

THE JCP'S MIYAMOTO LEADERSHIP SINCE 1961

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I

The Japan Communist Party (JCP) is one of the largest nonruling Communist parties in the world. Founded in 1922, it was illegal in the prewar period and its membership did not exceed one thousand. On the eve of Japan's surrender, the party had long ceased to function when most of its members had either defected or been imprisoned. Although the party made an impressive resurgence immediately after World War II, its initial postwar success did not last long. During the 1950s, the party was badly divided internally and isolated politically in Japan as a result of a series of blunders committed by its leadership.

The party began to make an impressive comeback after 1961 under the leadership of Kenji Miyamoto who became the party's Secretary-General in 1958. Under Miyamoto's stewardship, the JCP has not only deradicalized its policy programs, but also declared successfully its independence from Moscow and Peking. Furthermore, since 1961, the JCP has attempted to attain its political objectives through the strategy of the "parliamentary path to revolution." On the whole this strategy has worked well. Today, the JCP is the second largest party in Japan in terms of party membership (i.e., 460,000); it is the richest party in terms of finance (i.e., over 21 billion yen in 1984); and its newspaper, *Aka-*

hata, is the largest party-operated newspaper in Japan with total combined subscriptions of about 3 million (600,000 daily and 2,600,000 Sunday editions). It also has 26 seats in the 511-member *Shugiin* (the House of Representatives) and 14 seats in the 252-member *Sangiin* (the House of Councillors).

It is the purpose of this paper to examine the role of Kenji Miyamoto in shaping the JCP's political fortune and policies since the time of the adoption of the party's new program in 1961 to the present. Since Miyamoto has relied heavily on a number of his trusted lieutenants in the management of party affairs, the roles of his close lieutenants who have composed together with Miyamoto the party leadership since 1961 will be also analyzed. In addition, it will analyze the underlying cause of the recent stagnation of the JCP which has hastened the "twilight of the Miyamoto system" within the JCP.¹⁾

II

Since the development of the JCP as a parliamentary party is closely related to Miyamoto's leadership of the party, it is necessary to review briefly the developments leading to the establishment of the "Miyamoto system" of leadership within the party.

Immediately following the Japanese surrender in August 1945, the JCP was reorganized under the leadership of Kyuichi Tokuda and Sanzo Nosaka. Under Nosaka's famous "peaceful path to revolution" the JCP expanded its power base rapidly between 1946 and 1949. In 1949, for instance, the party succeeded in electing 35 members to the lower house of the Diet, polling nearly three million votes (or 9.7 percent of the total votes cast). The JCP's triumph in 1949 did not last long, however. With the adoption of a new strategy of violent revolution in 1950-1951 under instructions from Moscow and Peking (commonly known as the

1) For a detailed analysis, see Minoru Morita, "Miyamoto Taisei no Tasogare," *Shokun*, February 1986, pp. 39-47.

1951 "Thesis"), the JCP lost all of its 35 seats in the 1952 elections, and its popular vote plummeted to 897,000 in 1952.²⁾

Following orders from Moscow and Peking, the JCP had attempted to organize a guerrilla force in Japan and to train its members to subversive activities and terrorism. However, the violent revolutionary strategy proved disastrous, for it provoked U.S. military authorities in Japan to retaliate with measures designed to curb the Communist activities after June 1950. The Japanese Communists were purged from public office and many of them, including Tokuda went underground or into exile in Communist China during the period of the Korean War, 1950-53. The sporadic terrorist activities of the JCP alienated it from the masses, and the party rapidly became a symbol of extremism. Not only did the JCP's electoral support dwindle, but its membership shrank drastically, from 150,000 in 1949 to about 20,000 by 1955.³⁾

In the wake of the disaster created by the "ultra-leftist adventurism" of 1950-55, Kenji Miyamoto was to emerge as a leader of the JCP to rebuild the party. To be sure, Miyamoto had impressive credentials as a party leader. A graduate of the Tokyo Imperial University, he had been a member of the JCP's Central Committee as early as 1933. After twelve years' imprisonment (1933-1945), Miyamoto emerged from prison as one of the most respected leaders of the party. He had been overshadowed, however, by the more "bossy" Kyuichi Tokuda (who died in China in 1953), and the popular Sanzo Nosaka, who had shaped the party line from 1946 to 1950.

Miyamoto challenged the leadership of the Mainstream faction in 1950, when the Cominform attacked Nosaka's peaceful approach to the revol-

2) Robert A. Scalapino, *The Japanese Communist Movement, 1920~1966* (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1966), p.72. See also, Hirotake Koyama, *Sengo Nihon Kyosanto shi* (Tokyo: Haga Shoten, 1970), pp.60 and 151. In the 1953 general elections, the JCP votes shrank further to 650,000. See Shigetaro Iizuka, *Miyamoto Kenji no Nihon Kyosanto* (Tokyo: Ikko-sha, 1973), p.190.

3) *Ibid.*, p.190.

ution. Siding openly with the Cominform, Miyamoto's faction (i.e., the International faction) demanded "self-criticism" of the leadership of the Mainstream faction, as well as the acceptance of the Cominform's directives, alienating him from the party leadership. When the mainstream leaders went underground in 1950, Miyamoto founded a separate party organization.⁴⁾ However, this group was not recognized as a legitimate party organization by the Cominform, which increasingly intervened in the internal affairs of the JCP at this time. In August 1951, Miyamoto's group was dissolved under pressure from Moscow and Peking, and Miyamoto was to remain largely inactive until 1954.⁵⁾

By 1955, it became apparent to the JCP leaders that there was an urgent need for consolidation of a badly divided organization and also for a reevaluation of the revolutionary strategy. Through a compromise worked out between Shigeo Shida, the strong man of the Mainstream faction, and Miyamoto, the two rival groups merged in the spring of 1955. Sanzo Nosaka became the First Secretary of the party and headed a new leadership group which included Kenji Miyamoto, Shigeo Shida, and Yoshio Shiga. The JCP also decided to do away with the defunct strategy of violent revolution and to map out a new strategy.

Miyamoto's emergence as the party's Secretary-General at the 7th Party Congress in 1958 may be attributed partly to his non-involvement in the formulation of the party's militant strategy from 1951 to 1954, and partly to the fortuitous circumstances involving the downfall of Shigeo Shida who had been the real power in the JCP during 1952~55,

4) In September 1950, Miyamoto organized the National Unity Committee, which was dissolved the next month. In December 1950, Miyamoto and other leaders of the International faction established another organization, the "JCP National Unity Conference," to fight the leaders of the Mainstream faction. Its followers numbered approximately 10,000. For details, see Shigetaro Iizuka, *Nihon Kyosanto* (Tokyo: Sekka-sha, 1969), pp. 45~50. See also Koyama, *op. cit.*, pp. 86~129.

5) Iizuka, *Nihon Kyosanto*, p. 54. See also, Tawara, *Hadaka no Nihon Kyosanto* (Tokyo: Nisshin Hodo Shuppanbu, 1972), pp. 287~291.

replacing Ritsu Ito as the party's *de facto* leader in 1952. The erstwhile leader of the Mainstream faction was expelled from the party as it became clear that he had misused party funds and abused his power.⁶⁾

At the 7th Party Congress, Miyamoto was still overshadowed by the party chairman, Sanzo Nosaka, in terms of prestige and popularity. After that, he began to build up his power base within the party, but it was not until 1966 that he became the undisputed leader of the JCP. During the intervening eight years, Miyamoto had to wage a series of struggles against his opponents within the JCP and with their mentors in Moscow and Peking.

The first serious challenge to the Miyamoto leadership was posed by a group headed by Shojiro Kasuga, a party veteran who was closely identified with Moscow. The Kasuga group openly opposed a new party program that had been drafted and presented by Miyamoto in 1958. They argued against its adoption largely on the basis of the "structural reform theory,"⁷⁾ originally advanced by Togliati in Italy, contending that Japan was an independent, "advanced capitalist country" which was ready to proceed to the "socialist revolution" like Italy and other Western European countries through peaceful parliamentary means. Since over two-fifths of the delegates were opposed to Miyamoto's draft program, a temporary action program was adopted, pending further discussion.

After the inconclusive 7th Party Congress in 1958, the new party leadership made the Kasuga group its central target and prepared itself for the final shutdown, which took place in the spring of 1961. At the party's Central Committee meeting, Miyamoto succeeded in overcoming the Kasuga group's opposition and secured the committee's endorsement for the adoption of his draft program.⁸⁾ Shortly thereafter, the leaders of the Kasuga faction withdrew from the JCP.

6) Shida disappeared in December 1955, after being investigated about his misuse of party funds during 1951~55. He was officially expelled from the party in 1956. See Koyama, *op. cit.*, pp.194~196.

7) Scalapino, *op. cit.*, pp.102~3.

8) *Ibid.*, p.109.

At the 8th Party Congress, in July 1961, the Kasuga group was officially ousted from the party, and there was little opposition to the new party program presented to the congress by Miyamoto. With the departure of the Kasuga faction, Miyamoto's power position was immensely improved. Reelected as the party's Secretary-General, Miyamoto succeeded in establishing his leadership within the party.⁹⁾ Although Nosaka was reelected as chairman of the Central Committee, he was excluded from the Secretariat which ran the party under Miyamoto. Both the Presidium and the Secretariat were dominated by Miyamoto's supporters (e.g., Satomi Hakamada, Harushige Matsushima, Korehito Kurahara, Shinichi Takahara, etc.). In addition, Miyamoto succeeded in placing a number of his supporters in the key positions within the party. After 1961 Miyamoto gradually overshadowed the power of the Party Chairman, Sanzo Nosaka.

According to the newly adopted party platform, the JCP was to pursue the basic strategy of the parliamentary path to revolution instead of the strategy of violent revolution. However, unlike Kasuga's proposal, the program did not preclude the possibility of violent revolution. Nor did it abandon the model of a two-stage revolution. On the basis of the newly adopted party program, Miyamoto attempted to rebuild the JCP after 1961. The task was complicated by the conflicting pressures exerted by Moscow and Peking, as the two Communist giants attempted to pull the JCP into their respective orbits as a party of their growing contest for the leadership of the world communist movement.

Against the intensifying Sino-Soviet conflict, the JCP sought to steer a course of neutrality by playing down the ideological differences between the two camps. It became obvious, however, that despite JCP's superficially neutral and conciliatory attitudes toward both Moscow and Peking, it was leaning increasingly toward Peking.¹⁰⁾

9) Iizuka, *Nihon Kyosanto*. p. 256.

