (communist) regime.

1. A Communist Utopia

At the theoretical level communism means the fifth, final, and climactic stage of human evolution, that is, from ancient communism to feudalism, to capitalism to socialism (state capitalism, "revolutionary period"?) and, ultimately, to communism. In the preface to the 1882 Russian edition of the *Communist Manifesto*, Marx and Engels distinguished the primeval common ownership of land (the Russian *obshchina*) from the "higher form of communist common ownership." The same distinctions were noted in the 1883 and 1890 German editions. Both also claimed that in communist society the present dominates the past, while in bourgeois society the past dominates the present, and

41) A detailed analysis of the South Korean Workers' Party is found in Il-won Pak, *op. cit.* and Nam-sik Kim, *op. cit.*

that "communism deprives no man of the power to appropriate the products of society; all that it does is to deprive him of the power to subjugate the labour of others by means of such appropriation"⁴²⁾

Karl Marx distinguished in his *Critique of the Gotha Programme* (1875) "the first phase of communist society" from its "higher phase." The first phase is the society "as it is when it has just emerged after prolonged birth pangs from capitalist society." He, then, wrote:

In a higher phase of communist society, after enslaving subordination of individuals under division of labour, and therewith also the antithesis between mental and physical labour, has vanished; after labour, from a mere means of life, has itself become the prime necessity of life; after the productive forces have also increased with the all-round development of the individual, and all the springs of co-operative wealth flow more abundantly-- only then can the narrow horizon of bourgeois right be fully left behind and society inscribe on its banners: from each according to his ability, to each according to his needs!⁴³⁾

Marx's communist society, if realized, would be a utopia with full abundance, equality, justice and freedom for all. In *State and Revolution*, Lenin reiterated basically the same Marxian ideal. He contended that democracy in a capitalist society is only for the rich, and communism alone is capable of giving a really complete democracy, democracy for the people, for the majority, with the necessary suppression of the minority who are the exploiters.⁴⁴⁾

Nearly seventy years after seizing power of the Soviet Union, the CPSU still promises a communist utopia somewhere in the future. In other words, the final realization of a communist society rests still with

42) Marx and Engels, *Manifesto*, p. 25 and p. 65.

43) Karl Marx, *Critique of the Gotha Programme* (New York: International Publishers, 1938, 1966), p. 10.

44) V.I. Lenin, *State and Revolution* (New York: International Publishers, 1932, 1943), p. 74.

the CPSU's *promise*, not with the reality of the Soviet Union. The Soviet Union's new Communist Party program states:

Communism is a classless social system with one form of public ownership of the means of production and full social equality of all members of society; under it, the all-round development of people *will* be accompanied by the growth of productive forces through continuous progress in science and technology; all sources of public wealth *will* gush forth abundantly, and the great principle "From each according to his ability, to each according to his needs" *will* be implemented. Communism is a highly organized society of free, socially conscious working people in which public self-government *will* be established, a society in which labor for the good of society *will* become the prime vital requirement of everyone, a necessity recognized by one and all, and the ability of each person will be employed to the greatest benefit of the people.⁴⁵⁾

Similarly, North Korea's Kim Il Sung pointed out a futuristic communist society:

Our ideal is to build a society where everyone is well-fed, well-clothed, and lives a long life, a society where there is no laggard nor idler and all are progressive and work devotedly, a society where all the people live united in harmony as one big family....there is such plenty that people work according to their abilities and receive according to their needs.⁴⁶⁾

The question is, then, how long will it take for the Soviet Union, North Korea and other socialist countries to realize such ideal communist society? Are seventy years in the Soviet Union and forty years in North Korea not sufficient time to develop such communist dream?

45) Quoted in Harry Schwartz, "What is Communism? Is It Being Achieved?" in Sameul Hendel (ed.), *The Soviet Crucible: The Soviet System in Theory and Practice* (North Scituate: Duxbury Press, 1980), Fifth edition, p. 430.

46) Kim Il Sung, *On Socialist Pedagogy* (Pyongyang: Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1979), pp. 43-44.

Are the Soviet Union and North Korea nearing or straying away from such utopia?

2. Life Under Communism

Harry Schwartz, for instance, attempted to see how close the Soviet Union is now to the ultimate communist utopia on the basis of four vital points.⁴⁷⁾ Claim No. 1: the communist society *will* have to have a great abundance of goods so that all needs can be met.

But the shortages of consumer goods and other necessities of life are well known in the Soviet Union, North Korea and other socialist countries. The Soviet Union is still far behind the United States in GNP and GNP per capita. So is North Korea vis-a-vis South Korea.⁴⁸⁾

Claim No. 2: the communist society *will* be inhabited by people motivated in different ways from those in the West.

But the "new socialist man," who is equipped with a high degree of Communist consciousness, industry, discipline and devotion to the public interest portrayed by the CPSU or North Korea's KWP, differ greatly from the people living under the Soviet and North Korean communist societies. The ruling elites are not devoid of corruption, ossification and inefficiency. The Soviet Union's *nomenklatura* and North Korean ruling counterparts enjoy life-styles different from their working masses; they are accorded with special powers, positions and privileges. The problems of alcoholism, laziness, absenteeism, moonlighting and black market activities are chronic in the Soviet Union. The same may not be true in North Korea, although they are not entirely absent.⁴⁹⁾

Claim No. 3: in the communist society, there *will* be "full social equality of all members of society."