10) See Koyama, *op. cit.*, pp. 303~5. Within the ICP, there were three different factions, on supporting the Chinese Communist Party, another

The Soviet Union's signing of the partial nuclear test-ban treaty in July of 1963 marked the beginning of the JCP's more outspoken criticism of the Soviet position. In October 1963, for example, the JCP criticized the Soviet line as "modern revisionism," and hardened its opposition to Moscow. Against this background, talks were held in Moscow between the JCP delegation and Soviet leaders in March 1964 in a futile attempt to iron out the differences between the two parties. Yoyogi's rupture with Moscow came shortly thereafter, when the pro-Moscow Diet members of the JCP, Yoshio Shiga and Ichizo Suzuki, were expelled from the party after voting for the ratification of the nuclear testban treaty in violation of party discipline. Moscow denounced the JCP's action and, in an attempt to discredit the JCP leadership, revealed hitherto unpublished letters exchanged between Moscow and Yoyogi during 1963~1964. Yoyogi responded to the Soviet action by purging most of the pro-Soviet members from the party by fall of 1964.¹¹⁾ With Moscow's blessing, the purged members in turn organized a group called "The Voice of Japan." It was not until 1979 that relations between the two parties were "normalized" on the basis of "independence, equality and non-interference." In the meantime, the JCP denounced Moscow for its numerous sins and "big-power chauvinism," including the invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968.

Even more serious than the Soviet challenge to Miyamoto's leadership were the attempts by the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), starting in 1966, to impose its will upon the JCP. It was widely assumed at the time of the expulsion of the pro-Soviet elements from the JCP in 1964 that the party had drifted toward Peking's orbit.¹²⁾ However, Miyamoto

supporting the Soviet Union, and the third supporting a position of neutrality while leaning toward Peking.

11) According to Koyama, several hundred party members left the JCP together with the pro-Soviet leaders (Shiga, Suzuki, Shigeo Kamiyama, etc.). See Koyama, *op. cit.*, pp. 342~70. See also Iizuka, *Miyamoto Kenji no Nihon Kyosanto*, pp. 231~32.

12) J.A.A. Stockwin, "The Japanese Communist part in the Sino-Soviet Dispu-

apparently had reservations about embracing Peking's militant strategy — especially in the wake of the decimation of the Indonesian Communist Party after the abortive coup of September 30, 1965, which was believed to have been undertaken with Peking's blessings. As a result, when the Chinese Communists attempted to dictate militant policies to the JCP, a rupture between Yoyogi and Peking developed during Miyamoto's visit to Peking in March 1966, largely due to the inability to find common ground with Mao on two basic issues:¹³⁾ (1) the problem of promoting Sino-Soviet cooperation in Vietnam; and (2) the proper revolutionary strategy to be adopted by the Japanese Communists. Mao ruled out the possibility of cooperating with the Soviet Union in Vietnam and did not endorse the JCP's parliamentary path to revolution, while advocating the necessity for armed struggles in Japan. When Miyamoto did not give in to the Chinese demands, Mao refused to issue the joint communique previously agreed by both sides. After this incident, according to Miyamoto, the Chinese Communists mobilized their resources to overthrow his leadership.

Upon his return from Peking, Miyamoto carried out a purge against the pro-Peking elements. Before the opening of the 10th Party Congress in October 1966, some 40 prominent pro-Peking members were expelled from the party, including Ryuji Nishizawa (the late Tokuda's son-in-law) and Kuraji Anzai (former chief of the party's personnel section). The pro-Peking elements in turn organized splinter groups, challenging the

te—From Neutrality to Alignment?” in D.B. Miller and T.H. Rigby (eds.), *The Disintegrating Monolith* (Canberra: Australian National University Press, 1965), pp. 142~43. See also Robert A. Scalapino, “Japan,” in Witold S. Sworakowski (ed.), *World Communism: A Handbook*, 19 18~1965 (Stanford, CA: Hoover Institution Press, 1973), p. 245; and Kyosuke Hirotsu, “The Strategic Triangle: Japan,” in Leopold Labedz (ed.), *International Communism After Khrushchev* (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1965), pp. 123~30.

13) Izuka, *Miyamoto Kenji no Nihon Kyosanto*, pp. 116~24; and Asahi Shimbun sha, (ed.), *Nihon Kyosanto* (Tokyo: Asahi Shimbun sha, 1973), pp. 213~17.

authority of Miyamoto's leadership. The Peking regime provided all-out support for these elements.¹⁴⁾ As the conflict between Yoyogi and Peking intensified, invectives flew from both directions: the JCP denounced the "Maoist Clique" for its "anti-Marxist and anti-Leninist behavior," including the Cultural Revolution. The Chinese Communist retaliated by labelling the "Miyamoto revisionist clique" one of China's "four arch-enemies," after American "imperialism," clique one of China's "four arch-enemies," after American "imperialism," "Soviet revisionism," and the Sato's "reactionaries."¹⁵⁾ The JCP's conflict with Peking has not resolved since 1966.

With the elimination of the pro-Soviet and pro-Peking elements from the party, Miyamoto became the undisputed leader of the JCP. At the 10th Party Congress, not only was he re-elected Secretary-General, but his trusted lieutenants were placed in key positions at the top echelon of the party hierarchy. Several rising "stars" of the Miyamoto faction (e.g., Koichiro Ueda, Fuwa, Mitshuhiro Kaneko, Shigeru Suwa, Takeji Hama, Yoshikazu Ibaraki) were appointed as candidate members of the Secretariat. Together with Miyamoto's other staunch supporters already in the Secretariat (e.g., Hakamada, Masayoshi Oka, Shoichi Ichikawa, Shunsho, Ebisudani, Hiroyuki Okamoto, Shinchi Takahara, Tomio Nishizawa, Hiroshi Murakami, etc.), they came to control the party's Secretariat.¹⁶⁾

By 1966, it became clear that the new Mainstream faction under Kenji Miyamoto consisted of four groups of leaders who had been recruited by Miyamoto: (1) those labor union leaders who belonged to the Tokuda faction (e.g., Shinichi Takahara, Makoto Ida, Hiroshi Murakami, Takeji Hama, Mitsuhiro Kaneko, etc.); (2) local party leaders who helped Miyamoto in consolidating his power (e.g., Shoichi Ichikawa, Harushige

14) *Ibid.*, pp. 218~25.

15) *Ibid.* See also Paul F. Langer, *Communism in Japan* (Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 1972), p. 74.

16) Iizuka, *Miyamoto Kenji no Nihon Kyosanto*, pp. 234~36.

Matsushima, Junkichi Gesu, Toranosuke Iwabayashi, Kazuyoshi Sunama, Shunsho Ebisudani, etc.); (3) young theoreticians and bureaucrats who formulated policies for the party (e.g., Itaru Yonahara, Tomio Nishizawa, Hiroyuki Okamoto, Koichiro Ueda, Tetsuzo Fuwa, Akira Kudo, etc.), and (4) the surviving members of the International faction (e.g., Satomi Hakamada, Korehito Kurahara, etc.).¹⁷⁾

III

One of the most important consequences of the JCP's severance of ties with Moscow and Peking was the liberation of the party from foreign domination. For the first time since the establishment of the party in 1922, the JCP's leadership became free to map out its own strategy, unhindered by Chinese or Soviet interference. It declared its intention to pursue an independent course of action by "creative application of Marxism-Leninism" to the political problems in Japan. Such an independent posture eventually led the Miyamoto leadership to turn away further from the Chinese model of revolution and embraced the parliamentary path to revolution. It also strengthened its claim to being an independent, national Japanese party.¹⁸⁾

To be sure, the JCP had already experimented successfully with the parliamentary strategy under the leadership of Sanzo Nosaka during 1946~1949; and following the disasters wrought by the violent revolutionary strategy of 1950~1955, the Central Committee of the JCP had agreed, as early as June 1956, to consider a new program for "peaceful parliamentary revolution," because the 1951 "Thesis" did not fit the situation in Japan.¹⁹⁾ It was not until 1961 that the JCP's decision to explore the

17) Iizuka, *Nihon Kyosanto*, pp. 256~57.

18) For a detailed analysis, see Hong N. Kim, "Deradicalization of the Japanese Communist Party Under Kenji Miyamoto," *World Politics*, January 1976, pp. 273~295, esp. 277~281.

19) As early as June 28~30, 1956, the Central Committee of the JCP acknowledged the possibility of a "peaceful transition to socialism" in Japan

possibility of seeking power by a parliamentary path was laid down officially in the new party program adopted by the 8th Party Congress.

In this document,²⁰⁾ the JCP acknowledged that Japan was a highly developed capitalist country, but dependent on the United States. Accordingly, the Japanese Communists must wage a struggle against the two principal enemies, "U.S. imperialism" and "Japanese monopoly capitalism," by carrying out a "people's democratic revolution." With the completion of this phase of the revolution, it should proceed toward the "socialist revolution." The first phase of the revolution was to be carried out by a JCP-led multiclass "national democratic united front." As for revolutionary strategy and tactics, the party program stipulated that the Communist-led united front should seek to capture as many parliamentary seats as possible. "If a majority of seats could be won, then the parliament could be transformed from a tool of reaction to an instrument of the people."²¹⁾ Undoubtedly, the 1961 "Thesis" was a product of compromise among the party leaders, for it retained the Chinese model of two-stage revolution while recognizing the possibility of the peaceful parliamentary approach to revolution.

The adoption of the 1961 "Thesis" notwithstanding, it was not until after the break with Peking in 1966 that the JCP became really serious about the "parliamentary path to revolution."²²⁾ During the intervening years (1961~1966) the Chinese influence was still substantial within the JCP, and the JCP was more concerned with the "struggle" against the United States.

After 1966, the JCP's justification for the "parliamentary path to revolution" took the form of rejecting the violent revolution advocated

and decided to revise the 1951 "Thesis." For details, see Scalapino, *The Japanese Communist Movement, 1920~1966*, p.100. See also, Koyama, *op. cit.*, p.207.

20) For a Japanese text of the party program, see *Asahi Shimbun sha, op. cit.*, pp.296~310.

21) *Ibid.*, p.308.

22) *Asahi Shimbun sha, op. cit.*, p.251.

by the Chinese Communists on the grounds that (1) Japan is a highly “advanced capitalist country,” comparable to the Western European countries; (2) accordingly, the peaceful transition to revolution is as feasible in Japan as in the Western European countries. The “peaceful transition to people’s democracy” is possible in Japan, according to Tetsuzo Fuwa, because Japan’s liberal democratic political system provides such a possibility.²³⁾ Specifically, Fuwa pointed out that the Japanese Diet enjoys substantial constitutional powers within the Japanese state apparatus and plays a pivotal role in the operation of the Japanese government. Consequently, if a majority of the Diet seats could be captured, it would be possible for the JCP-led united front to form a new government, which could transform the existing Diet into a “People’s Democratic Parliament.” In Fuwa’s theory of “people’s parliamentarism,” one can detect the basic ingredients of the doctrine of “peaceful transition” to revolution which has been widely advocated by the European Communists since the late 1950’s, if not earlier.²⁴⁾

In pursuing the parliamentary path to revolution, Miyamoto relied heavily on a new generation of JCP theoreticians such as Koichiro Ueda,

23) Tetsuzo Fuwa, *Jinmin teki Gikaishugi* (Tokyo: Shin Nihon Shuppan sha, 1970). See also, Iizuka, *Miyamoto Kenji no Nihon Kyosanto*, pp. 153~56.

24) According to Cyril E. Black, “in discussing the prospects for revolution in the years ahead, Soviet doctrine places almost exclusive emphasis on ‘peaceful transition to socialism’ which it defines as the ‘*transition of individual countries to socialism without an armed rising and civil war.*’” (Italics in original). The Soviet conception of “peaceful transition” is not, according to Black, necessarily peaceful in the same sense as the transfer of power in a democratic system is peaceful, “but may involve threat of violence and readiness to use violent methods in the event of unforeseen opposition.” That is why Soviet writings distinguish the theory of “peaceful transition” from the heresy of the “revisionists” or “reformists,” which denies the necessity for “class struggle” and precludes the “possibility of non-peaceful revolution.” For details, see “The Anticipation of Communist Revolution,” in Cyril E. Black and Thomas P. Thornton, (eds.), *Communism and Revolution: The Strategic Uses of Political Violence* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1964), pp. 438~39. See also Raymond L. Garthoff, “The Advanced Countries,” *Ibid.*, pp. 407~9.

Tetsuzo Fuwa (Ueda's younger brother), and Toshio Sakaki. In many respects, they were responsible for expounding new theoretical ingredients which came to be known as "Eurocommunism."²⁵⁾ Under the guidance of the Ueda brothers, the JCP deradicalized its policy programs and undertook a series of reforms in order to project a more nationalistic, democratic and peaceful image to the Japanese voters.

Theoretical considerations aside, the Miyamoto leadership had other reasons to be willing to commit the JCP to parliamentary politics. With its streamlined party organization of over 250,000 members and a widely circulated party organ, the JCP had succeeded in electing 14 members to the lower house of the Diet, polling over 3.1 million votes in the December 1969 elections. By the end of 1969, the JCP also held more than 1,600 seats in various local assemblies.²⁶⁾ These "worldly successes" undoubtedly reinforced the Miyamoto leadership's inclinations to pursue

25) According to Vernon V. Aspaturian, "Eurocommunism" as a distinctive analytical concept is marked by the following 4 principal characteristics: 1. "The organizational, tactical, and ideological autonomy and independence of each Communist party in applying the principles of Marxism-Leninism"; 2. "The renunciation of violent revolution, the dictatorship of the proletariat, and the irreversibility of Communist power as necessary elements in the creation of a socialist society"; 3. "Permanent commitment to the values of Western humanism, democratic values, and pluralism, that is, a pledge to honor the institutions of free and universal suffrage, the freedom of opinion, expression, press, and association; the right to strike, the free movements of people, and so forth"; and 4. "The alternation of the balance between internal and external commitments... giving higher the priority to finding common ground with domestic kindred anticapitalist political and socialist forces than to the preservation of common ground with USSR." For a detailed analysis, see Vernon V. Aspaturian, "Conceptualizing Eurocommunism: Some Preliminary Observations," in Vernon V. Aspaturian et al., *Eurocommunism Between East and West* (Bloomington, Indiana: Indiana University Press, 1980), pp. 3~23. For a detailed analysis of "Euro-Nippon-Communism," see Peter Berton, "Japan: Euro-Nippon-Communism," in *ibid.*, pp. 326~362; and Jan F. Triska, "Eurocommunism and the Decline of Proletarian Internationalism," in *ibid.*, pp. 75~77.

26) Hong N. Kim, "The JCP's Parliamentary Road," *Problems of Communism*, March-April 1977, p. 20.

the parliamentary road.

At its 11th Party Congress in 1970 the JCP not only reaffirmed its intention to follow the parliamentary path but also emphasized the necessity of establishing a "democratic coalition government" in the 1970's as a prelude to setting up a national democratic united front government. The immediate task was to win control of the Diet in cooperation with other "democratic forces," such as the Japan Socialist Party (JSP), and to form a broad coalition government under the leadership of the JCP. These points were stressed in the subsequent party congresses throughout the 1970's.

In the aftermath of the JCP's decision to seek power through parliamentary means, it became unmistakably clear to the Miyamoto leadership that without an increase in the party's electoral strength it would be unrealistic to expect any success in the implementation of "peaceful transition to revolution." In order to increase the JCP's electoral strength, however, drastic changes were needed to improve party's image with the voters, to streamline the party's operation for "electioneering," and to adjust the party's political style and behavior to that becoming an electoral party. As a result, deradicalization of the JCP has been effected in virtually every aspect of the party's activities in recent years.

First, under Miyamoto's leadership the JCP has made systematic efforts to divest itself of the taint of violence and create a new democratic image. Beginning with the 11th Party Congress in 1970, the party allowed the press to cover the sessions of the congresses. Furthermore, resolutions adopted at the 11th Party Congress pledged that the JCP would not institute a one-party dictatorship even if it came to power, but would permit the functioning of opposition parties "so long as they dit not attempt to destroy the democratic system by violence."²⁷⁾ To help allay the fears and suspicions of the non-Communist parties, the JCP also watered down traditional Communist doctrines. For instance, at its 12th

27) Iizuka, *Miyamoto Kenji no Nihon Kyosanto*, pp. 169~76. See also, Tawara, *op. cit.*, p. 51.

Party Congress in 1973, the party officially decided to replace the term "dictatorship of the proletariat" ("puroretaria dokusai") with "regency of the proletariat" ("puroretaria shikken").²⁸⁾ By July 1976, the JCP had discarded "the regency of the proletariat" as well and had substituted in its stead an even milder term, "the power of the working class" ("rodokaikyu no kenryoku").²⁹⁾ Moreover, the party deleted "Marxism-Leninism" from its bylaws and its program and replaced it with the blander phrase "scientific socialism" ("kagakuteki shakaishugi").³⁰⁾

Second, concurrent with its assiduous attempts to improve the JCP's image, the Miyamoto leadership has engaged in systematic efforts to deradicalize its political communications. The JCP's "soft line" was reflected particularly in the editorial policy of *Akahata*.³¹⁾ Beginning in 1968, the JCP leadership drastically changed the format of the paper by diversifying its sources of information and introducing an entertainment section that features comics, interviews with show-business celebrities, chess and *go* games, and the like. The deradicalization of *Akahata* made it one of the most widely circulated party-operated newspapers in Japan by the 1970s. By 1974, it boasted an overall circulation of nearly 3 million (650,000 for the daily paper and 2,350,000 for the Sunday edition). Furthermore, since 1971 its sales have accounted for more than 70 percent of the total income of the party.³²⁾

Third, the JCP has drastically altered its approach to elections. For example, it has begun to pay more attention to bread-and-butter issues that often determine the outcome of elections, rather than on complicated foreign policy issues. Specifically, the party has focused increasingly on such mundane but politically potent questions as inflation, taxation, pollu-

28) Hisamitsu Nagada, *Kyosanto Senryaku* (Tokyo: Kodansha, 1975), pp. 121~22.

29) *Asahi Shimbun*, July 31, 1976.

30) *Ibid.*

31) For a detailed analysis of *Akahata's* success, see Hisamitsu Nagada, *Akahata Senryaku* (Tokyo: Kodansha, 1973).

32) Iizuka Miyamoto Kenji no *Nihon Kyosanto*, pp. 214~215.

tion, and public welfare. Furthermore, to garner votes the JCP and its front organizations have also made all-out efforts to organize grassroots activities, such as bowling, table-tennis games, and other sports and entertainment. They have also catered to the common daily needs of the voters by providing tax counseling to small shopkeepers, medical services to the poor, and the like. Along with this stepped-up attention to servicing the interests and needs of voters, the JCP has modified its criteria for the selection of party candidates, placing increased emphasis on "voter appeal." Accordingly, physicians, lawyers, and attractive female candidates with moderate and respectable images tended to receive the party's nomination more frequently than do others.³³⁾

Fourth, Kenji Miyamoto has streamlined the operations of the JCP apparatus. A reorganization of the party's national apparatus in 1970 permitted him to solidify his grip on it. Nosaka retained the chairmanship of the Central Committee, but was excluded from the party's Presidium and its Standing Committee which became the real policy-making organ of the party comparable to the Politburo of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. The Standing Committee of the Presidium was chaired by Miyamoto; and its members included Hakamada, Oka, Fuwa, Nishizawa and Matsushima. Most of them had been staunch supporters of Miyamoto after the 7th Party Congress. Fuwa, Miyamoto's "crown prince," became Secretary-General of the party. His brother, Koichiro Ueda, was elected as a member of the Presidium. Under Fuwa, the Secretariat included a number of young leaders who were talented in organizational as well as policy matters (e.g., Kaneko, Ichikawa, Gesu, Murakami, Toshio Sakaki, Masaru Kojima, Zenmei Matsumoto).³⁴⁾

As a result of these developments and changes, the JCP emerged as a

33) For example, of 38 Communists elected to the lower house of the Diet in December 1972, 12 were lawyers, 2 were medical doctors, 6 were teachers, and 4 were leaders of Communist controlled local businessmen's associations. The remaining 14 were labor union leaders of "party bureaucrats." See *Asahi Shimbun sha, op. cit.*, pp.146~147.

34) Iizuka, *Miyamoto Kenji no Nihon Kyosanto*, pp.223~225.

powerful electoral party in the 1972 *Shugin* elections. It won 38 (or 39) seats in the 491-member House of Representatives and polled more than 5,479,000 votes (or 10.5 percent of the total). In 1974, furthermore, the party more than doubled its seats in the upper house of the Diet, the *Sangiin* (the House of Councillors). It won 13 seats, including 9 new ones to raise its total membership in that chamber to 20 out of 252. In this election, it received more than 6.4 million (or 12 percent) of the votes cast in local constituencies and over 4.9 million (or 9.4 percent) of the votes cast in the national constituency. The party also did well in various local elections. By December 1975, it held 3,165 out of 76,216 seats in prefectural, municipal, town, and village assemblies, and it has also played an important role in electing so-called "progressive" governors in such populous prefectures as Tokyo, Osaka, and Kyoto.³⁵⁾ In general, the Communists registered their most conspicuous electoral successes in the highly industrialized urban centers of the crowded Pacific coastal belt, where nearly two thirds of the Japanese population live.

IV

The JCP's emergence as a major parliamentary opposition party by the 1970's was possible largely due to the effective reorientation and reorganization of the party under the leadership of Kenji Miyamoto who became the undisputed leader of the JCP by 1966. Like other Japanese political parties, the JCP was plagued by factional strife from 1950 to 1966. However, Miyamoto succeeded in getting rid of the problem by 1966 with the elimination of pro-Soviet and pro-Chinese faction leaders from the party.