As Schwartz pointed out, the real income of a top Soviet official,

47) Harry Schwartz, *op. cit.*, pp. 429-433.

48) For a discussion of the North Korean people's everyday life, see Pukhan Chonso, 1945-1980 (Seoul: Kukdong Munjeyonkuso, 1980), pp. 477-484.

49) *Ibid.*

writer or scientists is on par with that of an average resident of Westchester County [a rich American suburb] while at the bottom of the Soviet economic system are millions living at a level poorer than the Americans who collect unemployment insurance.⁵⁰⁾

Claim No. 4: the communist society will be composed of "free" people. Nothing can be further from the truth than this claim. The demand that the press, radio, schools, theatre and the like adhere to the party line is no less insistent than it was under Stalin, and the policy of equating political opposition with subversion continues. North Korea today is worse in this respect than the Soviet Union. In the midst of the Kim Il Sung cult, virtually all activities are compelled to conform to the KWP guidelines and Juche idea. Unless freedom means the Orwellian newspeak, that is, "freedom is slavery," the freedom we associate with religion, press, assembly, association, petition and speech is absent in North Korea. As Schwartz pointed out, one of the powers a dictatorial regime enjoys is "the power to decide what words means."⁵¹⁾ Only under such power the Soviet Union and North Korea today may be "free." In fine, as a Polish high school senior's remark was quoted in the beginning, there is indeed "an abyss between the [communist] ideology and its implementation."

Governing Apparatus: From Withering away to Swelling

1. The Withering Away of the State

Communism may stand for a political system or a governing apparatus of the socialist countries. Marx wrote that "between capitalist and communist society lies the period of the revolutionary transformation

50) Harry Schwartz, *op. cit.*, p. 432. See also, Mervyn Matthews, *Privilege in the Soviet Union: A Study of Elite Life-Styles Under Communism* (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1978).

51) *Ibid.*, p. 433.

of the one into the other. There corresponds to this also a political transition period in which the state can be nothing but *the revolutionary dictatorship of the proletariat*.⁵²⁾ Then several questions arise here: when does the revolutionary dictatorship of the proletariat end? Does it end after the society enters the first phase of communism, its higher phase, between the two phases, or after its higher phase? When does the "state," in short, wither away?

In *Das Kapital* Marx explained the state as follows:

It is always the direct relationship of the owners of the conditions of production to the direct producers--a relation always naturally corresponding to a definite stage in the development of the methods of labour and thereby its social productivity--which reveals the innermost secret, the hidden basis of the entire social structure, and with it the political form of the relation of sovereignty and dependence, in short, *the corresponding form of the state*. This does not prevent the same economic basis--the same from the standpoint of its main conditions--due to innumerable different empirical circumstances, natural environment, racial relations, external historical influences, etc., from showing infinite variations and gradations in appearance, which can be ascertained only by analysis of the empirically given circumstances.⁵³⁾

Interestingly enough, Marx acknowledged here infinite variations and gradations of the form of the state due to various non-economic factors, although he firmly believed the premise that the specific economic form determines the specific form of the state. Similarly, Engels wrote that the state is a product of society at a certain stage of development. "It is the admission that the particular society has become entangled in an insoluble contradiction with itself" and that "it (society) is cleft into irreconcilable antagonisms." In order that these antagonisms, stemming from classes with conflicting economic interests, might not consume them-

52) Karl Marx, *Critique of the Gotha Programme*, p.18.

53) Karl Marx, *Das Kapital* Vol. III, pp. 791-792.

selves and society in sterile struggle, "a power standing above society becomes necessary for the purpose of moderating the conflict, of keeping it within the bounds of 'order.' This power, arisen out of society, but placing itself above it and increasingly alienating itself from it, is the state."⁵⁴⁾

Marx and Engels assumed that the state has not existed from all eternity, that there has been societies without it, and that only in a certain stage of economic development did the state become a necessity owing to the cleavage of society into classes. In *the German Ideology*, Marx contended that the state is the form of organization which the bourgeois adopted both for internal and external purposes, that is, for the mutual guarantee of their properties and interests. The state exists only for the sake of private property, and it is the "form in which the individuals of a ruling class assert their common interests."⁵⁵⁾ The state is, in brief, an instrument of the ruling class.

If the state is an instrument of the ruling class at a given stage of economic development, its power (state power) is bound to be repressive. Marx equated the word "state" with "the government machinery," "the old repressive machinery," "an engine of class despotism," or "the bureaucratic-military machine, which needs to be 'smashed' rather than being *transferred* from one hand to another."⁵⁶⁾ Engels characterized it as "a special repressive force," and Lenin described it as a "special machinery of suppression," "the form of oppression," "the machine for the oppression of one class by another" and "the special apparatus for compulsion."⁵⁷⁾ In a simplistic yet lucid manner, Engels summed up the

54) Frederick Engels, *The Origins of the Family, Private Property, and the State* introduction by Evelyn Reed (New York: Path Finder Press, 1978), pp. 158-159.

55) Marx and Engels, *The German Ideology*, pp. 59-60.

56) Marx's letter to Dr. Kugelmann on the Paris Commune (April 12, 1871) in Karl Marx, *The Civil War in France* introduction by Frederick Engels (New York: International Publishers, 1940, 1960), p. 85.