As a result of the successive expulsion of Miyamoto's most vocal

35) *Asahi Shimbun*, March 9, 1976. For a detailed analysis, see Hong N. Kim, "Deradicalization of the Japanese Communist Party under Kenji Miyamoto," p. 288.

opponents and critics since 1961, the Miyamoto leadership today has few enemies within the party. The main enemies are all outside such as the Shiga's pro-Moscow "Voice of Japan" group, the pro-Peking group (e.g., the Japan Labor Party), the radical students of the Revolutionary Communist League and the like.

A reorganization of the party's national apparatus in 1970 permitted Miyamoto to solidify his grip on it and create the "Miyamoto system" of leadership. Although power theoretically emanates from the Central Committee, the real power of decision making rests with the Standing Committee of the Presidium and the Presidium of the Central Committee. Miyamoto chaired both of these from 1970 to 1982. Sanzo Nosaka, chairman of the Central Committee, maintained only nominal power after the 11th Party Congress in 1970, at which time he was dropped from the Standing Committee of the Presidium. The Secretariat, the real workhorse of the party's central apparatus, was packed with Miyamoto's trusted lieutenants and was headed by Tetsuzo Fuwa from 1970 to 1982.

At the 16th Party Congress held in July 1982, several changes in the top leadership of the party took place. Kenji Miyamoto stepped down as chairman of the Presidium. He was replaced by Fuwa. Apparently, Miyamoto's poor health and the need for a more energetic young person at the party's helm prompted the change, which had been anticipated since Fuwa's assumption of the "acting chairmanship" of the party in 1977. Nosaka also retired from the position of the Central Committee and became its honorary chairman. He was succeeded by Miyamoto, who was still the most powerful man within the party. Deputy Secretary-General Mitsuhiro Kaneko became the party's new Secretary-General.³⁶⁾

At the 17th Party Congress held in November 1985, the JCP leadership line-up led by Miyamoto was retained. Fuwa was reelected as chairman of the Presidium. The key post of Secretary-General was retained by

36) *Asahi Shimbun*, August 1, 1982.

Kaneko. As a replacement for Tomio Nishizawa, who died shortly before the congress, Shinichi Takahara was elected as vice-chairman of the Presidium. The other four remaining vice chairmen (i.e., Koichiro Ueda, Shunsho Ebisdani, Kamejiro Senago, and Hiroshi Murakami) were reelected. The change in the membership of the Presidium was also minimal in that except for three retired members the remaining 49 members were reelected. In the Secretariat, Takeji Hama replaced Saburo Uno as a Deputy Secretary-General. The size of the Secretariat membership was reduced from 13 to 11.³⁷⁾

Despite the changes made at the 16th and 17th party congresses, there can be no doubt that Miyamoto still is the top leader of the JCP. The fact that Miyamoto still retained real power was indicated in the summer of 1983 when Presidium Chairman Fuwa and vice chairman Ueda had written articles for the party's theoretical Journal, *Zenei*, that contained their self-criticism for the error committed in writing a history of the party the two had coauthored in 1956. They confessed that they had committed errors in overstating the importance of the party's relations with China and the Soviet Union and publishing internal JCP polemics in a non-party publication. It is widely suspected that the self-criticism was imposed on them by Miyamoto who began to take a tougher line in dealing with party affairs and was unhappy about the Ueda brothers' "bourgeois individualism."³⁸⁾

The incident sparked renewed interest in the reported estrangement between Miyamoto and his erstwhile right-hand man Ueda (and possibly Fuwa) and fueled speculations about factional strife within the JCP. To be sure, as early as 1970, Tsuyoshi Mizushima identified several factional groups among top JCP leaders:³⁹⁾ Tokyo University alumni, recruits

37) *Asahi Shimbun*, November 25 & 26, 1985.

38) *Asahi Shimbun*, September 26, 1983. See also John F. Copper, "Japan," *Yearbook on International Communist Affairs 1984* (Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 1984), p. 230.

39) Tsuyoshi Mizushima, *Shokugyo Kakumeika: Nikkyo Kanbu 160 mei no Rirekisho* (Tokyo: Zenboshu, 1970), pp. 240~243.

from the party Secretariat, former local cadres from the Osaka-Kyoto districts; local party bosses from other areas; labor union leaders; former officers of the postal workers union ; and survivors of the Tokuda faction.

While rejecting Mizushima's view of the existence of fullfledged factions within the JCP, Haruhiro Fukui suggested in 1978 that it might be nevertheless useful to distinguish among several types of Presidium members.⁴⁰⁾ The groups identified in the Fukui study were not factions in the ordinary sense, for they were based largely on their social and career backgrounds. First, Fukui identified seven top leaders (see Table I). Only Miyamoto and Fuwa are still active, while the other five in this group have faded away from the scene due to death, retirement, or expulsion (i.e., Hakamada in 1977). The second group included about ten "up-and-comers" who were mostly born in the 1920's. Eight out of the original the ten members are still active in the Presidium (e.g., Ueda, Kaneko, Kojima, etc.).

The third group consisted of "veteran party bureaucrats: Miyamoto loyalists." Of six members so identified, only Ebusudani still remains in the Presidium, while the other five members have dropped out altogether. In the fourth group, Fukui identified "veteran party bureaucrats: Tokuda loyalists." Of the ten members so identified, five are currently Presidium members, while the other five have either retired or died. Finally, Fukui listed five members in the group titled "reformed Tokuda faction leaders." None of them is however active anymore largely due to their old age. Senaga, Kobayashi and Furukata, who were listed as "unclassifiable" by Fukui, are still active in Presidium.

On the basis of his study, Fukui pointed out that the fifth group had little or no growth potential and the third group was in a position marginally better. On the other hand, the second group was rated as

40) Haruhiro Fukui, "The Japanese Communist Party, The Miyamoto Line and Its Problems," in Morton A. Kaplan (ed.), *The Many Faces of Communism* (N.Y.: Free Press, 1978), pp. 287~298.

the “wave of the future”; and the fourth group had a “pretty good chance” provided that “its members continue to demonstrate their loyalty to the Miyamoto line,” as well as their skill in the management of party affairs.⁴¹⁾

The utility of Fukui’s study of the JCP Presidium members is limited in that only 17 out of 41 Presidium members included in his study still remain active. Furthermore, distinction along the Tokuda and Miyamoto factions seems to be largely meaningless in the 1980s in view of the fact that surviving members of former Tokuda faction have been as loyal to Miyamoto as his original lieutenants since 1961.

A more meaningful classification of present leaders of the JCP can be made along a modified version of the classification scheme advanced originally by Tsuyoshi Mizushima in 1970: (1) Tokyo University alumni; (2) former labor union leaders; (3) former local party leaders; (4) veteran party bureaucrats.

It is widely believed that Miyamoto, a graduate of Tokyo University (“Todai”), places more importance on the ability of a person than the length of one’s service to the party or “prison record.” Particularly, Miyamoto has had a tendency to recruit his brain trusts from the graduates of prestigious universities, particularly his alma mater, which is by far the most prestigious university in Japan. Among the current Presidium members, “Todai” alumni include Miyamoto, Fuwa, Ueda, Uno and Kobayashi in the presidium Standing Committee and Kudo, Nakajima, and Zenmei Matsumoto in the Presidium.⁴²⁾ All of them except Uno and Kobayashi are concurrently members of the Japanese Diet. Most of them entered the party while students and have stayed active in the party without interruption since graduation. Fuwa and Ueda began to work for Miyamoto from 1961 and became his brain trusts by 1964. They have been the key architects of the “Miyamoto

41) *Ibid.*, p. 296.

42) Mizushima, *loc. cit.*, p. 240. See also, Tsuyoshi Mizushima, *Miyamoto Kenji Taoruru Hi* (Tokyo: Zenboshu, 1985), pp. 112~114, 118~120.

system" and the "miyamoto line" since then. They are in a sense new species of the JCP members, who are talented and sophisticated "word artists" of modern revolutionary theory.⁴³⁾ In their academic training, elitist outlook on society and politics, and pragmatic bent, they resemble most closely their university alumni in the nation's government bureaucracy and in academia. Collectively they comprise the core of the think-tank of the party and defend and fortify the evolving orthodoxy of the Miyamoto line against attacks and criticisms from outside or inside the party. Miyamoto has recognized the special ability and talents of this group (e.g., Fuwa, Ueda) and effectively harnessed them to the consolidation and development of his power and ideological line.

Apparently there has been a split within the "Todai" group: most of them support the "Ueda line" (i.e., Koichiro Ueda's "flexible approach to party building"), whereas Uno and Kobayashi have sided with other former Miyamoto's secretaries (e.g., Kojima, Yoshioka, etc.) to support the "Miyamoto line" (i.e., Kenji Miyamoto's "rigid approach" to the task of party building).⁴⁴⁾

Another important group of party leaders who have supported Miyamoto began their careers as labor union leaders. Prominent members of this group include Murakami, Takahara (both vice-chairmen); Hama (Presidium Standing Committee members); and Hiroshi Arabori and Takashi Shigeno in the Presidium. Murakami, Takahara, Hama, Arabori, and Shigeno are also known as the "Zenteiha" (or the Postal Workers Union group) for they began their political careers in that labor union.⁴⁵⁾ After finishing eighth grade in formal education, Hama, Murakami, Arabori and Shigeno attended the Postal Workers Training Institute. Apparently, members of this group do not have as much theoretical training or ideological sophistication as the first group. Nevertheless, they are seasoned veteran labor union leaders knowledgeable and skillful

43) Fukui, *op. cit.*, p. 297.

44) Mizushima, *Miyamoto Kenji Taoruru Hi*, pp. 45~72, 112~120.

45) *Ibid.*, pp. 79~82. See also Mizushima, *Shokugyo Kakumeika*, p. 242.

in dealing with the rank and file of the labor unions and non-Communist groups and organizations in Japan.

The third group consists of leaders who have risen from the local party organizations. Included are Kaneko, Ichikawa, Ebisudani, Akeda, and Senaga in the Presidium Standing Committee and Omura and Furukata in the Presidium. Ichikawa, Akeda, and Ebisudani were formerly leaders of the Kansai region (e.g., Osaka and Kyoto) party apparatus. For years, the Kansai region has been a JCP stronghold, rivaling Tokyo in terms of importance.⁴⁶⁾ In terms of education, they are either graduates of technical or vocational schools except Ebisudani and Kaneko (i.e., sixth and eighth grade education respectively). Senaga and Furukata have been the leaders of the Okinawa People's Party, an affiliate of the JCP, throughout the postwar period.

The fourth group consists of leaders who have reached the Presidium from the rank of the party's central apparatus (i.e., the *apparatchiki*): Masaru Kojima, Yoshinori Yoshioka and Hiroshi Tachiki in the Presidium Standing Committee; and Toshio Sakaki, Tadao Nirasawa, Norio Nishiii, Shunichi Nishihara, and Akihar Niihara in the Presidium. Kojima began his career as Miyamoto's secretary shortly after Miyamoto became the party's Secretary-General in 1958. He is regarded as a close confidant of Miyamoto. Yoshioka, on the other hand, began his career as an *Akahata* reporter. Since the latter part of the 1970's, he has become Miyamoto's confidant for international affairs. Sakaki, Nirasawa, Nishii and Niihara also rose from the editorial office of the *Akahata*. In contrast, Tachiki and Nishizawa started as staff members of the International Affairs Department of the JCP. As a whole, they are not only well educated but also articulate and prolific writers who have played important roles in the party's propaganda apparatus.⁴⁷⁾

Finally, there are some Presidium members who are difficult to classify. For example, Sadako Ogasawara and Ikuko Yamanaka are the

46) *Ibid.*, p. 241.

47) *Ibid.*, pp. 240~241. See also Mizushima, *Miyamoto Kenji Taoruru Hi*,

only female members of the Presidium. Apparently, they hold their membership in the Presidium largely because of their symbolic and ornamental value, for they are concurrently members of the upper house of the Japanese Diet.

To be sure, all of them have been staunch supporters of Miyamoto at least from 1961 on. Nevertheless, their relative roles and influence within the party obviously have fluctuated over the years. For example, the members of the second (labor union leaders) and third group (local party officials) played a crucial role during the formative years of the Miyamoto leadership (ca. 1958-1966), whereas the first group ("Todai" alumni) played the dominant role in the "Eurocommunist" phase (1966-1979). Starting from 1982, Miyamoto's former secretaries (e.g., Kojima, Uno, Kobayashi, Yoshioka) are wielding increasingly more power within the party. As a result, tensions and friction are inevitable between those whose influence is increasing and those whose influence is declining within the party.

According to Mizushima, the JCP leadership is currently divided into two major factions: (1) the Miyamoto secretaries faction; and (2) the Ueda faction. Those identified as leading members of the Miyamoto secretaries faction include Miyamoto's former secretaries (e.g., Uno, Kojima, Yoshioka, and Kobayashi) plus vice chairmen Ebisudani and Takahara and Secretary-General Kaneko. Hiroshi Ueda, Miyamoto's chief body guard and a Presidium member, is also regarded as an important member of the group.⁴⁸⁾ Juxtaposed to the Miyamoto secretaries faction is a group of intellectuals headed by vice chairman Koichiro Ueda and core members of the "Todai" alumni (e.g., Fuwa, Nakajima, Kudo, Nishizawa) plus a number of party's propaganda and policy experts (e.g., Toshio Sakaki, former Editor-in-Chief of *Akahata*, Hiroshi Tach-

pp. 66~72, 114~122. See also, Kotaro Tawara, *Nihon Kyosanto Shunobu* (Tokyo: Taiyo, 1975). pp. 139~219.

48) For the core members of the Miyamoto secretaries faction, see Mizushima, *Miyamoto Kenji Taoruru Hi*, pp. 104~122.

iki, foreign policy expert, Tadao Nirasawa, Akiharu Niihara, Shunichi Nishizawa).⁴⁹⁾ Some powerful *Zenteiha* leaders (e.g., Murakami, Hama, Arabori) are also believed to be supporters of the Ueda faction.⁵⁰⁾ Obviously, there are some Presidium Standing Committee members who have stayed away from identifying with either one of the two factions (e.g., vice chairman Senaga, Deputy Secretary-General Akeda, and Presidium Standing Committee member Ichikawa).

According to Mizushima, factional strife between the two groups began to surface as a result of disagreement between Miyamoto and Ueda pertaining to the proper approach to the problem of strengthening the JCP's organizational power in 1982. Apparently, Miyamoto has stressed the importance of "strengthening the vanguard nature of the party," which in fact means more rigid ideological indoctrination of the party members. Ueda, on the other hand, has favored a more flexible approach to the problem of party building by emphasizing the necessity for expanding the mass base of the party (or the theory of a "mass party of vanguards"). In addition, Ueda, a proponent of "Eurocommunism," is more flexible and forward looking in his approach to the problem of forming a united front with non-Communist parties and groups, whereas Miyamoto has become more rigid and dogmatic in this regard.⁵¹⁾

Largely because of Miyamoto's immense power and influence within the party, the Miyamoto loyalists have upper hands in jockeying for power within the party. However, the situation could change drastically if Miyamoto vacates the top leader's position either due to death or resignation. Factional strife is so intense that Mizushima, for example, would not rule out the possibility of the party's split along the factional

49) For the core members of the Ueda faction, see *ibid.*, pp. 64~72.

50) *Ibid.*, pp. 79~81.

51) *Ibid.*, pp. 46~60. See also, Asahi Janaru (ed.), "Mie-kakure suru 'Miyamoto vs. Fuwa. Ueda' Kakutsui no Kage," *Asahi Janaru*, December 6, 1985, pp. 84~86. See also, Itaru Muraoka, "Fuwa Iincho to Ueda Fukuiincho no Kimyo na Jiko Hihan," *Asahi Janaru*, July 29, 1983, pp. 96~99.

line in the post-Miyamoto period.⁵²⁾

Mizushima's diagnosis of the JCP factionalism could be an exaggeration. Nevertheless, there is sufficient evidence to believe that the relationship between Miyamoto and Ueda is not as good as before and that Miyamoto has been relying increasingly on his former secretaries in dealing with party affairs. For example, Ueda has not been given any important portfolio within the party since the latter part of the 1970's; and important policy-making positions he once held are now taken over by Miyamoto's former secretaries. The Ueda brothers' self-criticism undertaken in the summer of 1983 also should be viewed in this context. Furthermore, the demotion of Toshio Sakaki from the Presidium Standing Committee to the Presidium in 1985 also indicates that Miyamoto no longer favors the liberalization of the party's policies on the basis of "Eurocommunism." Sakaki together with Ueda have been leading proponents of "Eurocommunism" within the JCP since the 1970's.⁵³⁾

Miyamoto's increasing dependence on his former secretaries and die-hard loyalists, instead of more liberal Ueda faction members, seems to have brought about not only more regimentation within the party but also the stagnation of the party in the 1980's.

V

On the eve of the 17th party congress of the JCP in November 1985, it became evident that there was a growing dissatisfaction with Miyamoto's leadership within the party. In fact, some young party members openly demanded his resignation from the party's chairmanship on the grounds that the JCP suffered a 10-year stagnation under his leadership from the mid-1970s.⁵⁴⁾

52) Mizushima, *Miyamoto Kenji Taoruru Hi*, pp. 22~38.

53) *Ibid.*, p. 53. See also, Asahi Janaru (ed.), *loc. cit.* pp. 85~6.

54) Minoru Morita, "Miyamoto Taisei no Tasogare," *Shokun*, February 1986.

The stagnation of the JCP's organizational strength was reflected in the party's inability to increase its membership as well as the readership of the *Akahata*. In spite of Miyamoto's desperate attempts to increase the party membership to 500,000 and the combined *Akahata* readership to 4 million (daily and Sunday editions), the JCP has so far failed to attain the goals. In fact, there has been actual decline in the party membership and the *Akahata* readership in recent months. For example, at the 16th Party Congress held in July 1982, the JCP leadership claimed that the party membership reached 480,000.⁵⁵⁾ However, by the time of the 17th party Congress in November 1985, it decreased to 460,000.⁵⁶⁾ Moreover, the reported figure also included several tens of thousands of the so-called "Article 12" members who failed either to pay annual dues or to attend any party meeting for more than a year. As for the *Akahata* readership, the JCP leadership boasted over 3,550,000 in subscriptions at the 16th Party Congress in 1982.⁵⁷⁾ Although the party did not reveal the exact number of the *Akahata* subscriptions at the 17th Party Congress, it nevertheless admitted that there was a considerable decrease in the *Akahata* subscriptions. It is widely believed that it has dropped below the 3 million mark, the lowest since 1974.⁵⁸⁾

The decline of the JCP's electoral strength was another area of concern for many party stalwarts. From 1961 to 1972, the JCP registered impressive gains in both parliamentary seats and popular votes in general elections. It secured 38 seats in the House of Representatives in the 1972

pp. 39~47. See also Itchi Iri, "Kokoku no Kokorozashi o shiranu Miyamoto Enjaku Taisei no Tonosama Minshushugiron o Awaremu," *Asahi Janaru*, January 31, 1986. pp. 98~101; and *Asahi Shimbun*, November 9, 15, 1985.

55) *Asahi Shimbun*, July 14, 1982. See also, Mizushima, *Miyamoto Kenji Taoruru Hi*, p. 151.

56) *Yomiuri Shimbun*, November 25, 1985.

57) *Asahi Shimbun*, August 1, 1982. See also Mizushima, *Miyamoto Kenji Taoruru Hi*, p. 151.

58) *Asahi Shimbun*, September 20, 1985.

general elections, polling over 5,479,000 votes (or 10.5%). However, in the 1976 general elections, the JCP suffered a stunning defeat by losing 21 seats in the House of Representatives, even if its share of popular votes remained about the same (10.4%).

In the 1979 general elections, the JCP recovered its lost ground by winning 39 seats with 5,626,000 votes (or 10.4%). However, in the 1980 general elections, it registered another setback by winning only 29 seats with 5,804,000 votes (or 9.8%). In the 1983 general elections, the JCP fared even worse as it lost three more seats (i.e., 26 seats) in the lower house by garnering 5,302,000 (or 9.3%) votes. What was disturbing to the JCP leadership was the fact that the party's share of the popular vote plummeted to 9.3%, the lowest since 1972.⁵⁹⁾

Although the Miyamoto leadership tended to blame the "anti-Communist" campaigns waged by the non-Communist parties and the Japanese media for party's continued electoral setbacks from 1976, Miyamoto's critics both inside and outside the JCP blamed Miyamoto for the party's debacle in one parliamentary election after another. Apparently, a combination of several factors have contributed to the JCP's "10-year stagnation," which Miyamoto himself acknowledged unwittingly at a party Central Committee meeting in 1983.⁶⁰⁾

First, a renewed controversy over the Miyamoto's involvement in the famous 1933 "lynching death" incident in 1976 and the purging of Satomi Hakamada, Miyamoto's erstwhile right hand man, in 1977 dealt a severe damage to the JCP's image in general and Miyamoto's in particular. The controversy was triggered by Hakamada's autobiography in which he

59) For the JCP vote in the general elections for the House of Representatives from 1946 to 1972, see Kim, "Deradicalization of the Japanese Communist Party Under Kenji Miyamoto," p.297. For the JCP's share of votes in the subsequent general elections from 1976 to 1983, see Takayoshi Miyakawa (ed.), *Seiji Handbukku '85 Feb.* Seiji Koho Center, 1985), p.210.