57) See, for instance, Marx, *Civil War in France*, p. 20, p. 55 and p. 60;

repressive character of the state power:

...the state of antiquity was above all the state of the slave owners for the purpose of holding down the slaves, as the feudal state was the organ of the nobility for holding down the peasant serfs and bondsmen, and the modern representative state is an instrument of exploitation of wage labour by capital.⁵⁸⁾

Since the state power is inherently oppressive, according to the *theory* of Marx, Engels and Lenin, no room *can* exist for the state in an ideal communist society. In theory, the state is "superfluous," "not necessary," "transitory" or "withering away." Marx pointed out that freedom consists in "converting the state from an organ standing above society into one completely subordinated to it."⁵⁹⁾ Because the state is the antithesis of freedom, Engels even suggested that the 'state' should be replaced by what he called 'community' (Germeinwesen in German or Commune in French). He argued that a free state is one where the state is *free* and is, therefore, a despotic government. Hence, the state, only a transitory institution, will of itself dissolve and disappear with the introduction of the socialist order of society. Further, he explained that it is pure nonsense to talk of a 'free people's state' because the proletariat *uses* the state not in the interests of freedom but in order to hold down its adversaries by force, and "as soon as it becomes possible to speak of freedom, the state as such ceases to exist."⁶⁰⁾ In *Anti-duehring* he elaborated his concept of the withering away of the state:

When ultimately it (the state) becomes really representative of society as a whole, it makes itself superfluous. As soon as there is no longer any

V.I. Lenin, *State and Revolution*, p.66 and p.74. Also, Marx, *Critique of the Gotha Programme*, p.19.

58) Robert C. Tucker (ed.), *The Marx-Engels Reader* (New York: W.W. Norton Co., 1972), p.653.

59) Marx, *Critique*, p.17.

60) *Ibid.*, p.31.

class of society to be held in subjection: as soon as, along with class domination and the struggle for individual existence based on the former anarchy of production, the collisions and excesses arising from these have been abolished, there is nothing more to be repressed, and a special repressive force, a state, is no longer necessary. The first act in which the state really comes forward as the representative of society as a whole--the seizure of the means of production in the name of society--is at the same time its last independent act as a state. The interference of a state power in social relations becomes superfluous in one sphere after another, and then becomes dormant of itself. Government over persons is replaced by the administration of things and the direction of the processes of production. The state is not 'abolished,' it *withers away*.⁶¹⁾

Like Marx and Engels, Lenin reiterated, at least in theory, the fundamental incompatibility of freedom and the state. He argued that as long as the state exists there is no freedom. When there is freedom, he contended, there will be no state. The state will become absolutely unnecessary under communism because "there is no one to be suppressed--'no one' in the sense of a class, in the sense of a systematic struggle with a definite section of the people."⁶²⁾

It is clear from the above that Marx, Engels and Lenin are in basic agreement that in an ideal communist society the state is no longer necessary because no class antagonisms will exist. At the same time they acknowledged that the state will not disappear overnight and an ideal communist society--a classless and stateless community--will not be realized instantly, as their phrases, "ultimately," "as soon as..." and "withering away," indicate. As noted earlier, Marx identified the period of the revolutionary transformation from capitalism to communism, and distinguished the first from the higher phase of communism. Similarly, Lenin admitted that during the revolutionary transformation period the

61) Emile Burns, *A Handbook of Marxism* (London: Victor Gollancz, 1935), pp. 295-296.

62) Lenin, *State and Revolution*, p. 75.

suppression of the minority of exploiters by the majority of exploited is still necessary, that is, a special apparatus, special machinery for suppression, or the 'state' is still necessary.⁶³⁾

Since Marx, Engels and Lenin anticipated the eventual demise of the state, the question of *duration*--how long will it take for a state to wither away--must be answered. On this question, all three are rhetorical at best, and elusive and evasive at worst. Marx saw the withering away process as "long struggles" and "historic processes."⁶⁴⁾ Engels believed that the state will exist until "a new generation will be able to throw off the entire State trumpery from itself."⁶⁵⁾ Lenin confessed that "by what stages, by what means or by what practical measures humanity will proceed to this higher aim--from each according to his ability and to each according to his needs--this we do not and cannot know," Further, he wrote:

...we have a right to speak solely of the inevitable withering away of the state, emphasizing the protracted nature of this process and its dependence upon the rapidity of development of the higher phase of communism; leaving quite open the question of lengths of time, or the concrete forms of withering away, since material for the solution of such question is not available.⁶⁶⁾

Bukharin and Preobraschensky provided an explicit answer to this question; "two or three generations will have to grow up under the new conditions" before the classless, stateless communistic society will be realized.⁶⁷⁾

63) *Ibid.*, p. 74.

64) Marx, *The Civil War in France*, p. 62.

65) Quoted in Sherman H.M. Chang, *The Marxian Theory of the State* (New York: Russell and Russell, 1931, 1965), p. 132.

66) Lenin, *State and Revolution*, p. 79.

67) Bukharin and Preobraschensky, *ABC of Communism*, p. 60. Quoted in Sherman Chang, *op. cit.*, p. 132.