60) Itaru Muraoka, "Judai na Kiro ni tatsu Nihon Kyosanto," *Asahi Janaru*, February 17, 1984, p.25.

mentioned that the release of Kenji Miyamoto from prison in October 1945 might have been possible due to an oversight on the part of the prison officials, for Miyamoto was serving life imprisonment after being convicted for his involvement in the "lynching death" incident of 1933 under the criminal code and not strictly as a political prisoner. The matter was taken up for clarification by Ikko Kasuga, chairman of the Democratic Socialist Party (DSP), in the House of Representatives in 1976 and became headline stories for months. The JCP's subsequent purge of Hakamada deepened popular suspicion about the nature of Miyamoto's role in the lynching death incident, because Hakamada named Miyamoto as the "real killer" in the incident.⁶¹⁾ It is beyond any doubt that these developments have tarnished the image of the JCP in general and that of Kenji Miyamoto in particular.

Another factor which has contributed to the JCP's stagnation can be found in the growing friction between the JCP and other opposition parties, resulting in the JCP's political isolation in the 1980's. The JCP's relations with non-Communist opposition parties, particularly the Japan Socialist Party (JSP), began to deteriorate from the beginning of January 1980, when the JSP signed a coalition agreement with the Komeito pledging not to include the JCP as a partner in the future coalition government. A similar agreement was also signed between the Komeito and the DSP. Miyamoto denounced the JSP for signing the pact with the Komeito, asserting that the agreement reflected "the JSP's swing toward the right," and that the pact represented an "anticommunist, pro-LDP policy" because it recognized the continuation of the U.S.-Japan security treaty and the legality of the Self-Defense Forces.⁶²⁾ The JCP-

61) For a detailed analysis, see Takuro Suzuki, "*Kyosanto Shuzai 30 nen*" (Tokyo: Keizai Oraisha, 1977), pp. 86~135. A key passage from Hakamada's memoirs published in the February 2, 1978 issue of *Shukan Shincho* is quoted in Mizushima, *op. cit.*, p. 159.

62) Hong N. Kim, "Japan," in Richard F. Staar (ed.), *1981 Yearbook on International Communist Affairs* (Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 1981), p. 156.

JSP feud has continued to escalate since 1980. Although Miyamoto did not rule out the possibility of restoring rapport with the JSP at the 16th Party Congress in 1982, he precluded such a possibility at the 17th Party Congress in 1985.⁶³ For the first time since 1970, the JSP reporters were barred from covering the JCP congress' proceedings in November 1985.⁶⁴ Meanwhile, the JCP's relations with the Komeito and the DSP also deteriorated. As a result, the JCP has been isolated politically from non-Communist opposition parties, which have refused to cooperate with the Communists. The JCP's inability to work with other opposition parties undoubtedly undermined its standing with the Japanese voters who may be willing to support a coalition government as a possible alternative to the ruling LDP government.

Third, the JCP's rigid and dogmatic attitude toward the non-Communist labor organizations and mass movements have also alienated it from the non-Communists. For example, Miyamoto's attempts to organize a JCP-controlled national labor union federation from the latter part of the 1970's angered the powerful *Sohyo* leadership, which denounced the JCP's Miyamoto leadership as "dictatorial," "divisive," and "harmful."⁶⁵ Miyamoto's unwillingness to cooperate with other non-Communist mass organizations except on his own terms has also created other problems. In the summer of 1984, for example, when the leaders of the JCP-controlled *Gensuikyo* (an anti-nuclear organization) cosponsored anti-nuclear rallies in cooperation with the JSP-controlled *Gensuikin*, Miyamoto expelled the *Gensuikyo* leader, Yoshikiyo Inoue, from the JCP and the *Gensuikyo*. Several prominent scholars who protested Miyamoto's actions were also purged from the JCP. It was rumored that Koichiro Ueda had encouraged Inoue to take the initiative but could not prevent his expulsion.⁶⁶ It is also believed the Ueda himself incurred Miyamoto's

63) *Asahi Shimbun*, July 14, 1982; and *Yomiuri Shimbun*, November 24, 1985.

64) *Asahi Shimbun*, November 24, 1985.

65) Kim, "Japan," p. 157. See also, Tsuyoshi Mizushima, *Miyamoto Kenji no Inbo* (Tokyo: Zenboshu, 1980), pp. 255~257.

wrath in 1983 because of his flexible and accommodating stance toward the possibility of taking joint actions with non-Communist *Nitshiren* (or "Japan Citizens League") led by Makoto Oda. The self-criticism undertaken by the Ueda brothers in the summer of 1983 was, as speculated by many, imposed on them by Miyamoto as a punishment of Ueda's "bourgeois individualism" displayed in his dialogue with Oda.⁶⁷⁾ As a consequence of Miyamoto's uncompromising and dogmatic attitudes toward non-Communist mass organizations, the JCP's relations with these groups have steadily deteriorated in recent months.

Fourth, the JCP's stagnation should also be attributed to the widening gap between the expectations it generated in the 1970's by emphasizing basic tenets of "Eurocommunism" and the reality of a Leninist party operating on the basis of "democratic centralism." In a series of declarations issued in the 1970's the JCP promised its willingness to preserve a pluralistic liberal democratic political system under a "democratic coalition government" to be established by a united front led by the JCP. In addition to promising rotation of governmental power between the coalition government parties and its opposition (i.e., the LDP), the JCP guaranteed the maximum protection of civil rights and liberties under its rule.

However, as the so-called "Taguchi controversy"⁶⁸⁾ so clearly indicates,

66) Yu Akeji, "Tatta Hitori no Hanran de wa nai, *Asahi Janaru*, January 31, 1986, p.101. See also, *Asahi Janaru Henshubu*, "Mie kakure suru 'Miyamoto vs. Fuwa Ueda' Kakutsui no Kage," *Asahi Janaru*, December 6, 1985, p. 86; and Mizushima, *Miyamoto Kenji Taoruru Hi*, pp.92~95.

67) For a detailed analysis, see Itaru Muraoka, "Fuwa Iincho to Ueda Fuku-iincho no Kimyo na Jiko Hihan no Imi," *Asahi Janaru*, July 29, 1983, pp. 96~98.

68) Professor Fukuji Taguchi and other anti-Stalinist scholars of the JCP demanded to do away with "democratic centralism" which makes the Communist party monolithic and dictatorial. Without such transformation, the Communist party would wield dictatorial power if it controls the government. In order to ensure freedom and democracy, the Japanese Communist Party must undertake necessary changes to secure intra-party democracy which would guarantee freedom of criticism and opposition to

the Miyamoto leadership has no intention of either giving up “democratic centralism” (and Leninist mode of operation) or transforming the JCP in a regular democratic political party completely open to free competition for ideas, policies, and power among its members. The stark gap between the lofty promises on the one hand and the reality of the undemocratic Leninist party’s mode of operation on the other hand inevitably creates a serious credibility problem in the minds of many Japanese voters. Therein lies the real cause of the JCP’s dilemma and stagnation. If its commitment to a pluralistic democratic political system is genuine, it should prove its sincerity by practicing democracy within the party. The irrefutable fact, however, is that the party’s mode of operation remains not only the same, but Miyamoto refuses to allow any criticism or challenge on the part of the rank and file of the JCP. Anyone who dared to criticize or challenge Miyamoto has been purged, being labeled as various types of “anti-party” enemies. The recent purge of several Tokyo University graduate students who demanded Miyamoto’s resignation is a case in point. They were not only deprived of their right to attend the party congress as delegates, but also either suspended of party or expelled from the party.⁶⁹⁾ In short, there is a growing credibility gap between what the JCP preaches and what it practices.

the party leadership, the replacement of the party leadership through democratic procedures and process, and the dispersion of power through the introduction of “separation of powers” and an independent party control organ coequal to the executive organ of the party. For a detailed analysis, see Shigetaro Iizuka, “Kyo Santo,” in Rei Shiratori (ed.), *Kakushin Seiryoku* (Tokyo: Toyo Keizai Shinposha, 1979), pp. 184~186. See also, Fukuji Taguchi, *Senshinkoku Kakumei to Tagenteiki Shakaishugi* (Tokyo: Otsuki Shoten, 1979).

69) For a detailed analysis, Minoru Morita, “Miyamoto Taisei no Tasogare,” *Shokun*, February 1986, pp. 39~43; and Itchi Iri, “Kokoku no Kokorozashio shiranu Miyamoto Enjaku Taisei no Tonosama Minshushugi rono Awaremu,” *Asahi Janaru*, January 31, 1986, pp. 98~101; and Itchi Iri, “Watakushi wa Ryoshin to Kiyaku ni motozuite Miyamoto Gicho no Yutaio kankoku shita,” *Asahi Janaru*, December 6, 1985, pp. 87~90.

Under such circumstances, the stagnation of the party is inevitable.

Fifth, the JCP's image has also been tarnished by illegal and inexcusable acts of violence and atrocities committed by other Communist parties abroad. The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979-1980 and its continuous occupation of that landlocked country has intensified anti-Soviet and anti-Communist sentiments among the Japanese. More recently, the Soviet shooting down of the KAL passenger plane in September 1983 angered the Japanese. Furthermore, the North Korean bombing assassination of 17 South Korean government leaders in Rangoon, Burma, in October 1983 shocked the Japanese. These developments have not only embarrassed the JCP but also undermined the JCP's standing with the voters. In order to ascertain its innocence from these acts of violence, the JCP protested the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, condemned the Soviet shooting down of the KAL plane, and denounced Pyongyang's terrorist attacks against South Korean leaders in Rangoon.⁷⁰⁾ Nevertheless, irreparable political damage has been done to the party owing to guilt by association. To be sure, the JCP's normalization of relations with Moscow in December 1979, coupled with frequent visits to Moscow by Miyamoto and other JCP leaders, did not help the cause of the party.

Finally, it should be pointed out that the JCP's electoral stagnation should be attributed to the changing socio-political environment in Japan. The JCP's electoral success of the 1960's and the 1970's was possible in part due to the voters' growing discontent with the LDP's inability to cope with deteriorating urban and environmental problems, such as housing and land shortages, photochemical pollution, and traffic congres-

70) John F. Copper, "Japan," in Richard F. Staar (ed.), *1984 Yearbook on International Communist Affairs* (Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 1984), pp. 233~34, 231. For the JCP's denunciation of "Kim Il-Sungism," see *Akahata*, December 9, 1983. The JCP denounced "Kim Il-Sungism" and "Juchae Sasang" as "unscientific ideology" which promotes the leader-people relationship comparable to the Emperor-subjects relationship in the prewar Japan. See also, *Asahi Shimbun*, December 17, 1983.

tion and the like which had become serious by the end of the 1960's.⁷¹⁾ In protest, urban voters cast their votes for the JCP and other opposition parties. However, starting in the 1970's, the LDP has invested massively to cope with these problems. As a result, Japan's air and water quality is meeting the international standards. Furthermore, Japan's urban problems are also alleviated as a result of the LDP's continuous efforts to cope with the problems. Furthermore, as a result of continuous economic prosperity, more than 90 percent of the Japanese regard themselves as members of the middle-class.⁷²⁾ Furthermore, more Japanese are satisfied with the quality of life they are enjoying today than ever before.⁷³⁾ Under such circumstances, it is increasingly difficult for the JCP to pick up protest votes in the urban centers.