2. The Swelling of the State

It is evident from Marx, Engels and Lenin that the withering away of the state is indefinite, protracted and conditional, albeit ineluctable. Logically, another way of measuring the process of the state's demise would be to find out whether the size of the state governmental machinery and/or the scope of its influence or repression in a socialist country at a given point of time (t) has become greater or lesser at a later point in time ($t+1$). Specifically, are nearly seventy years of a proletarian dictatorship not sufficient for the Soviet Union to complete the transition from capitalism to communism and from the first phase of communism to its higher phase? Has the North Korean state machinery been shrinking or swelling for the last forty years?

The answers to these questions are rather unequivocal. After nearly seventy years of communist experiments in the Soviet Union and forty years of similar implementations in North Korea, their respective state machineries have not withered away. To the contrary, they have swollen, not to mention their conspicuous expansion of the military and its hardware. The Soviet Union's increasing globalist expansionism and North Korea's militarism attest to this contradiction between the "theory" of the withering away of the state and the practice of state expansionism. Is the menace of the "US imperialist and its lackies" a sufficient rationale for the Soviet Union (and North Korea and other socialist countries) to engage in expansionism and militarism? Or, is that the pretext for the Soviet *nomenklatura* to perpetuate their power under a totalitarian political straightjacket?

David Shipler's and Fox Butterfield's personal observations of the Soviet and Chinese current scenes, respectively, are worth noting in this regard:

In Moscow there is no outside. The hierarchy is totally enveloping, and

the chain of command from the lowliest assembly-line worker to the Stalin or the Khrushchev or the Brezhnev or the Andropov at the pinnacle is unbroken, deriving from comprehensive government ownership and party control.⁶⁸⁾

Every Chinese belongs to a *danwei* through his office, factory, school, or commune. Although technically a person's place of work, the *danwei* also often provides the housing where a Chinese lives, the school where his children get an education, clinics for when he gets sick, and ration cards for his rice, cooking oil, and soap. Before a Chinese can get married, he must get permission from the Party secretary of his *danwei*; if a couple want to get divorced, their *danwei* must first approve.⁶⁹⁾

The regimented life in the present North Korea is far worse than the above depiction of the Soviet and Chinese scenes, as the scene of the current political life in North Korea presented below testify:

You can't be *free* because freedom, among other things, means choice. It means that you are free to choose your job, house, spouse, life style, etc. Unfortunately, I found little of such freedom in North Korea. I was told that no one in North Korea is unemployed; no one is starving; and no one is excluded from free medical care and schooling. The North Korean government, i. e., the Benevolent Leader Kim Il Sung, takes care of everyone and everything. Everyone is employed, but that is because the government dictates people what, where, and how to work, with virtually no choice for the workers. Everyone's food and housing may be taken care of, but again the government rations the food and allocates the housing units. Schooling may be free, but again at what price!⁷⁰⁾

68) David K. Shipler, *Russia: Broken Idols, Solemn Dreams* (New York: Penguin Books, 1984), p.17.

69) Fox Butterfield, *China: Alive in the Bitter Sea* (New York: Bantam Books, 1983), p.323.

70) Sung Chul Yang, *Torn Between Seoul and Pyongyang*, an unpublished manuscript.

The caption in the front page of the *Pyongyang Times* on March 9, 1983, read:

“Demonstration of Our People’s United Strength Elections to City and County People’s Assemblies: 100% Voter Turnout, 100% Yes Votes”

On February 25, 1985, the exact same caption-- “100% Voter Turnout, 100% Yes Votes”--appeared in the front page of the *Pyongyang Times*. The only changes I have detected in these two “news stories” were that the number of deputies have increased from 24,562 in 1983 to 28,793 in 1985, the KWP’s invincible “might” was replaced by its invincible “strength” and the “respected Comrade Kim Il Sung” has supplanted the “great leader President Kim Il Sung.” By contrast, the *Beijing Review* of February 25, 1980, reported, for instance, that the voter turnout in China’s Tongxiang County election was not 100%, but 98.86%. Even in the election in the Soviet Union, the “yes” vote is not 100% but 99.9%!⁷¹⁾ To put it differently, the perfect voter turnout in North Korea represents political aberration rather than democratic vitality; its perfect “yes” vote indicates the absence of the people’s spontaneous political input, which, in turn, attests to political regimentation rather than the realization of a utopia.

One thing is clear. The repressive state of the old society, deplored fervently by Marx, Engels and Lenin as the “bureaucratic-military machine,” has not, contrary to their expectations, been smashed in any of the present socialist countries. Rather, it has expanded constantly and consistently at all the socialist countries. As Milovan Djilas noted, “the growth of state power, more precisely, of the bureaucracy which enforced the tyranny did not stop with the dictatorship of the proletariat. Instead, it increased.”⁷²⁾ In Nisbet’s words, “no nation could be

71) See Richard F. Starr, *op. cit.*

72) Milovan Djilas, *The New Class: An Analysis of the Communist System* (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1957, 1964), p. 86.

as thoroughly saturated by military discipline, regimentation, and the symbolism of war as are the Soviet Union, China, and other smaller socialist countries."⁷³⁾ Hendel's point is more direct:

The failure of the Soviet state to wither away, in the face of the claim that the USSR has already achieved socialism, a classless society and, according to the New Party Program, "a state of the entire people" (itself a formulation in conflict with basic theory) --however rationalized-- is in fundamental contradiction with Marxist theory.⁷⁴⁾