In short, it is fair to say that the JCP's "10-year stagnation" is caused partly by Miyamoto's own mistakes and partly by objective conditions and developments which are beyond the JCP's control.

VI

From the foregoing analysis, a few basic conclusions can be drawn:

First, Kenji Miyamoto has played an important role in rebuilding the JCP after 1955, especially after 1958 when he assumed the position of the

71) Kim, "The JCP's Parliamentary Road," p.23. See also, Hong N. Kim, "Urbanization and Changing Voting Patterns in Japan," *Keio Journal of Politics* (Tokyo: Keio University Press), No. 4, 1983, pp.43~51; and Hong N. Kim, "The Crisis of Japan's Liberal Democratic Party," *Current History*, April 1975, pp.158~62; and Taketsugu Tsurutani, *Political Change in Japan* (N.Y.: David Mckay, 1977), pp.137~149.

72) *Asahi Shimbun*, November 24, 1985. See also Takuro Suzuki, "Kyosanto Daikai to Churyu Ishiki no Kanren wa," *Hokkai Taimus*, November 13, 1985; and Takuro Suzuki, "Kyosanto 'Naibu' ni Ihen ga okite iru," *Hokkai Taimus*, July 17, 1985.

73) Over 70% of the Japanese expressed their satisfaction with the quality of life in public opinion surveys conducted by the Prime Minister's Office and the *Asahi Shimbun* in 1985. See *Asahi Shimbun*, November 24, 1985 and Suzuki, *loc. cit.*

Party's Secretary General. Miyamoto should be credited with the JCP's adoption of two basic policies: (1) the parliamentary path to revolution and (2) autonomous independent policy toward Moscow and Peking. The deradicalization of the JCP from 1961 enabled the party to emerge as a legitimate parliamentary opposition party in Japan. Furthermore, it has enabled the JCP to be accepted as a legitimate political party in Japan.

Second, under Miyamoto's leadership, the JCP also asserted its independence from its erstwhile mentors, Moscow and Peking. Miyamoto's bold policy of defiance toward Moscow and Peking has undoubtedly strengthened the JCP's claim to being an independent national Japanese party. With the severance of ties with Moscow and Peking, the JCP veered away from the Chinese and Soviet models of revolution, identifying itself more closely with Western European Communist parties and advocating the parliamentary path to revolution. For the first time since the establishment of the party in 1922, the JCP's leadership became free to map out its own strategy, unhindered by Chinese or Soviet interference. Such a change in the party's external relations with Moscow and Peking made it possible to make steady gains in the parliamentary elections in the 1960's and 1970's.

Third, Miyamoto should also be credited with the sound financial management of the party since 1961. Under his leadership, the JCP succeeded not only in expanding the readership of *Akahata* and other publications, but also strengthened sources of revenues. Through the increased sale of these publications it has been able to generate sufficient funds to operate the party and wage expensive election campaigns year after year. In fact, the officially reported income of the JCP ranked the first among all the political parties in Japan in 1984.

Fourth, Miyamoto also should be credited with the streamlining of the party organization. He has been particularly perceptive in scouting able young party cadres for key party positions. The recruitment of the Ueda brothers and a number of other new generation of party leaders in turn made it possible for the JCP to project a new image to the

Japanese voters. By way of creating the honorary membership in the Presidium and other honorary positions, Miyamoto kicked up many of his erstwhile colleagues who became either too senile or political liabilities.

Fifth, despite Miyamoto's impressive achievements as the JCP leader, it should be pointed out that Miyamoto has outlived his usefulness. In a sense, Miyamoto has become a liability for the JCP. The mere fact that he has held the most powerful position within the JCP for nearly three decades is not well received by the Japanese public. Insofar as Japanese non-Communist parties are concerned, top leaders' power rarely lasts more than several years. Also, the stigma of Miyamoto's involvement in the 1933 "lynching death" incident tends to be detrimental to JCP's attempts to build a new bright image for the party. Miyamoto's reputation as a ruthless politician in dealing with his erstwhile colleagues (e.g., Hakamada) also deepens his dark image. Furthermore, Miyamoto has become increasingly dogmatic and inflexible in dealing with non-Communist opposition parties and groups. Miyamoto also has taken increasingly rigid attitudes toward the U.S.-Japan security treaty and the Self Defense Forces. Furthermore, indications are that he has lost interest in experimenting further with "Eurocommunism," even though he still pays lip service to that. In short, Miyamoto is no longer as innovative, imaginative, or creative a leader as he once was. Perhaps, his retirement from the party leadership will do far more good than damage to the JCP.

Finally, the question most frequently asked both within and outside the JCP nowadays is: When will Miyamoto step down from the party leadership? Who will succeed him as the leader of the JCP? To be sure, no one can tell with certainty. However, it is generally believed that Fuwa has the inside track to succeed Miyamoto as the next leader of the party. Of course, one should not rule out the possibility that other members of the Presidium, such as Secretary-General Kaneko, will inherit the mantle of Miyamoto.

The assumption of the top party leadership by Fuwa or Ueda would enable the JCP to be flexible and innovative in its approach to party

affairs. Being intellectuals heralding from a middle-class family, Fuwa or Ueda can be expected to maintain such a posture.⁷⁴⁾ Also, their long term service in the Japanese Diet would also strengthen their commitment to the "parliamentary path" to revolution.⁷⁵⁾ On the other hand, the succession of Kaneko and others to Miyamoto could spell further stagnation of the JCP. A product of elementary school education, and former

74) For the Ueda brothers' backgrounds, see Kotaro Tawara, *Nihon Kyosanto Shunobu* (Tokyo: Taiyo, 1975), pp.106~138.

75) According R. Neal Tannahill, "party policy and posture depend on the individuals and groups of men and women composing the party's leadership." More specifically, he points out "many leadership characteristics (and consequently much of the variation in party behavior) can be explained on the basis of a number of generalizable characteristics, including the backgrounds of the party leaders, the generation of the top leadership, the position of the party leadership vis-a-vis the political system, and the leaders' personal relationships to the Soviet Union." On the basis of his study of nonruling Western European Communist parties' leaders, Tannahill argues that Western European Communist leaders with middle-class backgrounds tend to be more independently minded and more attuned to domestic concerns than their proletarian counterparts. Better educated than their working class cousins, they feel 'less of a need to look abroad for models' and less dependent on Moscow for ideological underpinnings. Moreover, intellectual party leaders tend to be less dependable allies of the Soviet Union and the most innovative in devising domestic programs and strategies. "By definition, intellectuals have the training and predisposition to interpret Marx and Lenin for themselves rather than relying on Moscow's version of the truth." Furthermore, the personal position of individual Communist party leaders in relation to the political system is also an 'important part of their political socialization.' According to Tannahill, in general, "the experience of holding political office tends to moderate Communists' domestic and international attitudes and to increase their acceptance of alliances with non-Communist parties." He goes on to say that "As office holders, Communist politicians develop an appreciation of cooperation with office holders from other parties. Additionally, Communist leaders with long tenure in governmental office tend to develop an institutional allegiance to the system. Thus they develop a stake in the established political order." See R. Neal Tannahill, *The Communist Parties of Western Europe: A Comparative Study* (Westport, Connecticut: Greenwood Press, 1978), pp.161~181.

locomotive engineer, Kaneko has little training in theoretical aspects of Marxism-Leninism and is likely to be conservative in his approach to political affairs.⁷⁶⁾

76) Tannahill also provides a useful perspective on (Western European) Communist leaders with working class background. First, since working class Communist leaders generally lack the ideological sophistication to fashion and justify their policies with Marxism-Leninism, "they are tied to some external source of ideological verities, almost by default." See *ibid.*, p. 164. Consequently, Communist working-class leaders "have historically tended to look to Moscow as a political and ideological fatherland." Communist leaders with trade unionist background, however, bring perspectives characteristic of their union experience to their leadership roles. Because of the differing nature of unions in different countries and the varying positions of Communist parties vis-a-vis the union movement in different countries, Communist union leaders' perspectives vary. Nevertheless, Tannahill points out that "in countries where Communist union strength is concentrated in a single union or a single area, whether broadly as in the CGT in France, or narrowly as in Norway and Sweden, where the Communists dominate a few locals in certain regions of the country, trade unionist party leaders cling to conservative position." See *ibid.*, p. 172. Thus, "in Norway, opposition to transforming the Left-wing electoral alliance into a party came from hard liners, many of whom were in union posts." Similarly, trade union leaders in France are generally among the French Communist Party's more 'conservative members.' See *ibid.*. Tannahill also mentions that "Regardless of whether Communist union militants tend to be conservative and pro-Soviet as in France, or progressive and independent-minded as in Britain, they all tend to be non-revolutionary." In part this is because union status gives them a measure of prestige in the political system as it is, and partly because of their experience in bargaining with governmental authorities. Finally, because of their proximity to the day-to-day struggle for bread and butter reforms, union leaders tend to lose interest in revolutionary goals. For a detailed analysis, see *ibid.*, pp. 164~166, 171~173. Finally, with regard to the *apparatchiki*, Tannahill makes the following observation: "Communist leaders whose entire careers have been in the party tend to develop strong attachments to it as an institution. Unlike many of their intellectual and proletarian counterparts, *apparatchik* leaders eschew rigorous orthodoxy be it pro-Soviet or otherwise in favor of policies and practices designed to insure the organizational well-being of their party. Consequently, *apparatchik* leaders opt for uninnovative, pragmatic policies they believe will maintain and enhance their party's social and electoral

Regardless of which one eventually emerges as Miyamoto's successor, the prospects for the JCP's growth seem to be rather grim. As long as the Japanese enjoy unprecedented economic prosperity and uninterrupted peace, it will be difficult for the JCP to offer any real viable alternatives to the ruling LDP. It is fair to say that the 'golden days' of Miyamoto's JCP are over.

position." Thus, according to Tannahill, "apparatchik leaders of the Western European parties tend enthusiastically to endorse Moscow's policy of international detente, for example, because of its value domestically. In contrast, the Soviet intervention in Czechoslovakia in 1968 is regarded by many Western party leaders as an electoral albatross." As an excellent example of an *apparatchik* Communist leader in Western Europe, Tannahill mentions Enrico Berlinguer, the former secretary-general of the Italian Communist Party. For details, see *ibid.*, pp. 170~171.