In summary, a classless and stateless communist society has not yet emerged in any of the socialist countries. The withering away of the state has not occurred anywhere, including North Korea. Nor is there any sign that the communist states would wither away in the near future. To the contrary, the state apparatus, be it party, state, or military bureaucracy has swollen invariably. From this standpoint, not the state itself but only its theory has withered away. Doubtless, no society, including the totalitarian system, is static. The changes have been discernible in the Soviet Union when power moved from Lenin to Stalin, Khrushchev, Brezhnev, Andropov, Chernenko and to Gorbachev. Likewise, North Korea changed under Kim Il Sung from the 40s to the present. Still these changes have taken place within a totalitarian politico-economic framework.

III. Communists: General Definitions and Korean Versions

As much as the term "communism" has been abused and misused, so has been the label "communists." The communists may refer to those who believe in Marxism-Leninism, those attempt to overturn the existing political system and supplant it with a communist system by violent

73) Robert Nisbet, *Twilight of Authority* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1975), p. 147.

74) Hendel, *op. cit.*, p. 442.

revolutionary means, those who are formal members of a communist party, those who are sympathetic to communist theories and/or to communist revolutionaries, those who are the ideal communist, the "new socialist man," or any combination of all these types.

Communists as a Believer

One category of communists may simply be those who naively believe in Marxism-Leninism at its face-value. They may be attracted by the idealistic appeals of Marxism-Leninism without realizing the enormous gap existing between its theoretical ideals and the political reality of the socialist countries which claim Marxism-Leninism as their ideological foundations. Another group may be political fanatics or "true believers" who are blindly obsessed with Marxim-Leninism and await its inevitable political triumph. The communist "true believers" are ready to die for their cause and, to that extent, they are mentally akin to the communist revolutionaries.

In North Korea, today, the communists belonging to the first category are rare except for, perhaps, the youths who are too young to discern the difference between the KWP propaganda and the life under communism at home and abroad. By contrast, in the midst of the Kim Il Sung cult, the second category is not hard to find there, although the motives vary widely among the North Korean "true believers." They have wittingly or unwittingly become true believers because of their power, positions and privileges, or because of their fear of losing such benefits if they do not pretend to embrace the Kim Il Sung cult. In fact, in appearance at least, virtually all the People in North Korea seem to love "the Great Leader Kim Il Sung" and the "Dear Leader Kim Chong Il." It may be safe to assume, then, that there are more fakes among these true-believers than real fanatics.

Communist as a Revolutionary

Marx and Engels began *the Communist Manifesto* (1848) with a rather eerie deliverance: "A spectre is haunting Europe --the spectre of Communism." Further, they asserted that "the communist revolution is the most radical rupture with traditional property relations."⁷⁵⁾ But Marx and Engels did not define in this pamphlet what communism *is*. Instead, they made a series of claims about communists. Under the section on proletarians and communists, they listed what the communists should or should not do: (i) do not form a separate party opposed to other working-class parties; (ii) do not have separate interests apart from those of the proletariat as a whole; (iii) do not set up any sectarian principles of their own; (iv) defend the common interests of the entire proletariat, independently of all nationality, in the national struggles of the proletarians of the different countries; (v) represent always and everywhere the interests of the proletarians in the struggle of the working class against the bourgeoisie.⁷⁶⁾

Marx and Engels, then stated that the communists are "the most advanced and resolute section of the working class parties of every country." The immediate aim of the communists is the "formation of the proletariat into a class, overthrow of the bourgeois supremacy, conquest of political power by the proletariat."⁷⁷⁾ In the same vein they stressed that "the distinguishing feature of Communism is not the abolition of property generally, but the abolition of bourgeois property." Then, they wrote that "the theory of the Communists may be summed up in the single sentence: abolition of private property."⁷⁸⁾

Further, Engels separated communists from "socialists in 1847." He

75) Marx and Engels, *Manifesto*, p. 72.

76) *Ibid.*, pp. 60-61.

77) *Ibid.*, p. 61.

78) *Ibid.*

divided "socialists in 1847" into two types: (i) the adherents of the various Utopian systems, notably the Owenites in England and the Fourierists in France; and (ii) the manifold types of social quacks who wanted to eliminate social abuses by offering their version of panaceas and patchwork, without hurting capital and profit in the least.⁷⁹⁾

It is quite evident from the above that Marx and Engels portrayed the communists as "revolutionaries." It was, however, Lenin who systematically conceptualized what he called "professional revolutionists." The overwhelming majority of the working masses are politically unconscious and revolutionarily inactive. Hence, according to Lenin, the professional communist revolutionists alone, who are motivated, disciplined and secretly organized, can successfully lead those masses to the violent communist revolution.⁸⁰⁾

In his treatise on "the tasks of Korean Communists" on November 10, 1937, Kim Il Sung urged his audiences to organize and mobilize the masses in order to defeat Japanese imperialism and to regain the Korean independence. In doing so, he advocated that the Korean communists must eliminate "all the reactionary landlords, pro-Japanese elements and traitors to the nation."⁸¹⁾

In sum, to Marx and Engels the communists as revolutionaries meant those who are willing to overthrow the bourgeois society and lead the proletarian revolution to its victory. To Lenin, the communists as revolutionaries referred to "professional revolutionaries," a tiny minority who must lead the Russian communist revolution by overthrowing the Tsarist Russia. Finally, to Kim Il Sung, the Korean communists as revolutionaries stood for those who must fight against the Japanese imperialism and regain the Korean national independence and, ultimately, win it under communist rule.

79) *Ibid.*, p. 29 (Engel's preface written in London on May 1, 1890).

80) Lenin, *What Is To Be Done*, pp. 116-117.

81) Kim Il Sung, *On the Building of The People's Government*, Vol. I, pp. 3-40.

Communist as a Party Member

To be eligible for party membership in the Soviet Union, an applicant must be eighteen or older, have a good personal record and know the basics of Marxism-Leninism. He or she is required to secure written recommendations from several members who have belonged to the CPSU for at least five years. A favorable decision by the primary organization must then be approved by the appropriate upper-level party office. For a year the new member remains a candidate on probation without a voting power.

Although it is hard to estimate how many Soviet citizens join the CPSU for convenience rather than for ideological conviction, the former category is by no means miniscule. Perhaps, in most of the cases people join the CPSU for a combination of several factors, e.g. ideological convictions, special privileges, prerogatives, and perquisites that go with party membership. The CPSU membership usually provides the institutional mechanism through which ambitious young men and women can advance their careers and fortunes.

The CPSU party members are grouped into two categories--the party elite and the rank-and-file members. Of one million party elites, a quarter of a million constitute party functionaries or *apparatchiks*, who are the executives of the party machine, and some three-quarters of a million make up high-ranking party members or *nomenklatura*, who occupy key positions within the state, military and other top civil, diplomatic, labor or professional organizations.⁸²⁾ As noted above, 17 million CPSU members out of 270 million people comprise a tiny minority. To that extent, even the CPSU rank-and-file members are a privileged class in comparison with the rest of the Soviet citizenry.

The procedures and qualifications for enlisting in the CCP is virtually

82) For a discussion of the Soviet *nomenklatura*, see Richard Pipes, *Op. Cit.*, pp. 29-33.

similar to those for joining the CPSU. One conspicuous addition is a professed belief in Maoism or the Mao Zedong Thought. Specifically, Section One of Article 3 of the 1982 CCP Constitution (adopted by the 12th National Congress of the CCP on September 6, 1982) specifies: "to conscientiously study Marxism-Leninism and Mao Zedong Thought, essential knowledge concerning the Party, and the Party's line, principles, policies and decisions...." Again, subgroups similar to those in the Soviet Union exist among some 40 million CCP members in China. Likewise, preparatory organizations such as the Chinese Youth League, the counterpart of the Soviet *Komsomol*, are usually the initial steps before joining the CCP.

Unlike the Soviet and Chinese party constitutions, North Korea's KWP Charter adopted at the 6th KWP Congress on October 13, 1980, is replete with the Kim Il Sung's Juche idea. The KWP party members are "juche-type, communist revolutionaries who fight single-handedly for the great leader Comrade Kim Il Sung, the fatherland, the people, and the ultimate victory of socialism and communism" (Chapter One: Party Members). Also stressed is the loyalty to Kim Il Sung in lieu of Marxism-Leninism. A duty of the KWP members is to "be boundlessly loyal to the great leader Comrade Kim Il Sung and the party...." But the technical aspect of membership to the KWP is virtually identical to that for the CPSU and CCP. Specifically, requiring written recommendations from two party members and being placed on a year-long probationary period are the same as those for the CPSU and CCP membership, but the eligibility age is not specified for the KWP members. Again, like the Soviet and Chinese counterparts, North Korea's Socialist Working Youth League is the youth auxiliary organization of the KWP. Doubtless, the division of KWP members into the top elites and the rank-and-file members do exist. Some 3 million KWP party members are proportionately larger in numbers than their Soviet and Chinese counterparts in relation to the total population. A relatively larger KWP membership does not attest to the KWP's popularity, but

to a tighter political regimentation and control in North Korea than in the Soviet Union or China.

There are presently no communists in South Korea who belong to a formal communist party. Perhaps, there may be a few who formerly belonged to the South Korean Worker's Party and other leftist parties and/or those who were the former members of the KWP residing in the South. Regardless, the communist party and its political activities are outlawed in the South and, thus, the card-carrying communist party members are nonexistent in the South, or at least, not openly active and visible.

The reasons for the emergence of a Communist state in the North and the absence of communists and their organizations in the South are several. First, the Soviet occupation forces attempted to implant a pliant communist political system and sought to expand it in the North, as the American military administration worked for an anti-communist political system in the South. Second, as noted previously, the self-defeating political strategies and intrigues of Pak Hon-yong and his South Korean Workers' Party suffered public confidence. Third, ever since the launching of the DPRK and the ROK in 1948, no political elements other than the KWP and its auxiliary organizations have been permitted to exist in the North, as communists and their political activities have been outlawed in the South. Fourth, the Korean War and other subversive and terroristic acts intermittently perpetrated by North Korea have created a sense of abhorrence toward communism in the South. Finally, some 4 to 5 million refugees, who fled from the North to the South prior to and during the Korean War, have been a significant safeguard against communism.