TABLE 1. Groups among JCP presidium members. (1978)

NAME	YEAR BIRTH	YEAR MEMBER	YEAR PRESIDUM	EDUCATION	FORMER OCCUPATION
<i>1. Top Leaders (7)</i>					
○ (S) Fuwa	1930	1947	1970	Tokyo U (economics)	Student activist
(S) Hakamada	1904	1925(?)	1958*	KUTV (Moscow)	Worker
(S) Kurahara	1902	1927	1958*	Language school	Culture movement activist
(S) Matsushima	1912	1947	1961	Teachers college	Journalist
○ (S) Miyamoto	1908	1931	1958*	Tokyo U (economics)	Writer
(S) Nishizawa	1913	1939(?)	1964**	High school (Harbin)	Researcher
(S) Oka	1914	1948	1964	Tokyo U (economics)	Teacher
<i>2. Up-and-comers (10)</i>					
(S) Ibaraki	1924	1946	1970	Technical school	Labor unionist
○ (S) Kaneko	1924	1946	1970	Vocational school	Labor unionist
○ Kojima	1927	1947(?)	1973	High school	Student activist
○ Kudo	1926	1947(?)	1973	Tokyo U (science)	Student activist
○ Nakajima	1928	1949	1976	Tokyo U (literature)	Student activist
○ Nirasawa	1922	1948	1976	Business school	Student activist

o Omura	1921	1947(?)	1973	Keio U (dropout)	Family business
o Sakaki	1929	1947	1973	Waseda U	Student activist
(S) Suwa	1926	1946	1973	Technical school	Labor unionist
o (S) Ueda	1927	1946	1970	Tokyo U (economics)	Student activist
3. <i>Veteran Party Bureaucrats: Miyamoto Loyalists</i> (6)					
o (S) Ebisudani	1908	1931(?)	1970	Elementary school	Worker
Gesu	1912	1931	1966**	High school (dropout)	Clerk
Hoshino	1906	1945	1976	Kyoto U (literature)	Journalist
(S) Okamoto	1909	1949	1966**	Tohoku U (economics)	Professor
Sunama	1903	1927(?)	1966**	Tokyo U (economics)	Clerk
Tada	1907	1929	1970	Elementary school	Worker
4. <i>Veteran Party Bureaucrats: Tokuda Loyalists</i> (10)					
o Akeda	1925	1948(?)	1973	Wakayama U (dropout)	Labor unionist
o Hama	1921	1947	1970	Vocational school	Union leader
o (S) Ichikawa	1923	1946	1970	Technical school	Labor unionist
Ida	1914	1948	1970	Kyoto U (science)	Labor unionist
(S) Iwabayashi	1908	1931	1966**	Middle school	Union leader
o (S) Murakami	1921	1947	1970	Vocational school	Union leader
Ofuchi	1913	1945	1964**	Vocational school	Labor unionist

○ (S) Takahara	1917	1947	1966**	Technical college	Union leader
Yasui	1917	1948	1970	Teachers college	Union leader
Yonehara	1909	1946	1964	High school (dropout)	Worker
5. <i>Reformed Tokuda Faction Leaders</i> (5)					
Kasuga	1907	1928	1958*	Technical school	Laor unionist
Kawada	1900	1922	1964	Elementary school	Union leader
Konno	1910	1929	1964**	High school (dropout)	Labor unionist
Uchino	1901	1928	1966**	Elementary school	Labor unionist
Yoshida	1904	1928	1966**	Vocational school	Labor unionist
6. <i>Unclassifiable</i>					
○ Furukata	(?)	1972(?)	1973	(?)	(?)
○ Kobayashi	(?)	(?)	1976	(?)	(?)
○ Senaga	1908	1972(?)	1973	High school (dropout)	Okinawa People's party leader

Legend: (S) before name indicates standing committee membership One asterisk (*) indicates in or before the year given. Relevant information for the period before 1958 was not available. Two asterisks (**) indicates first elected as candidate member in the year given and promoted to full member rank in a later year. (○) indicates active in 1986.

Source: Haruhiro Fukui, "The Japanese Communist Party: The Miyamoto Line and Its Problems," in Morton Kaplan (ed.), *The Many Faces of Communism* (New York: Free Press, 1978), pp. 294~295.

TABLE 2. GROUPS AMONG JCP PRESIDIUM STANDING COMMITTEE MEMBERS (1986)

Name	Year Birth	Year Member	Year Presidium Standing Com. Member	Education	Former Occupation
1. <i>Tokyo University Alumni:</i>					
Miyamoto, Kenji	1908	1931	1958	Tokyo U. (Economics)	Writer
Fuwa, Tetsuzo	1930	1947	1970	Tokyo U. (Physics)	Student activist
Ueda, Koichiro	1927	1946	1973	Tokyo U. (Economics)	Student activist
Uno, Saburo	1931	1950	1982	Tokyo U.	Student activist
Kobayashi, Ejzo	1928	1947	1972	Takyo U. (Natural Science)	Student activist
2. <i>"Zenteitha" Labor Leaders:</i>					
Takahara, Shinichi	1917	1947	1977	Technical college	Union leader
Murakami, Hiroshi	1921	1947	1973	Vocational school	Union leader
Hama, Takeji	1921	1947	1973	Vocational school	Union leader
3. <i>Former Local Party Leaders:</i>					
Ebisudani, Shunsho	1908	1931(?)	1973	Elementary school	Worker
Senaga, Kamejiro	1908	1972(?)	1973	High school (dropout)	Okinawa People's Party Leader
Ichikawa, Schoichi	1923	1946	1970	Technical school	Labor unionist

Kaneko, Mitsuhiro	1924	1946	1973	Vocational school	Labor unionist
Akeda, Yoshio	1925	1948(?)	1977	Wakayama U (drop-out)	Labor unionist
Kawahara, Nobuo	1927	1953	1983	Elementary school	Steel worker
4. <i>Party Bureaucrats:</i>					
Kojima, Masaru	1927	1947(?)	1983	High school	Student activist
Tachiki, Hiroshi	1931	1958	1984	College (China)	<i>Appartchiki</i>
Doshioka, Yoshinori	1928	1947	* 1982	High school	<i>Akahata</i> reporter
Nishii, Norio	1923	1952	1984	Middle school	<i>Akahata</i> reporter
5. <i>Others:</i>					
Ogasawara, Sadako	1920	1954(?)	?	?	Christian feminist
Miyamoto, Tadabito	1922	?	?	?	Coal Mineworker
Sawada, Hajime (candidate member)	?	?	?	?	?

Sources: Haruhiro Fukui, "The Japanese Communist Party: The Miyamoto Line and Its Problems," in Morton Kaplan (ed.), *The Many Faces of Communism* (New York: Free Press, 1978), pp. 294~295; Tsuyoshi Mizushima, *Shokugyo Kakumeika: Nikkyo 160 mei no ririkisho* (Tokyo: Zenboshu, 1970); Kotaro Tawara, *Nihon Kyoosanto Shanobu* (Tokyo: Taiyosha, 1975); and Tsuyoshi Mizushima, *Miyamoto Kenji no taoreru hi* (Tokyo: Zenboshu, 1985).

TABLE 3. MEMBERS OF THE JCP SECRETARIAT (1986)

Name	Year Birth	Year Member	Year Secretariat Member	Education	Former Occupation
*Kaneko, Mitsuhiro (Secretary General)	1924	1946	1970	Vocational school	Labor unionist
*Akeda, Yoshio (Deputy Secretary-General)	1925	1948(?)	1976	Wakayama U. (dropout)	Labor unionist
*Kojima, Masaru (Deputy Secretary-General)	1927	1947(?)	1970	High school	Student activist
*Hama, Takeji (Deputy Secretary-General)	1921	1947	1985	Vocational school	Union leader
*Kobayashi, Eizo	1928	1947	1985	Tokyo U.	Student activist
Abe, Yasushi	1923	1950(?)	1985	Technical school	Union leader
Arabori, Hiroshi	1925	1946(?)	1974	Vocational school	Union leader
Konno, Junichi	1927	1949(?)	1983	Tokyo College of Foreign Studies	<i>Akahata</i> reporter
Shiraishi, Yoshio	1929	?	1982	?	Miyamoto's secretary
Nihara, Akiharu	1931	1951	1977	Kyushu University	<i>Akahata</i> reporter
Matsumoto, Zenmei	1926	1947(?)	1970	Tokyo U. (Politics)	Lawyer

* Indicates Presidium Standing Committee member.

Sources: See Table 2.

TABLE 4. JCP MEMBERSHIP, 1945~1985

YEAR	TOTAL MEMBERSHIP
1945	1,000
1949	150,000
1955	20,000
1958	35,000
1961	80,000
1964	150,000
1966	270,000
1970	300,000
1972	300,000
1974*	340,000
1976**	379,000
1977**	393,000
1980**	438,000
1981**	442,000
1982**	479,000
1983(Nov.)**	471,000
1984(Nov.)**	453,000
1985(Nov.)***	460,000

Sources: Shigetaro Iizuka, *Miyamoto Kenji no Nihon Kyosanto* (Tokyo: Ikko sha, 1973), pp. 189~191.

* The 1974 figure is based on *Asahi Shimbun*, Feb. 22, 1974.

** The figures for 1976~1984 are based on Tsuyoshi Mizushima, *Miyamoto Kenji Taoruru Hi* (Tokyo: Zenboshu, 1985), p. 151.

***The 1985 figure is based on *Yomiuri Shimbun*, November 25, 1985.

TABLE 5. CIRCULATION OF *AKAHATA*, 1960~1985

Year	Daily Edition	Sunday Edition	Total
1960	58,000	70,000	128,000
1961	100,000	200,000	300,000
1963	150,000	500,000	650,000
1965	200,000	900,000	1,100,000
1966	200,000	1,000,000	1,200,000
1968	300,000	1,000,000	1,300,000
1970	400,000	1,500,000	1,900,000
1972	550,000	1,950,000	2,500,000
1973	600,000	2,200,000	2,800,000
1974	650,000	2,350,000	3,000,000
1976	650,000	2,500,000	3,150,000
1980	611,000	2,939,000	3,550,000
1981	537,000	2,164,000	2,701,000
1982	613,000	2,901,000	3,514,000
1983(Nov.)	533,000	2,346,000	2,879,000
1984(Nov.)	532,000	2,203,000	2,735,000
1985(Sept.)	?	?	3,000,000

Sources: Hisamitsu Nagada, *Akahata Senryaku* (Tokyo: Kodansha, 1973), p. 30; *Asahi Shimbun*, February 22, 1974; *Asahi Nenkan 1975*; Tsuyoshi Mizushima, *Miyamoto Kenji Taoruru Hi* (Tokyo: Zenboshu, 1985), p. 151 and *Asahi Shimbun*, September 20, 1985.