Communists as Sympathizers

This type of communists is the most difficult to identify and, thus, the most likely to be abused and misused. It is tempting for the commu-

nist countries to exaggerate the number of people who are supportive of, at least, sympathetic to their causes and struggles. It is equally tempting for the anti-communist countries to prosecute any political opponent or rival organization on the grounds of sympathizing with the communists. Whether or not a simple *feeling* of sympathy, explicit *advocacy*, specific *act*, or any combination of these three will make any individual or organization a communist sympathizer is both a political and legal question.

More often than not, the communist sympathizers are a creation of political labeling and moralizing. To illustrate a personal experience, during the Korean War of 1950~53, one platoon of the North Korean military forces were stationed for about a month in my home town and incarcerated many prominent local citizens. The North Korean platoon and their local collaborators executed many notables en masse and buried them in a mass grave the night before they retreated which was soon after the UN troops landed on Inch'on in September 1950. The North Korean authorities called those prominent citizens "reactionaries" (*pandongbunja*) or "bad elements of society." After the South Korean authorities regained the area, some local communist collaborators were captured and imprisoned and they were labeled the "communist collaborators" (*puyokja*) or "bad elements." If my memory serves me right, within a month, the same people, who were once considered "good people" became "bad elements," and vice versa.

A vagueness and broadness surrounding the definition of the communist sympathizers can be subject to political abuses. For example, South Korea's Anti-Communist Law stipulates that "any person who has benefited the anti-State organizations by praising, encouraging or siding with or through other means the activities of an anti-State organization or their components or the communist organizations outside the Republic of Korea shall be punished by imprisonment at hard labor for not more than seven years. The same shall apply to the person who has organized or affiliated with the organization for the purpose of com-

mitting such acts" (Section 1, Article 4).⁸³⁾

By contrast, in North Korea non-communist sympathizers or "enemy class" are generally categorized into four groups. The first group include former landlords, capitalists, ex-officials of the Imperial Japan, bad religious elements and pro-Americans, and they are subject to political suppression. To the second group belong those who need to be isolated from the rest of the populace for fear of their sympathy with South Korea. The third group are composed of those who need to be isolated from the mainstream of the society for ideological education and political rectification. The fourth group comprise those who can be coopted into the ruling camp after the successful completion of the KWP ideological education.⁸⁴⁾

Communists as New Socialist Men

Finally, the communists may denote what they *should be*, i.e., the new socialist men, rather than what they actually *are*. For instance, Article 59 of the CPSU party rules list the moral code of the "builders of communism" as follows:

1. Devotion to the cause of Communism, love for the Socialist homeland (and) for the countries of Socialism;
2. Conscientious labor for the good of society; he who does not work, neither shall eat;
3. Concern of everyone for the preservation and growth of public property;
4. A high sense of public duty, intolerance toward infringements of public interests;
5. Collectivism and comradely mutual assistance; one for all, all for one;

83) *Laws of The Republic of Korea* (Seoul: The Korean Legal Center, 1969), pp.1321~1322.

84) For details, see *Pukhan Chonso*, p.475.
Quoted in Medish, *op. cit.*, p.108.

6. Humane relations and mutual respect among people: one person to another person--friend, comrade, brother;

7. Honesty and truthfulness, moral purity, simplicity and modesty in public and personal life;

8. Mutual respect in family life, concern for the upbringing of children;

9. Intolerance toward injustice, parasitism, dishonesty, careerism (and) profiteering;

10. Friendship and brotherhood of all the peoples of the USSR, intolerance toward national and racial animosity;

11. Intolerance toward the enemies of Communism, the cause of peace, and the freedom of nations;

12. Fraternal solidarity with the working people of all countries, with all nations.⁸⁵⁾

Article 3 of the Constitution of the CCP adopted by the 12th National Congress of the CCP on September 6, 1982, too, specifies several "duties" the CCP party members must fulfil:

1. To consciously study Marxism-Leninism and Mao Zedong Thought, essential knowledge concerning the Party, and the Party's line, principles, policies and decisions; and acquire general, scientific and professional knowledge;

2. To adhere to the principle that the interests of the Party and the people stand above everything, subordinate their personal interests to the interests of the Party and the people, be the first to bear hardships and the last to enjoy comforts, work selflessly for the public interest, and absolutely never use public office for personal gain or benefit themselves at the expense of the public;

3. To execute the Party's decisions perseveringly, accept any job and fulfill actively any task assigned them by the Party, conscientiously observe

85) See, for instance, Paul Kurtz and Svetozar Stojanovic (eds.), *Tolerance and Revolution: A Marxist-Non-Marxist Humanist Dialogue* (Beograd: Philosophical Society of Serbia, 1970), Also, Gerson S. Sher (ed.), *Marxist Humanism and Praxis* (New York: Prometheus Books, 1978), p.13.

Party discipline and the laws of the state, rigorously guard Party and state secrets and staunchly defend the interests of the Party and the State;

4. To uphold the Party's solidarity and unity, to firmly oppose factionalism and all factional organizations and small-group activities, and to oppose double-dealing and scheming of any kind;

5. To be loyal to and honest with the Party, to match words with deeds and not to conceal their political views or distort facts; to earnestly practise criticism and self-criticism, to be bold in exposing and correcting shortcomings and mistakes in work, backing good people and good deeds and fighting against bad people and bad deeds;

6. To maintain close ties with the masses, propagate the Party's views among them, consult with them when problems arise, listen to their views and demands with an open mind and keep the Party informed of these in good time, help them raise their political consciousness, and defend their legitimate rights and interests;

7. To play an exemplary vanguard role in production and other work, study and social activities, take the lead in maintaining public order, promote new socialist ways and customs and advocate communist ethics;

8. As required by the defense of the motherland and the interests of the people, to step forward and fight bravely in times of difficulty and danger, fearing neither hardship nor death.

Unlike the Soviet and Chinese "new socialist men," North Korea's version is the *Juche* type. The new socialist man of *Juche* type, in essence, has two additional duties (1) that he or she must be boundlessly loyal to the "Great leader Kim Il Sung" and (2) that he or she must carry out the "great task of reunifying the fatherland." Otherwise, as the key "duties" of the KWP members below illustrate, North Korea's new socialist man differs little from his or her Soviet and Chinese equivalent:

1. Should stand firmly on the unitary ideological system of the party; Should be boundlessly loyal to the great leader Kim Il Sung and the Party and unconditionally accept, thoroughly defend, and accurately implement

party line and policies; Should constantly study, preserve, and defend the revolutionary tradition of the party by applying it to his (her) daily work of life; Should fight against all anti-party and anti-revolutionary lines of capitalism, feudalistic Confucianism, revisionism, dogmatism, flunkeyism, factionalism, provincialism, and nepotism; Should uphold the unity of the party based on the *Juche* ideology;

2. Should actively participate in the organizational life of the party, be trained in the party spirit, and revolutionize himself (herself) to become an active proletarian revolutionary among the working class; Should actively participate in party meetings, study sessions, and the organizational and ideological lives of the party; carry out party decisions and assigned work of the party correctly; review his (her) party life daily; actively carry out ideological struggle through self-criticism; and transform himself (herself) into a revolutionary vanguard; Should strictly observe the Party charter that applies to all members, irrespective of rank and accomplishments, and fight against violators of the party charter;

3. Should have revolutionary study habits and continuously raise his (her) political, ideological, and cultural standards; Should accurately grasp the *Juche* ideology and the party line, policies, and tradition on revolution; keep abreast of contemporary situations; and make efforts to raise his (her) cultural standards by studying the problems of socialist economic management and advanced science and technology;

4. Should carry out the revolutionary mass line and must always work with the toiling masses; Should constantly explain party line and policies to the masses, educate and organize them, unite them around the party and mobilize them for party work, and meet their demands in time by correctly understanding them;

5. Should set an example for the masses in his (her) work and life and play the role of a vanguard in all works of the country; Should fight against conservatism and negativism, actively participate in the management of enterprises, actively endeavour to protect and multiply state and cooperative property, and be frugal;

6. Should possess lofty Communist moral character, love his (her) organization and groups, and sacrifice individual gains for the benefit of the

organization; should bravely tackle all sorts of difficulties by displaying lofty revolutionary spirit of self-reliance; Should always be thrifty, humble, unselfish, frank before the party, humane and cultured, and he (she) should set an example in observing national laws, social order, and social morality;

7. Should defend the socialist fatherland; should always be alert and ready to be mobilized, learn about military affairs, defend revolutionary gains against enemy intrusions, and be determined to participate actively in the great revolutionary task of reunifying the fatherland;

8. Should uphold orders of the revolutionary system, fight against indolence, hold high political vigilance at all times, and strictly keep secrets of the party and state;

In sum, communist as a new socialist man, whether he or she is a Soviet, a Chinese, or a North Korean, is an ideal person whom the CPSU, the CCP, and the KWP wishes to create. Like the chasm existing between communism and the communist states, a similar unbridgeable gap spans those actual card-carrying communist members and the idealized communist--the new socialist man.

IV. Concluding Remarks

Thus far, I have examined communism and Korean communism as a political doctrine, a historical movement, a societal developmental stage, and a political system. Also, communists and Korean communists were subdivided into five types--believers, revolutionaries, formal party members, sympathizers, and new socialist men. In so doing, I have explored many chasms existing between the official claims of communist doctrines and the actual reality of communist societies today, and between the political labeling and moralizing of communists and the card-carrying communists. The crux of the matter is that the present socialist countries, including North Korea, are a far cry from Marx's version of communism. As a convenient escapism, the so-called Marxist human-

ists advocated a bizzare notion that communism is not the fifth, the final, and the ultimate human society, but it is once again "the transition period from capitalism to humanism."⁸⁵⁾ Regardless of their wishful thinking and idealism, once popular "communism with a human face" is still alien to the present socialist totalitarian system.⁸⁶⁾

One additional political reality is worth mentioning in this context. Namely, the parallel division between the socialist and the capitalist world on a global scale and between the North and the South in the Korean peninsula as a political by-product of post-world war II still persists. The mutual hostilities continuing between North and South Korea hurt no one but the Korean people themselves. The final military showdown between the two superpowers will result in the extinction of the human species. The plea for ideological toleration in political arena similar to the idea of religious toleration in spiritual realm may be, thus, urgently called for.

86) A reference to Dubchek's "socialism with a human face" is found in Kurtz and Stojanovic, *op. cit.*, pp.163-164.